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Abstract: Measuring the Costs of Voting and their Impacts 
 
Although much literature in political science refers to the costs of voting, they 
have not been comprehensively studied. I develop a new theory of costs based on 
both the tasks needed to vote and their attendant individual-specific trade-offs. I 
then use an original survey to demonstrate that perceived task difficulty measures 
perform well for measuring these costs. Finally, I look at the impact of these costs on 
both validated voter turnout and intention to vote. 
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Chapter	1:	Conceptualizing	and	Measuring	the	Costs	of	
Voting	
	
I.	Introduction	Over	the	last	few	decades,	much	ink	has	been	spilled	over	the	effects	of	various	voting	reforms	and	their	effects	on	voter	turnout.		Some	of	these	reforms	target	registration,	including	the	motor-voter	registration	process	implemented	after	HAVA	and	relaxing	of	registration	deadlines	through	same	day/Election	Day	registration.		Policies	increasing	the	places	and	times	available	to	vote	such	as	early	voting	and	Election	Day	Vote	Centers	(EDVCs)	form	another	type	of	voting	reform	that	has	increased	in	popularity	over	time.		Other	voting	reforms	have	aimed	to	make	voting	more	convenient	by	increasing	access	to	mail	balloting.		These	include	providing	absentee	ballots	without	excuse,	permanent	absentee	lists,	and	at	the	extreme,	universal	vote	by	mail	in	which	every	vote	is	cast	on	a	mailed	ballot.		Finally,	a	recent	push	by	the	Republican	Party	to	reduce	the	risk	of	voting	fraud	resulted	in	some	states	adopting	strict	voter	ID	laws	that	require	showing	state-issued	ID	to	vote.	Most	of	these	reforms	were	adopted	with	the	goal	of	increasing	voter	turnout,	sometimes	accompanied	by	the	desire	to	reduce	the	cost	of	election	administration	as	well.		The	exception	here	is	voter	ID,	for	which	the	laws	have	been	aimed	at	reducing	fraud	(or	decreasing	minority	voter	turnout,	depending	on	who	you	ask).		Regardless	of	lawmakers’	goals	when	adopting	these	reforms,	scholars	examining	the	effects	of	these	laws	have	generally	approached	them	from	the	perspective	of	their	effects	on	the	costs	of	voting.		Registration	reforms,	early	voting,	and	mail-assisted	voting	are	usually	seen	as	reducing	the	costs	of	voting,	while	strict	voter	ID	is	seen	as	increasing	the	costs	of	voting	to	those	without	photo	ID.		To	understand	why	this	framework	is	applied	and	what	it	means,	a	brief	digression	into	the	rational	utility	model	of	voting	is	in	order.		
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I.	i.	Framework:	The	Rational	Model	of	Voting	The	rational	utility	model	of	voting,	which	was	first	developed	by	Downs	(1957)	and	formalized	by	Riker	&	Ordeshook	(1968),	begins	with	the	assumption	that	humans	are	rational	actors	who	pursue	goals	efficiently	through	a	process	of	weighing	utilities	of	actions.		In	this	model,	voters	compare	the	expected	gain	in	utility	of	voting	for	their	preferred	party	against	the	costs	of	casting	this	vote.		In	the	strict	economic	utility	form	of	this	model,	the	benefits	of	voting	are	a	potential	voter’s	expected	utility	benefit	from	his	favored	party	winning	multiplied	by	the	probability	that	he	casts	the	decisive	vote	in	the	election.		If	the	costs	of	voting	are	high,	it	is	rational	for	those	with	low	expected	benefits	to	not	turn	out	to	vote.	Of	course,	since	the	expected	utility	of	a	tie-breaking	vote	is	generally	too	small	to	predict	a	positive	economic	utility	of	turnout	for	almost	all	voters,	scholars	expanded	the	model	beyond	economic	utility	by	adding	a	term	for	“civic	duty”	as	another	benefit	of	voting.		There	are	other	benefits	of	voting	that	could	be	included	as	well,	such	as	the	emotional	value	of	expressing	one’s	views	and	the	social	status	(or	avoided	social	shaming)	granted	by	being	seen	as	a	voter.		Although	including	these	benefits	moves	the	model	beyond	the	original	economic	utility	model,	they	are	not	incompatible	with	a	generalized	model	of	rational	utility	as	long	as	voters	weigh	the	costs	of	voting	against	these	benefits.		A	key	feature	of	this	model	is	that	the	cost-benefit	calculation	is	based	on	the	perceived	costs	and	the	perceived	benefits	to	the	voter	(Aldrich	1993).		The	objective	value	of	a	vote,	or	the	objective	cost	of	casting	it,	do	not	matter	as	much	as	the	voter’s	perception	of	these	costs	and	benefits	and	which	side	of	the	equation	outweighs	the	other.	When	considering	how	voting	reforms	affect	voter	participation,	scholars	have	employed	this	extended	rational	model	of	voting	as	the	mechanism	between	the	policies	and	their	effects.		Voting	reforms	like	mail-assisted	voting	lower	the	costs	of	casting	a	ballot	by,	for	example,	eliminating	the	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polling	place.		As	a	result	of	these	lowered	costs,	some	potential	voters	will	now	perceive	that	the	benefits	of	voting	outweigh	the	costs,	while	before	they	saw	the	
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costs	as	higher.		This	leads	this	group	of	voters	whose	decision	calculus	“flipped”	to	now	turn	out	to	vote,	which	should	increase	overall	voter	turnout.		This	general	theory	is	applied	to	all	forms	of	convenience	voting	reforms,	including	Election	Day	registration,	early	voting,	and	vote	by	mail.		In	the	case	of	strict	voter	ID,	which	is	thought	to	increase	the	costs	of	voting	for	a	sub-population,	the	theory	predicts	lower	turnout	due	to	the	higher	costs	for	some	voters	outweighing	their	perceived	benefits	of	voting.	
II.	Motivation:	The	Puzzle	of	Voting	Reforms	If	we	observed	that	voting	reforms	that	we	think	reduce	costs	consistently	increase	turnout,	and	voting	reforms	that	increase	costs	consistently	decrease	it,	then	this	theory	would	seem	both	a	plausible	and	relatively	complete	explanation	of	the	mechanism	connecting	reforms	to	participation.		However,	the	collection	of	literature	on	this	topic	does	not	consistently	show	the	effects	on	turnout	that	the	rational	theory	predicts.		Studies	on	early	voting	have	found	no	increase	in	turnout	following	the	adoption	of	early	voting	(Leighley	&	Nagler	2013;	Gronke,	Galanes-Rosenbaum,	and	Miller	2007;	Neeley	and	Richardon	2001;	Stein	1998)	and	states	that	have	early	voting	show	lower	turnout	than	others	except	when	they	also	have	same	day	registration	(Burden	et	al.	2014).		Mail-assisted	voting	has	shown	inconsistent	effects	that	include	some	positive	effects	on	turnout	(Menger,	Stein,	&	Vonnahme	2015;	Gerber,	Huber,	&	Hill	2013;	Richey	2008;	Gronke,	Galanes-Rosenbaum,	and	Miller	2007),	but	also	include	null	effects	(Gronke	&	Miller	2012;	Southwell	2009)	and	negative	effects	(Kousser	&	Mullin	2007).		Voter	ID	has	also	shown	a	mixture	of	effects,	with	some	studies	failing	to	find	any	effect	(Alvarez	et	al.	2008;	Ansolabehere	2009;	Mycoff,	Wagner,	&	Wilson	2009)	or	actually	finding	a	backlash	effect	of	increasing	turnout	(Citrin,	Green,	&	Levy	2014).	The	only	type	of	voting	reform	that	has	substantially	increased	turnout	consistently	across	multiple	studies	is	registration	reforms.		More	lenient	registration	deadlines,	where	the	voter	can	register	closer	to	Election	Day,	substantially	increase	voter	turnout	(Wolfinger	&	Rosenstone	1978,	1980;	Leighley	
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&	Nagler	2013).		Motor-voter	and	online	voter	registration	also	have	a	small	positive	effect	on	voter	turnout	(Leighley	&	Nagler	2013;	Franklin	&	Grier	1997;	Knack	1995),	although	there	has	been	some	disagreement	on	the	effects	of	motor-voter	(Martinez	&	Hill	2001).		Further	expanding	the	registration	period	to	include	early	voting	days	and	Election	Day	has	an	additional	positive	effect	(Knack	&	White	2000;	Brians	&	Grofman	2001;	Burden	et	al.	2014).		Why	have	voting	reforms	that	change	registration	policies	had	more	consistently	positive	effects	on	turnout	than	other	voting	reforms?		The	literature	does	not	provide	a	compelling	answer	to	this	question,	other	than	the	primacy	of	registration	to	voting	access.	If	we	assume	that	voting	reforms	are	affecting	the	costs	of	voting,	the	rational	model	of	voting	predicts	clear	effects	on	voter	turnout.		Yet,	most	types	of	voting	reforms	fail	to	consistently	show	these	predicted	effects.		Even	registration	reforms,	which	have	the	most	consistent	findings	of	positive	turnout	effects,	result	in	only	modest	changes	in	turnout	(Brians	&	Grofman	2001;	Highton	2004;	Burden	et	al.	2014).		Why	do	we	not	consistently	observe	substantively	large	changes	in	turnout	from	these	reforms?		There	are	two	possible	reasons	for	these	findings.		One	is	that	the	voting	reforms	are	not	affecting	the	costs	of	voting	substantially.		If	this	is	the	case,	the	costs	of	voting	are	not	changing	enough	to	affect	turnout.		The	other	possibility	is	that	the	reforms	are	affecting	costs,	but	at	the	same	time	are	also	affecting	other	factors	that	affect	voting.		If	this	is	the	case,	then	the	policies	could	decrease	costs	and	make	it	easier	to	vote,	but	could	end	up	reducing	overall	voter	turnout	because	they	also	reduce	the	benefits	of	casting	a	ballot.	Unfortunately,	it	is	very	difficult	to	determine	which	possibility	may	be	creating	the	mixed	findings	on	the	effects	of	voting	reforms.		Studies	on	these	laws	have	generally	treated	the	mechanism	between	the	policy	and	turnout	as	a	“black	box”	and	have	not	examined	the	causal	mechanism	between	the	policy,	costs,	and	turnout.		Instead	of	looking	at	how	much	a	reform	reduces	the	costs	of	voting,	and	then	how	much	that	reduction	increases	turnout,	they	simply	include	voting	reforms	as	dummy	variables	and	look	at	the	effect	of	the	policies	directly	on	turnout.		The	diagram	shown	in	Figure	1a	shows	the	pathway	that	these	studies	purport	to	be	
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testing,	but	Figure	1b	shows	the	pathway	they	actually	test,	which	runs	straight	from	the	policies	to	participation.	
Figure	1a:	Pathway	Purportedly	Tested	
	
Figure	1b:	Pathway	Actually	Tested	
	In	line	with	the	second	possible	reason	listed	above	for	why	we	see	mixed	effects,	there	are	several	pathways	by	which	voting	reforms	may	affect	voter	turnout	that	do	not	run	through	voting	costs.		Figure	1c	shows	these	alternative	pathways.		The	first	is	the	effect	voting	reforms	have	on	the	benefits	of	voting.		In	particular,	voting	reforms	may	decrease	the	ability	of	voters	to	see	others	voting	and	to	be	seen	voting	by	others.		Early	voting	and	EDVCs	reduce	the	likelihood	that	voters	run	into	their	neighbors	at	the	polling	place	due	to	the	multiple	voting	locations	and	their	large,	centralized	nature.		This	reduces	the	ability	for	neighbors	to	monitor	voting	and	comment	on	who	is	being	a	“good	citizen”	and	who	is	not—comparable	to	their	monitoring	and	perceptions	of	who	recycles	(Gerber	et	al.	2015).		Mail-assisted	voting,	and	particularly	universal	VBM,	makes	social	monitoring	almost	impossible.		For	voters	who	are	motivated	by	others’	perceptions	of	their	behavior	and	for	those	who	enjoy	the	social	nature	of	Election	Day,	voting	reforms	can	reduce	or	eliminate	the	social	benefits	of	voting.		Since	these	benefits	
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are	weighed	against	the	costs	of	voting,	this	may	result	in	lower	voter	turnout	even	if	the	voting	costs	decrease	as	well.	
Figure	1c:	All	Pathways	Connecting	Voting	Reforms	to	Turnout	
	Another	alternative	pathway	connecting	voting	reforms	to	voter	turnout	runs	through	the	effect	voting	reforms	have	on	campaign	mobilization	strategies.		Early	voting	and	EDVCs	extend	the	mobilization	period	for	campaigns	that	are	trying	to	bring	voters	to	the	polls,	stretching	their	resources	and	making	neighborhood-based	targeting	more	difficult	(Burden	et	al.	2014).		Mail-assisted	voting	makes	mobilization	efforts	even	harder	because	campaigns	cannot	transport	voters	to	the	polls	and	prevents	them	from	knowing	which	voters	are	worth	targeting,	since	many	may	have	completed	their	ballots	prior	to	Election	Day.		Since	being	asked	to	participate	and	face-to-face	contact	have	large	effects	on	voter	turnout	(Rosenstone	&	Hansen	1993;	Gerber	&	Green	2000),	by	reducing	the	ability	of	campaigns	to	mobilize,	voting	reforms	may	decrease	voter	turnout	even	while	decreasing	costs	(Burden	et	al.	2014).				
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Finally,	it	is	possible	there	are	factors	that	influence	both	states’	levels	of	voter	turnout	and	the	adoption	of	voting	reforms.		For	instance,	states	that	currently	have	Republican	governments	and	see	minority	groups	growing	as	a	percentage	of	the	population	might	enact	strict	voter	ID	policies	to	reduce	minority	turnout	since	these	groups	usually	vote	Democratic.		There	may	also	be	some	factors	about	the	civic	culture	of	states	like	Oregon	that	lead	to	both	high	levels	of	voter	turnout	and	the	early	adoption	of	reforms	like	universal	vote	by	mail.		Since	these	demographic	and	cultural	factors	would	affect	both	the	adoption	of	laws	and	turnout	levels,	they	present	confounding	variables	if	this	graph	is	seen	as	a	directed	acyclic	graph	(Morgan	&	Winship	2007).		To	the	extent	these	factors	that	affect	both	turnout	and	reform	adoption	are	present,	any	estimates	of	the	effects	of	policies	on	turnout	will	be	biased	in	an	unknown	direction.	It	would	be	very	difficult	to	design	a	study	that	tested	the	impact	of	all	of	these	pathways	connecting	voting	reforms	to	voter	turnout.		This	would	require	extensive	information	about	voting	costs,	perceived	benefits	of	voting,	and	campaign	mobilization	tactics	and	utilization,	as	well	as	how	much	each	of	these	is	affected	by	a	particular	policy.		This	is	beyond	the	scope	of	any	one	study,	but	progress	can	be	made	toward	this	larger	picture.		The	first	main	contribution	of	this	project	is	to	illuminate	the	costs	of	voting	and	identify	how	these	costs	can	be	measured.		The	second	is	to	show	how	these	costs	affect	the	probability	of	voting	and	which	costs	have	the	largest	impacts	on	voter	turnout.		Understanding	what	the	costs	are	and	how	to	best	measure	them	is	an	important	prerequisite	for	seeing	how	much	the	costs	of	voting	are	affected	by	voting	reforms.		Revealing	how	much	these	costs	affect	the	probability	of	voting	can	then	generate	predictions	for	how	much	the	impact	of	these	reforms	affecting	costs	should	be.		When	matched	with	information	on	how	much	particular	voting	reforms	affect	costs,	the	effects	of	these	costs	can	reveal	how	much	voting	reforms	affect	turnout	specifically	through	this	pathway.		These	are	the	first	steps	to	understanding	the	larger	picture	of	how	voting	reforms	are	connected	to	voter	turnout.		
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III.	Literature	Review:	How	have	Costs	been	Measured?	The	first	goal	of	this	project	is	to	present	a	new	conceptualization	of	costs.		In	order	to	explain	why	this	is	necessary,	I	must	first	demonstrate	how	scholars	have	conceived	of	costs	in	past	studies	and	why	previous	work	has	been	insufficient.		I	will	begin	with	one	way	in	which	measures	that	are	not	actually	costs	of	voting	have	been	presented	as	viable	proxies	for	these	costs:	socio-economic	status	(SES)	variables.	
III.	i.	The	Resource	Model	and	SES	In	the	literature	on	who	participates	in	civic	society,	Verba	and	Nie	(1972)	developed	the	resource	model	of	participation	to	explain	why	high-SES	people	participate	in	politics	at	higher	rates	than	others.		In	the	resource	model,	which	was	more	fully	developed	in	Brady,	Schlozman,	and	Verba	(1995)	and	related	articles,	SES	provides	people	with	the	resources	they	need	in	order	to	pay	the	costs	of	participation.		For	example,	high-SES	provides	more	free	time,	thus	making	it	easier	for	high-SES	people	to	bear	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote.		Since	they	can	more	easily	bear	this	and	other	costs	like	transportation,	high-SES	people	turn	out	to	vote	more	often	than	others.	As	the	SES	model	developed	into	its	own	theory	of	voter	turnout,	it	became	more	detached	from	the	rational	framework	of	voting	and	the	concept	of	costs.		Instead	of	investigating	the	mechanisms	for	how	the	SES	characteristics	affected	the	voting	calculus,	these	scholars	simply	treated	the	mechanism	as	a	“black	box.”		Many	studies	connected	social	network	status,	education,	and	economic	placement	to	participation,	but	did	not	examine	in	detail	the	reasons	for	why	this	relationship	existed	(for	examples,	see	Verba	&	Nie	1972;	Acock	&	Scott	1980;	Leighley	1990).		Although	these	studies	proposed	that	SES	affects	civic	orientations	and	available	resources,	there	were	no	tests	between	these	explanations	for	the	strong	relationship	between	SES	and	voting.		The	closest	test	present	in	this	literature	is	Verba	and	Nie’s	(1972)	comparison	of	the	correlation	between	SES	and	participation	when	civic	orientations	are	excluded	vs.	when	they	are	controlled	for.		
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Although	this	is	a	weak	test,	it	presented	evidence	that	civic	orientations	mediate	much	of	the	relationship	between	SES	and	voting.	However,	the	dominant	explanation	for	the	SES	model	is	that	socio-economic	status	predicts	the	level	of	resources	that	individuals	possess,	such	as	free	time,	money,	or	civic	skills	(Brady,	Verba,	&	Schlozman	1995).		These	resources	form	the	budget	that	allows	people	to	pay	the	costs	associated	with	political	participation,	and	different	acts	of	participation	carry	different	types	of	costs.		The	resource	model	built	off	both	the	rational	choice	and	the	SES	models	by	pointing	out	that	differing	levels	of	resources	give	individuals	different	abilities	to	pay	the	costs	of	voting.			Although	the	resource	model	has	a	convincing	logic	that	allows	it	to	fit	into	the	rational	choice	model’s	framework,	it	is	subject	to	some	confounding	variables	that	I	believe	detract	from	Brady	et	al.’s	findings.		The	authors	use	family	income	as	a	proxy	variable	for	available	money,	but	this	is	highly	correlated,	if	not	synonymous,	with	SES	(Cho	1999).		They	also	use	educational	attainment	as	a	proxy	for	civic	skills,	which	is	also	highly	correlated	with	SES	(Cho	1999).		Since	the	resource	variables	are	strongly	affected	by	SES,	it	is	not	clear	whether	a	correlation	between	them	and	turnout	is	due	to	resources	themselves	or	comes	from	other	variables	affected	by	SES	that	influence	participation.		There	are	multiple	plausible	pathways	by	which	SES	can	affect	participation	other	than	through	resources—such	as	socialization	of	political	interest	and	civic	duty,	social	pressure	to	be	seen	as	a	voter,	and	differential	mobilization	to	various	SES	groups.		One	of	these	possible	pathways	is	that	placement	in	particular	social	groups	from	SES	factors	might	lead	individuals	to	possess	different	degrees	of	a	sense	of	civic	duty	and	interest	in	politics.		If	wealthier	and	more	educated	people	hold	stronger	norms	of	participation,	these	norms	are	then	transmitted	to	others	in	their	social	networks	(Abrams	et	al.	2010;	Gerber	&	Rogers	2009;	McClurg	2003;	Verba,	Schlozman,	&	Brady	2000;	Kenny	1992).		The	social	pressure	from	ones’	peers	can	have	a	large	effect	on	participation,	and	this	pressure	can	be	seen	as	the	“external	part”	of	civic	duty	(Gerber,	Green,	&	Larimer	2008).		This	story	presents	a	very	
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different	way	of	connecting	SES	to	the	rational	utility	model	than	the	resource	model	of	Brady	et	al.	(1995)—one	that	runs	through	the	“benefits”	side	of	the	rational	voter’s	turnout	equation.	Another	pathway	that	could	connect	the	SES	model	to	the	rational	choice	model	of	participation	runs	through	childhood	socialization.		Since	socio-economic	status	is	passed	down	between	generations,	individuals	with	high	SES	were	likely	raised	in	households	with	high	SES.		If	higher-SES	parents	were	more	likely	to	socialize	their	children	into	the	habit	of	voting,	then	this	would	lead	to	higher	“internal	portions”	of	civic	duty—the	psychological	satisfaction	that	comes	from	contributing	to	the	long-term	benefit	of	voting	to	society	(Westholm	1999;	Knack	1992).		Being	exposed	to	parents	who	are	politically	engaged	can	also	lead	to	higher	levels	of	political	interest	in	children	(Knack	1992;	Bennett	&	Bennett	1989;	Chaffee,	McLeod,	&	Wackman	1973).		This	socialization	can	also	come	through	the	generally	better	educational	opportunities	available	to	higher-SES	individuals.		Although	this	theory	is	very	similar	to	the	network	effects	from	peers,	it	carries	a	slightly	different	implication	regarding	when	the	SES	is	important.		Under	this	theory,	SES	as	a	child	would	predict	participation	better	than	SES	as	an	adult.	There	is	a	third	alternative	pathway	linking	SES	to	participation	which	comes	from	the	differential	exposure	to	mobilization	that	happens	to	individuals	based	on	their	placement	in	a	neighborhood	and	social	network.		Individuals	in	areas	with	more	high-propensity	voters	are	more	likely	to	be	targeted	by	mobilization	appeals	(Rosenstone	&	Hansen	1993;	Huckfeldt	&	Sprague	1992),	and	since	high-SES	individuals	tend	to	vote	more,	high-SES	neighborhoods	should	receive	more	mobilization	messages.		Since	mobilization	is	connected	to	higher	turnout	(Gerber	&	Green	2000;	Arceneaux	&	Nickerson	2009;	etc.),	this	increased	campaign	contact	in	high-SES	areas	could	be	driving	the	relationship	between	SES	and	turnout.		Furthermore,	mobilization	in	these	neighborhoods	can	lead	to	more	peer-to-peer	mobilization	from	neighbors	talking	about	politics	and	signaling	norms	of	participation	in	the	neighborhood.	
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	To	my	understanding,	none	of	these	alternative	mechanisms	connecting	SES	to	participation	have	been	directly	tested,	and	they	have	certainly	never	been	compared	to	the	resource	model	of	Brady	et	al.		One	of	the	goals	of	this	project	is	to	demonstrate	that	SES	factors	are	distinct	from	the	costs	of	voting.		If	SES	factors	do	not	have	a	strong	relationship	with	the	costs	of	voting,	then	the	impact	of	these	factors	on	voter	turnout	is	mostly	attributable	to	the	benefits	of	voting.		I	test	for	these	connections	in	Chapter	3	to	explore	this	possibility.	A	better	conceptualization	of	the	costs	of	voting,	which	I	will	present	in	subsection	IV	of	this	chapter,	begins	by	moving	away	from	the	resources	model	and	the	notion	of	“ability	to	bear	costs.”		Although	SES	may	be	related	to	voting	costs,	this	connection	would	come	through	its	effects	on	the	trade-offs	people	must	pay	to	perform	the	tasks	of	voting.		While	the	resources	theory	says	that	the	costs	themselves	are	mostly	static	and	people	vary	in	their	ability	to	pay	them,	I	argue	that	the	costs	themselves	vary	based	on	individual	characteristics.		Since	these	characteristics	(which	I	detail	in	subsection	IV)	vary	by	life	circumstances	and	the	voters’	environment,	SES	factors	are	likely	poor	proxies	for	these	costs.		
III.	ii.	Studies	Measuring	Specific	Costs	In	a	separate	line	of	literature	from	the	SES	studies,	scholars	have	examined	the	impact	of	specific	voting	costs	on	the	probability	of	voting.		Instead	of	using	survey-measured	proxy	factors	like	SES	or	different	resources	like	free	time,	these	studies	usually	employ	“unobtrusive”	measurements	to	examine	variation	in	a	particular	cost	of	voting.		For	example,	studies	looking	at	the	effect	of	the	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls	have	used	the	distance	between	the	voter	and	his	polling	place	to	see	how	living	farther	away	deters	voting	by	making	transportation	more	difficult.		Instead	of	asking	voters	this	distance	directly,	researchers	calculate	it	from	GIS	software	and	information	from	a	voter	file.		Similarly,	they	use	a	voter	file	to	observe	validated	voting	behavior	and	combine	this	information	to	model	how	distance	affects	the	probability	of	voting.	
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Most	of	the	studies	looking	at	specific	voting	costs	have	focused	on	the	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls	since	this	is	the	most	easily	observable	cost	with	considerable	individual-level	variation.		Using	the	technique	described	above,	scholars	have	found	that	longer	distances	reduce	the	likelihood	of	voting	(Haspel	&	Knotts	2005;	McNulty	2011;	etc.).		The	effect	of	distance	is	mediated	by	impedance,	which	represents	the	difficulty	of	the	route	from	the	voter’s	house	to	the	polls	due	to	traffic,	intersections,	etc.	(Gimpel	&	Schuknecht	2003).		Some	researchers	have	also	used	GIS	to	connect	voter	file	information	to	aggregated	U.S.	Census	information	on	voters’	characteristics.		For	example,	this	allowed	Haspel	&	Knotts	(2005)	to	see	how	neighborhood-level	average	vehicle	access	mediates	the	effect	of	distance.	In	addition	to	examining	how	distance	affects	voter	turnout	by	affecting	travel	costs,	scholars	have	also	used	“natural	experiments”	to	show	how	turnout	declines	when	traveling	becomes	more	difficult.		In	these	studies,	researchers	used	the	presence	of	rain	on	Election	Day,	which	varies	randomly	due	to	natural	factors,	to	proxy	for	how	rain	makes	traveling	to	the	polls	more	difficult.		Most	people	do	not	like	walking	in	the	rain,	and	many	do	not	like	driving	in	the	rain	and	may	avoid	it	for	safety	reasons.		As	a	result,	rain	makes	the	travel	cost	of	voting	higher,	and	turnout	drops	(Persson	et	al.,	2014;	Fraga	&	Hersh,	2010;	Gomez	et	al.,	2007).			Scholars	have	also	used	the	natural	experiments	of	precinct	consolidation	and	re-drawing	of	precincts	to	examine	the	cost	of	finding	the	polling	place.		In	a	traditional	precinct	voting	system,	voters	have	to	know	which	voting	location	is	specifically	assigned	to	their	neighborhood.		Since	many	voters	know	this	location	from	past	voting,	scholars	have	looked	at	the	change	in	turnout	when	voting	locations	change	while	the	voter	has	not	moved.		They	found	that	even	after	controlling	for	distance	changes,	voter	turnout	goes	down	upon	precinct	changes	due	to	the	information	search	cost	required	to	find	the	new	polling	place	(Brady	&	McNulty	2011;	McNulty,	Dowling,	&	Ariotti	2009;	Haspel	&	Knotts	2005;	Dyck	&	Gimpel	2005).	
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Only	one	study	on	the	specific	costs	of	voting	went	beyond	unobtrusive	measurements	to	include	survey	information	relevant	to	these	costs.		Bhatti	(2012)	used	survey	information	on	vehicle	access	and	was	able	to	connect	this	information	to	voter	files	due	to	the	unique	individual-level	survey	data	availability	in	Denmark.		This	technique	revealed	that	the	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls	has	a	larger	impact	on	those	without	vehicle	access,	and	this	cost	goes	up	as	distance	increases.	In	general,	studies	on	the	costs	of	voting	have	rarely	used	survey	data.		This	is	largely	due	to	the	difficulty	of	connecting	survey	information	to	validated	voter	turnout	information.		There	is	one	article	that	uses	survey	information	on	students’	social	opportunities	they	must	forgo	to	vote,	but	it	only	uses	hypothetical	vote	intention	since	connecting	this	information	to	observed	voting	was	not	possible	(Goerres	&	Rabuz	2014).		One	goal	of	this	project	is	to	use	individual-level	information	that	is	only	available	in	surveys	to	measure	costs	more	accurately	than	previous	studies	have	done.		This	dissertation	project	is	the	first	to	collect	information	on	a	large	number	of	cost	factors	and	areas	and	connect	them	to	verified	voter	turnout	information,	and	the	first	to	connect	individual-level	costs	measured	through	surveys	to	verified	voter	turnout	in	the	United	States	context.	
IV.	A	New	Theory	of	Costs	In	the	rational	model	of	voting,	the	act	of	voting	carries	various	costs	that	must	be	paid	in	order	to	cast	a	ballot.		In	deciding	whether	to	turn	out	to	vote,	potential	voters	weigh	their	perceived	benefits	of	voting	against	these	costs	and	will	vote	if	the	expected	benefits	outweigh	the	costs.		Scholars	have	recognized	that	these	benefits	vary	by	individual	based	on	several	factors,	including	a	voter’s	perceived	value	of	her	vote’s	instrumentality	(Aldrich	1993),	her	expected	social	benefits	or	sanctions	(Gerber,	Green,	&	Larimer	2008),	and	her	perceptions	of	the	value	of	voting	as	a	civic	duty	(Riker	&	Ordeshook	1968).		While	the	literature	shows	that	these	benefits	of	voting	vary	by	both	individual	characteristics	and	larger	contextual	factors,	it	has	not	generally	treated	costs	in	the	same	way.		Instead,	institutional-level	voting	reform	policies	have	been	presented	as	proxies	for	costs,	
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such	as	the	presence	of	strict	voter	ID	requirements	(Nielson	2014),	registration	prior	to	Election	Day	(Leighley	&	Nagler	2013),	or	the	presence	of	multiple	days	or	methods	of	voting	(Gerber	et	al.	2014;	Stein	&	Vonnahme	2008).		Even	when	researchers	have	considered	costs	at	the	individual-level,	such	as	the	distance	between	a	voter	and	her	polling	place,	they	have	treated	distance	(or	distance	interacted	with	impedance)	as	the	same	cost	for	all	voters,	regardless	of	vehicle	access	or	other	factors.		Only	one	study	in	a	European	context	actually	included	individual-level	data	on	vehicle	access,	and	no	studies	have	examined	how	the	other	costs	of	voting	are	similarly	influenced	by	individual	characteristics.	In	order	to	be	consistent	with	the	rational	utility	model,	costs	as	well	as	benefits	must	be	seen	as	changes	in	utility	that	accompany	the	act	of	voting.		Since	considering	the	economic	utility	of	an	action	in	the	rational	model	is	a	concept	that	only	exists	hypothetically	inside	of	peoples’	minds,	the	gains	and	losses	in	utility	from	an	action	cannot	be	measured	directly	and	objectively.		They	are	inherently	subjective	perceptions	of	people,	and	different	people	will	consider	the	same	cost	factor	in	different	ways.		Costs	or	gains	may	be	measureable	in	terms	of	tangible	concepts	like	“spending	an	hour	of	time,”	analogous	to	the	money	a	child	must	spend	to	buy	a	toy.		However,	the	gain	in	utility	that	is	associated	with	the	child’s	purchase	cannot	be	measured	directly,	as	it	exists	solely	as	enjoyment	in	the	mind	of	the	child.		For	instance,	this	toy	may	bring	intense	happiness	to	a	particular	boy	for	a	week,	but	for	his	sister	the	toy	might	be	ignored	altogether.		In	the	same	way,	the	loss	of	utility	from	spending	the	money	on	the	toy	cannot	easily	be	quantified	because	it	only	exists	as	a	set	of	trade-offs	that	the	child	internally	considers	about	what	else	he	could	buy	with	that	money.		If	the	boy	has	twice	as	much	weekly	allowance	money	as	his	sister,	the	trade-offs	he	must	make	to	buy	the	toy	should	seem	smaller	and	less	salient	for	him	than	they	seem	for	her.		Although	this	analogy	may	seem	odd	when	looking	at	the	costs	of	voting,	it	demonstrates	how	the	costs	of	performing	actions	vary	based	on	individual	circumstances	like	resources	and	perceived	trade-offs.		I	argue	that	voting	is	similar	in	that	an	outside	observer	cannot	objectively	
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measure	the	benefits	and	the	costs	without	accounting	for	the	voter’s	perceptions	of	them.	 The	benefits	of	voting	in	the	rational	utility	model	are	generally	considered	to	be	the	voter’s	utility	gain	from	her	preferred	candidate	winning	the	election.		In	entering	the	utility	model,	these	utility	benefits	are	mediated	by	the	probability	that	the	voter’s	ballot	is	the	decisive	vote	that	determines	the	outcome	of	the	election.			How	can	we	measure	this	utility?		For	individual	issues,	like	tax	policy,	we	may	be	able	to	calculate	the	difference	in	expected	utility	between	one	candidate’s	policies	and	the	other’s	(e.g.,	the	income	difference	from	paying	more	taxes	under	one	set	of	policies).		However,	this	calculation	becomes	much	more	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	when	multiple	policies	are	considered	in	conjunction.		How	does	the	gain	in	utility	from	lower	taxes	weigh	against	the	loss	of	utility	from	neglecting	infrastructure	maintenance?		What	if	we	add	changes	in	liberties	like	gun	control	into	the	equation?		How	do	we	calculate	one’s	change	in	utility	from	surrendering	a	gun,	much	less	combine	it	with	other	issues	to	identify	their	overall	utility	from	one	candidate	winning?		Since	policy	platforms	include	many	issues	for	which	it	is	difficult	to	measure	their	utility,	it	is	essentially	impossible	to	calculate	a	person’s	benefits	of	voting	from	objective	measures	of	policies.		The	only	way	to	observe	this	change	in	utility	would	be	to	ask	the	voter	directly	and	record	their	perceived	overall	benefits.	In	the	same	way	that	the	totality	of	benefits	from	a	voter’s	preferred	candidate	winning	cannot	be	converted	into	dollar	amounts,	the	costs	of	voting	cannot	be	measured	directly	from	objective	factors	like	distance	to	the	polls	or	time	spent	voting.		These	factors	certainly	influence	the	voter’s	perceived	costs,	but	they	are	not	the	costs	themselves.		In	my	re-conceptualization	of	costs,	these	factors	form	the	first	dimension	of	voting	costs.		This	dimension	consists	of	the	tasks	that	must	be	performed	in	order	to	vote,	which	are	determined	by	the	voter’s	environment.		The	environmental	factors	that	shape	the	tasks	dimension	include	the	voter’s	geographic	setting,	including	urbanization	and	transportation	access,	and	her	institutional	setting,	which	is	composed	of	various	voting	and	registration	laws.		For	example,	a	
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voter	who	must	register	one	month	before	Election	Day	faces	a	more	difficult	transaction	task	he	must	perform	than	a	voter	in	another	state	that	allows	registration	on	the	same	day	as	voting.		As	another	example,	a	voter	who	must	wait	in	line	for	two	hours	faces	a	harder	waiting	task	than	one	who	can	walk	in	and	vote	right	away.		Regardless	of	the	voter’s	characteristics,	each	of	these	tasks	can	be	objectively	ranked	as	more	or	less	difficult	by	an	outside	observer.		The	tasks	dimension	has	received	the	vast	majority	of	the	attention	in	the	literature	on	the	costs	of	voting,	but	it	is	usually	treated	as	the	costs	themselves	instead	of	just	one	dimension	that	shapes	individual-level	costs.	The	second	dimension	of	the	costs	of	voting	is	composed	of	the	individual’s	trade-offs	(also	known	as	opportunity	costs)	that	she	must	forgo	in	order	to	perform	the	tasks	of	voting.		These	trade-offs	are	determined	by	the	voter’s	individual	life	choices	like	marital	status	and	having	children,	by	uncontrollable	personal	factors	like	age	or	disability,	and	by	other	circumstances	like	vehicle	access	or	public	transportation	availability.		Consider	the	task	of	registering	to	vote	one	month	before	Election	Day.		This	can	be	an	onerous	task	for	people	without	internet	access	or	knowledge	of	their	election	office,	since	they	must	engage	in	a	difficult	information	search	to	find	out	how	to	register.		This	same	task	could	be	relatively	easy	for	someone	with	knowledge	of	how	to	contact	their	local	election	official	or	who	has	the	internet	access	and	skills	that	enable	him	to	find	the	information.		As	another	example,	traveling	a	mile	to	the	polls	is	relatively	easy	for	a	voter	with	a	car,	costing	only	a	few	minutes,	a	small	amount	of	gas,	and	other	almost	negligible	costs.		However,	the	trade-offs	needed	to	travel	a	mile	for	a	disabled,	elderly	voter	without	a	vehicle	are	much	higher	and	may	involve	paying	for	a	taxi	or	relying	on	the	goodwill	of	others	to	transport	them.	As	they	enter	the	economic	utility	calculation	of	the	rational	utility	model,	the	costs	of	voting	are	created	from	a	combination	of	both	the	task	dimension	and	the	trade-off	dimension.		For	example,	distance	from	a	voter	to	the	polling	place	has	no	direct	impact	on	whether	one	votes	by	itself,	but	it	does	have	an	impact	when	considered	in	combination	with	a	voter’s	available	transportation	options.		
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Similarly,	waiting	in	line	has	no	impact	on	its	own,	but	it	does	influence	voting	when	a	person’s	activities	they	must	sacrifice	in	order	to	stand	in	line	are	considered.		For	an	hourly	worker,	the	trade-off	may	involve	sacrificing	a	couple	hours’	worth	of	pay	in	order	to	wait	in	line.		For	a	stay-at-home	mother,	the	trade-off	may	involve	finding	a	babysitter	for	her	children.		For	a	retired	person,	however,	the	trade-off	for	waiting	may	be	negligible	since	he	is	not	sacrificing	pay	and	does	not	require	childcare	services.	Of	course,	if	these	task	dimension	factors	are	measured	as	proxies	of	individual	voting	costs,	they	will	likely	show	a	relationship	with	the	level	of	voter	turnout	across	a	population.		However,	this	aggregate-level	relationship	is	hiding	the	real	variation	in	trade-offs	that	people	within	the	electorate	face	in	order	to	perform	the	tasks	of	voting.		Looking	at	costs	as	the	combination	of	tasks	and	trade-offs	creates	a	much	clearer	measure	of	the	loss	in	utility	that	accompanies	voting,	providing	researchers	with	a	clear	conception	of	costs	with	which	they	can	measure	both	costs	themselves	and	the	costs’	effects	on	the	peoples’	likelihood	of	voting.	
V.	The	Tasks	of	Voting	The	various	costs	of	voting	can	be	grouped	together	into	four	main	tasks	that	a	potential	voter	must	complete	in	order	to	vote.		Each	of	these	tasks	can	be	seen	as	independent	and	separable	from	the	others,	and	in	most	states	a	voter	must	complete	all	of	them	in	order	to	successfully	cast	a	ballot.		Each	task	is	a	necessary,	but	not	sufficient,	condition	for	voting.		These	tasks	are	registering	to	vote,	finding	time	to	vote,	locating	the	polling	place,	and	traveling	to	the	polls.		
V.	i.	Registering	to	Vote	In	the	United	States,	the	first	task	that	a	voter	must	complete	is	registration.		The	process	of	registering	to	vote	differs	by	state,	where	some	states	allow	internet-based	registration	and	others	only	allow	mailed	applications.		States	also	differ	in	terms	of	when	voters	can	register	to	vote,	with	some	allowing	Election	Day	registration	while	others	have	deadlines	weeks	ahead	of	Election	Day.		As	discussed	
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in	the	literature,	the	task	of	registering	to	vote	mostly	requires	information.		A	voter	must	know,	first	of	all,	that	she	must	register	first	to	be	eligible	to	vote.		This	requires	a	minimal	but	not	universally	present	knowledge	of	the	political	system	in	the	U.S.		Secondly,	the	voter	must	know	where	to	obtain	the	registration	application,	when	the	deadline	for	submitting	the	application	is,	and	how	to	submit	the	application	to	the	relevant	office.		While	most	potential	voters	are	probably	aware	of	the	need	to	register,	many	of	them	are	probably	less	informed	about	their	states’	process	for	registering.		One	could	then	see	the	task	of	registering	to	vote	as	composed	of	two	sub-tasks:	obtaining	the	relevant	information	regarding	how	to	register,	and	then	obtaining,	filling	out,	and	submitting	the	application.	The	first	sub-task	of	registering,	that	is,	obtaining	the	necessary	information	on	the	application	process,	has	been	the	focus	of	most	of	the	literature	on	the	cost	of	registering	to	vote.		Often,	studies	such	as	Timpone	(1998)	have	used	education	or	a	measured	scale	of	political	information	as	a	proxy	variable	for	having	this	specific	bureaucratic	information.		This	makes	sense	because	highly	politically	informed	and	highly	educated	people	are	more	likely	to	know	where	to	find	this	information	and	how	to	obtain	it.		The	highly	politically	informed	are	probably	already	aware	of	this	process,	having	likely	registered	in	the	past	already.		Someone	who	is	highly	educated	but	not	politically	savvy	may	not	know	where	to	find	the	information,	but	his	education	gives	him	resources	(like	experience	with	bureaucracy)	that	make	the	task	easier	for	him	(Brady	et	al.	1995).			Of	course,	registering	also	requires	the	sub-task	of	submitting	the	application	as	well,	which	in	the	past	was	considerably	more	difficult	(Highton	2004;	Rosenstone	&	Hansen	1993).		After	the	adoption	of	HAVA,	many	voters	now	register	through	the	“motor-voter”	process	at	their	local	DMV	or	through	online	internet-based	registration	systems.		Motor-voter	registration	laws	come	“close	to	eliminating	registration	as	a	separate	activity	with	its	own	costs”	(Teixeira	1992)	since	they	allow	for	people	to	register	without	any	planning	or	a	separate	trip	to	a	government	agency.		Still,	when	voters	move	addresses	or	their	registrations	expire,	they	often	have	to	register	at	a	time	when	they	do	not	need	to	access	the	DMV.		In	12	
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states,	the	only	way	to	do	so	is	either	in-person	at	a	government	agency	or	by	sending	a	mailed	voter	registration	application	that	must	be	received	by	several	weeks	before	Election	Day.		In	these	states,	registering	outside	of	a	DMV	requires	the	substantial	tasks	of	printing	out,	filling	out,	and	mailing	a	form	or	of	driving	to	a	government	agency	during	work	hours.		Thirty-eight	other	states	allow	online	registration,	but	this	still	requires	filling	out	an	online	form	several	weeks	prior	to	the	election.		In	13	other	states,	this	task	can	be	performed	on	Election	Day	or	early	voting	days	at	voting	centers,	effectively	eliminating	this	task	and	its	costs	entirely.	
V.	ii.	Finding	Time	to	Vote	For	potential	voters	who	have	completed	their	prerequisite	registration	tasks,	the	next	cost	of	voting	they	must	fulfill	is	finding	time	to	vote.		By	“finding	time	to	vote,”	I	mean	identifying	a	period	of	time	in	which	the	other	tasks	of	voting	may	be	performed	and	preventing	scheduling	conflicts	with	this	period	of	time.		For	example,	a	single	mother	who	works	during	the	day	might	need	to	take	off	an	hour	from	work	to	travel	to	her	polling	place	and	vote	before	picking	up	her	child	from	daycare.		Regardless	of	when,	where,	and	how	a	voter	casts	her	ballot,	the	task	of	identifying	a	period	of	time	in	which	to	perform	the	other	tasks	of	voting	must	be	completed.		For	a	voter	fortunate	enough	to	live	in	one	of	the	three	states	with	universal	vote	by	mail	systems,	this	task	can	be	relatively	easy	because	it	can	involve	any	time	when	the	voter	is	at	home.		She	can	simply	fill	out	her	ballot	during	any	free	time	at	home	and	place	it	in	her	mailbox	to	cast	her	ballot.		This	makes	identifying	a	time	to	vote	easy	since	free	time	at	home	is	relatively	abundant	and	the	voter	can	stop	and	re-start	the	process	at	any	point.		The	flexibility	of	when	she	fills	out	her	ballot	allows	for	her	pick	from	many	different	times	to	find	the	one	with	the	lowest	trade-offs	and	therefore	the	lowest	costs.	With	the	exception	of	absentee	voters,	those	in	the	47	other	states	must	identify	a	time	in	which	they	can	travel	to	the	polls,	wait	in	line,	and	cast	their	ballots	in	voting	booths.		For	voters	in	the	34	states	that	allow	early	voting,	finding	this	time	is	easier	than	in	states	with	only	Election	Day	voting	since	these	voters	can	
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choose	from	a	variety	of	days	in	which	to	identify	their	time	to	vote.		A	voter	in	an	early	voting	state	like	Texas	who	works	on	weekdays	can	choose	to	vote	on	a	Saturday	or	Sunday	instead,	or	can	plan	to	stop	by	the	polls	after	work	on	any	day	of	the	two	weeks	leading	up	to	Election	Day.		By	contrast,	a	voter	in	a	state	like	Pennsylvania,	which	only	allows	Election	Day	voting,	must	find	a	chunk	of	time	on	one	particular	day	in	which	he	can	cast	his	ballot.		This	makes	the	task	of	finding	time	more	difficult	because	of	the	lack	of	flexibility	over	when	the	voter	must	set	aside	this	time.	There	is	also	a	search	cost	surrounding	finding	time	to	vote,	in	that	voters	must	be	aware	of	which	times	they	can	legally	ballot.		Although	early	voting	provides	flexibility	in	voting	times,	it	also	carries	a	higher	search	cost	since	voters	must	access	the	Internet	or	another	resource	to	identify	when	they	can	ballot.		On	the	other	hand,	this	cost	is	essentially	eliminated	for	VBM	states	since	voters	are	unconstrained	on	when	they	fill	out	their	ballots.		Even	for	voters	who	drop	off	mailed	ballots	in-person,	counties	often	provide	24-hour	drop-boxes	that	allow	them	to	submit	their	ballots	at	any	time.	
V.	iii.	Locating	the	Voting	Place	Citizens	who	want	to	vote	need	to	know	where	they	must	go	in	order	to	cast	their	ballots.		For	everyone	except	for	mail-assisted	voters,	this	involves	identifying	a	physical	location	they	must	travel	to	in	order	to	vote.		Voters	who	use	absentee	ballots	or	who	live	in	universal	VBM	states	do	not	have	to	find	this	location	because	they	can	simply	mail	their	ballots	to	the	county	using	the	instructions	included	with	their	ballots.	Voters	in	most	states,	and	those	who	did	not	or	could	not	request	an	absentee	ballot,	must	travel	to	a	polling	location	during	a	time	when	the	polls	are	open	in	order	to	cast	a	ballot.		In	most	in-person	voting	systems,	often	called	“traditional	precinct	voting,”	voters	are	assigned	a	single	location,	often	close	to	their	homes,	at	which	they	can	vote.		For	any	voter	who	has	not	used	their	neighborhood	precinct	location	before,	for	those	who	do	not	remember	where	they	
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voted	previously,	or	for	voters	whose	precinct	location	changed,	they	must	find	out	where	their	particular	precinct	is	assigned	to	vote.		This	information	is	publically	available	on	the	Internet	and	by	contacting	the	election	officials’	offices,	but	voters	must	be	aware	of	these	resources	and	know	how	to	access	this	information.		For	voters	who	have	been	in	the	same	precinct	over	many	elections,	this	location	often	stays	constant,	eliminating	the	“search	cost”	of	identifying	where	to	vote.		The	cost	of	locating	the	polling	place	can	be	substantial	enough	to	decrease	turnout	when	precinct	locations	change	due	to	consolidation	or	splitting	of	precincts	(Brady	&	McNulty	2004;	Haspel	&	Knotts	2005).			Even	in	systems	with	multiple	centralized	locations	voters	can	choose	from,	like	early	voting	and	EDVCs,	voters	still	have	to	know	what	their	options	are	and	figure	out	the	location	most	convenient	for	them.		Since	these	locations	may	change	over	time	and	are	not	as	proximate	to	the	voter,	EDVCs	require	a	search	cost	that	may	be	higher	than	for	precinct	voting.		Potential	voters	have	to	access	a	website	or	some	other	information	source	that	informs	them	about	which	locations	are	available	to	vote	at.	
V.	iv.	Traveling	to	the	Polls	Those	potential	voters	who	successfully	identified	and	set	aside	a	time	to	vote	must	also	identify	where	they	need	to	go	to	vote	and	physically	travel	there,	which	presents	another	area	of	voting	costs.			For	voters	in	universal	VBM	states,	transportation	cost	is	essentially	eliminated	since	the	voting	location	is	the	voter’s	home	or	wherever	else	he	chooses	to	fill	out	his	ballot.		Although	most	VBM	systems	provide	a	location	for	in-person	ballot	return,	voters	have	the	option	to	just	put	a	stamp	on	the	ballot	and	mail	it	back.		Voters	under	VBM	systems	would	face	this	cost	only	if	they	decide	to	return	their	ballots	in	person	rather	than	mail	them	back.		Voters	in	states	with	no-excuse	absentee	policies	or	permanent	absentee	lists	can	also	mail	their	ballots	back	to	avoid	travelling	to	the	polls.		However,	these	voters	must	request	an	absentee	ballot	
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first	(or	sign	up	for	a	permanent	absentee	status),	which	requires	planning	ahead	of	time	to	register	for	this	ballot.	While	traditional	voting	precinct	locations	are	chosen	to	be	close	to	where	voters	live,	this	distance	can	still	provide	a	substantial	obstacle.		Due	to	their	low	population	density,	rural	areas	often	have	large	distances	between	voters	and	their	assigned	locations.		Urban	areas	can	also	face	accessibility	difficulties	from	traffic,	lack	of	parking,	and	impediments	to	straight-line	travel	like	freeways	that	can	only	be	crossed	at	certain	locations.		While	precinct	voting	locations	are	usually	assigned	due	to	their	proximity	to	voters’	homes,	this	is	not	always	the	most	convenient	location	for	the	voter.		For	example,	a	voter	who	works	long	shifts	during	the	day	might	not	be	near	her	home	except	for	early	in	the	morning	or	late	at	night,	necessitating	travelling	from	her	workplace	during	a	lunch	break.	Some	jurisdictions	have	moved	toward	another	model	of	polling	places	that	relies	on	employing	a	number	of	easily	accessible,	well-staffed	large	locations.		These	locations,	known	as	Election	Day	Vote	Centers	(EDVCs),	allow	voters	to	ballot	at	any	of	the	EDVCs	in	their	county	rather	than	one	assigned	location.		They	are	typically	designed	to	be	convenient	by	their	proximity	to	workplaces,	shopping	centers,	and	areas	of	dense	population	(Stein	&	Vonnahme	2008).		While	these	locations	afford	the	voter	more	flexibility	in	terms	of	where	she	can	vote,	they	are	usually	further	from	voters’	homes	than	traditional	precinct	locations	and	almost	always	require	some	form	of	vehicular	transportation	to	access.			
VI.	Factors	Influencing	the	Difficulty	of	Voting	Tasks	For	the	individual	voter,	each	of	the	tasks	of	voting	present	costs	that	she	must	“pay”	in	order	to	cast	a	ballot.		Of	course,	these	costs	are	not	directly	paid	in	the	form	of	monetary	transfers	or	anything	similar.		Rather,	the	costs	that	the	voter	faces	are	the	trade-offs	she	must	make	in	order	to	perform	these	tasks.		The	relevant	question	to	the	potential	voter	is,	“what	must	I	sacrifice	in	order	to	perform	this	task?”		This	is	a	question	we	are	all	familiar	with,	as	we	make	sacrifices	with	every	decision	we	make	throughout	any	given	day.		For	example,	an	hour	spent	cooking	
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dinner	is	an	hour	that	could	have	been	spent	watching	TV	and	ordering	delivery	instead.		How	a	voter	perceives	the	costs	of	voting	is	inherently	shaped	by	his	perceptions	of	what	he	must	“trade”	to	perform	the	tasks	to	vote.		The	following	subsections	detail	the	factors	that	shape	these	trade-offs.	
VI.	i.	Experience	Experience	with	the	voting	process	primarily	affects	the	information	component	of	the	tasks,	sometimes	called	the	“search	cost”	or	“information	cost.”		For	example,	citizens	who	have	previously	registered	to	vote	at	another	address	will	likely	find	it	easier	to	register	again	since	they	are	aware	of	the	requirement	and	know	how	to	submit	an	application.		Even	people	who	move	from	another	state	with	a	different	registration	process	will	face	an	easier	task	in	registering	since	they	are	at	least	aware	of	the	requirement	well	in	advance	of	the	election.	Experience	reduces	information	costs	by	providing	two	tools	to	potential	voters:	expectations	and	knowledge.		An	example	of	experience	providing	expectations	is	that	people	who	were	registered,	but	move	and	need	to	re-register,	are	aware	of	the	need	to	register	again	before	they	can	vote.		They	also	have	some	expectation	of	the	registration	due	date,	or	at	least	that	it	is	several	weeks	before	Election	Day.		Experience	also	provides	knowledge	to	voters	that	reduces	search	costs	because	they	do	not	need	to	find	all	the	information.		For	example,	a	voter	who	has	previously	submitted	a	mailed	registration	application	might	remember	this	process	and	how	to	obtain	and	submit	the	application,	which	means	she	doesn’t	have	to	search	for	this	information.	The	determinants	of	experience	are	generally	the	number	of	voting	experiences	and	the	applicability	of	these	experiences.		Voting	once	previously	in	the	same	precinct	may	be	more	valuable	than	previously	voting	twice	in	another	precinct	or	in	different	types	of	elections.			Experience	helps	reduce	the	information	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	by	providing	expectations	about	the	amount	of	time	needed	to	vote.		While	new	voters	might	rely	on	media	estimates	or	peers’	accounts	of	their	wait	times,	those	who	have	
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voted	many	times	before	have	past	experiences	to	generate	their	expectations	from.			This	is	especially	true	for	voters	who	have	remained	at	the	same	residence	for	many	election	cycles	since	the	experiences	at	different	polling	places	will	vary	more	than	at	the	same	location	over	several	comparable	elections.	Experience	is	particularly	useful	for	the	tasks	of	locating	and	traveling	to	the	polling	place	for	voters	who	have	stayed	at	the	same	residence.		Since	election	officials	usually	keep	the	same	polling	locations	for	precincts	over	time,	habitual	voters	do	not	need	to	engage	in	an	information	search	to	find	out	where	to	vote.		On	a	more	detailed	level,	they	may	also	remember	the	best	way	to	get	there,	including	which	bus	route	to	take	or	where	to	park.	Within	the	framework	of	tasks	and	trade-offs,	one	mechanism	by	which	experience	affects	the	difficulty	of	tasks	is	by	eliminating	the	smaller	“sub-tasks”	associated	with	information	searches.		If	a	potential	voter	does	not	have	to	search	to	find	out	how	to	register	to	vote	or	where	her	polling	location	is,	her	costs	of	registering	and	traveling	to	the	polls	are	lower	because	these	sub-tasks	are	eliminated.		Experience	can	also	affect	the	difficulty	of	tasks	by	enabling	the	voter	to	make	more	accurate	predictions	regarding	expected	travel	times,	wait	times,	and	overall	difficulty	of	tasks.		If	a	voter	can	predict	with	a	high	degree	of	certainty	that	traveling	to	the	polls	and	waiting	in	line	will	only	take	45	minutes,	she	does	not	have	to	allocate	as	much	time	to	vote	as	a	voter	who	is	less	certain.		This	reduces	the	expected	difficulty	of	these	tasks,	which	affects	behavior	since	the	“true”	difficulty	is	unknown	until	the	task	is	completed.		Even	if	a	voter	with	less	experience	who	planned	to	take	2	hours	would	only	actually	need	45	minutes,	she	still	perceived	the	costs	of	voting	to	be	higher	based	on	her	prediction	of	2	hours	and	may	be	less	likely	to	vote	as	a	result.	
VI.	ii.	Employment	Situation	A	person’s	employment	situation	consists	of	his	employment	status	(employed	vs.	un-employed	or	retired)	as	well	as	the	characteristics	of	his	job,	including	how	many	hours	he	works	and	when,	whether	he	receives	paid	time	off	
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work,	and	the	flexibility	of	his	schedule.		Out	of	these	factors,	being	currently	employed	is	the	easiest	to	measure	and	is	the	dividing	factor	that	probably	makes	the	largest	difference	in	shaping	the	difficulty	of	the	voting	tasks.		The	characteristics	of	the	job	then	shape	the	trade-offs	that	the	person	faces	when	deciding	whether	to	vote.		However,	these	characteristics	are	likely	to	affect	the	difficulty	of	these	tasks	in	a	combinatory	manner	rather	than	individually.		For	example,	a	potential	voter	who	works	only	10	hours	per	week	might	still	find	this	is	a	barrier	to	voting	if	these	10	hours	fall	on	Election	Day,	his	schedule	is	inflexible,	and	he	receives	no	paid	time	off	work.	The	method	by	which	the	employment	situation	affects	costs	is	by	shaping	the	trade-offs	associated	with	the	task	of	finding	time	to	vote.		Voters	who	are	unemployed	or	retired	still	must	complete	the	same	tasks	as	those	who	work,	but	they	will	face	fewer	sacrifices	they	must	make	to	complete	these	tasks.		A	full-time	employee	at	a	desk	job	who	receives	paid	vacation	and	has	a	flexible	schedule	faces	sacrificing	a	few	hours	of	vacation	time	to	cast	her	ballot.			This	is	a	larger	trade-off	than	a	retired	person	faces	to	vote,	but	it	is	also	substantially	less	than	the	trade-off	faced	by	someone	who	receives	no	paid	vacation	and	has	a	less	flexible	schedule,	such	as	an	employee	in	the	service	industry.		If	an	employee	at	a	fast	food	restaurant	is	scheduled	to	work	on	Election	Day,	she	may	find	it	very	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	take	time	off	for	voting.		This	employee	would	likely	have	to	sacrifice	several	hours	of	pay	if	the	shift	could	not	be	re-scheduled,	assuming	that	her	boss	would	let	her	take	this	time	off.		Some	employees	with	very	inflexible	schedules	would	face	the	very	large	trade-off	of	getting	fired	for	leaving	their	shift	without	permission.	The	first	determinant	of	the	relevance	of	a	person’s	employment	situation	to	these	trade-offs	is	whether	a	person	is	scheduled	to	work	on	Election	Day	(or	in	early	voting	states,	during	the	times	of	early	voting).		This	is	most	applicable	if	the	person	is	supposed	to	work	during	all	of	the	voting	hours,	or	at	least	a	substantial	majority	of	them.		Employees	who	work	busy	schedules	on	other	days	or	who	do	not	work	might	have	to	sacrifice	their	leisure	time	to	vote,	but	they	would	not	face	the	same	employment	trade-offs.	
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Assuming	the	employee	has	to	work	during	most	of	the	voting	hours,	the	next	determinant	of	employment	trade-offs	is	the	flexibility	of	the	employee’s	schedule.		At	the	extreme,	an	inflexible	schedule	could	require	the	loss	of	one’s	job	to	vote.		If	the	schedule	is	flexible	enough	to	permit	the	employee	to	leave	work,	then	the	factor	of	lost	income	becomes	important.		If	the	employee	can	receive	time	off	work	relatively	easily,	then	whether	or	not	she	receives	paid	vacation	or	can	re-schedule	her	shift	determines	whether	the	employee	faces	a	monetary	cost	of	lost	income	from	taking	this	time	to	go	vote.	
VI.	iii.	Educational	Situation	A	potential	voter’s	educational	situation	is	defined	as	whether	she	is	currently	attending	school	and	whether	she	has	scheduled	classes	during	voting	hours.		Like	her	employment	situation,	this	area	of	trade-offs	primarily	affects	the	cost	associated	with	the	task	of	finding	time	to	vote.	The	main	determinant	of	how	one’s	education	affects	the	trade-offs	associated	with	finding	time	to	vote	is	having	classes	or	labs	during	voting	hours.		If	a	student	has	classes	during	most	of	the	time	that	polls	are	open,	then	the	flexibility	of	this	time	becomes	relevant.		Students	in	large	lecture	hall	classes	where	the	instructor	does	not	take	attendance	have	more	flexibility	to	miss	these	classes	than	those	who	have	required	labs	or	small	classes	with	discussion	points.		Although	other	factors	like	homework	could	be	considered	potentially	relevant,	this	work	is	generally	flexible	and	therefore	only	represents	trade-offs	with	leisure	activities.		The	trade-offs	associated	with	missing	class	can	range	from	the	minimal	cost	of	getting	notes	from	a	peer	for	a	class	with	no	attendance	policy	to	the	maximum	cost	of	failing	a	class	due	to	missing	a	required	lab	or	exam.	
VI.	iv.	Living	Situation	Peoples’	living	situation	includes	many	different	factors,	but	the	one	most	relevant	to	the	trade-offs	associated	with	voting	tasks	is	whether	a	voter	is	a	caretaker	for	one	or	more	dependents.		People	who	are	not	employed	and	not	attending	school	still	face	a	number	of	responsibilities	they	must	fulfill	on	a	daily	
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basis,	including	preparing	and	providing	food	and	other	various	types	of	housework	tasks.		For	those	with	dependents	such	as	children,	the	physically	or	mentally	impaired,	or	elderly	relatives,	these	tasks	also	include	caretaking.		While	most	tasks	of	self-	and	home-maintenance	like	preparing	food	are	flexible	in	when	they	are	performed,	caretaking	is	often	a	24-hour	constant	responsibility.		For	example,	young	children	cannot	be	left	at	home	alone	for	any	amount	of	time,	and	elderly	adults	with	Alzheimer’s	also	cannot	be	left	unattended.	The	living	situation	(or	caretaker	status)	primarily	affects	the	trade-offs	associated	with	finding	time	to	vote,	although	it	can	also	affect	the	trade-offs	attendant	to	traveling	to	the	polls.		Children	can	sometimes	accompany	adults	to	vote	and	would	not	be	prevented	from	entering	the	polling	booth	with	their	parents,	so	a	stay-at-home	mother	may	be	able	to	watch	them	at	the	same	time	as	she	casts	her	ballot.		However,	bringing	a	child	still	adds	to	the	overall	difficulty	of	the	task	by	making	it	more	stressful,	creating	a	trade-off	between	a	quiet	day	at	home	vs.	risking	one’s	toddler	having	a	meltdown	in	public.		Bringing	a	child	to	vote	also	creates	more	trade-offs	for	traveling	to	the	polls	by	requiring	a	safe	form	of	transportation	for	the	child	as	well	as	the	parent.	In	many	cases,	being	a	caretaker	requires	a	potential	voter	to	locate	and	provide	an	alternative	caretaker	for	the	time	he	needs	to	go	vote.		In	many	cases,	such	as	with	an	elderly	parent,	the	dependent	person	cannot	accompany	the	voter	to	the	polling	place	and	into	the	voting	booth.		In	situations	like	these,	a	voter	must	have	a	friend,	relative,	or	paid	caretaker	watch	the	dependent	while	they	travel	to	the	polls	and	vote.		Imposing	on	others	to	help	out	or	the	process	or	locating	a	babysitter	or	caretaker	can	impose	a	substantial	amount	of	stress,	which	creates	a	trade-off	compared	to	staying	at	home	with	little	stress.		In	the	cases	of	paid	help,	this	can	also	impose	a	monetary	burden	on	the	primary	caretaker.	
VI.	v.	Transportation	Access	A	voter’s	access	to	transportation	affects	the	trade-offs	associated	with	traveling	to	the	polls.			Voters	who	have	a	vehicle	available	and	can	drive	themselves	
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to	the	polls	generally	face	smaller	trade-offs	to	travel	than	those	who	do	not.		The	former	group	can	drive	themselves	to	the	polls,	paying	only	the	cost	of	the	time	needed	to	travel	and	the	small	cost	of	the	gasoline	and	vehicle	maintenance	for	the	miles	they	drive.		For	this	group,	the	primary	factor	shaping	the	trade-offs	with	getting	to	the	polls	is	travel	time,	which	is	a	function	of	both	distance	to	the	polls	and	impedance	(difficulty	of	the	route	due	to	traffic,	intersections,	etc.).	The	latter	group	must	figure	out	other	ways	to	get	to	the	voting	place,	including	walking,	biking,	public	transportation,	taxis	and	ride-sharing	apps,	or	getting	a	ride	with	someone.		For	them,	the	trade-offs	will	be	larger	as	the	number	of	options	and	the	convenience	of	these	options	decreases.		Voters	who	have	a	bus	stop	on	the	corner	that	takes	them	right	to	the	polling	place	face	only	small	trade-offs	of	the	time	and	bus	fare	to	travel.		Similarly,	voters	who	can	use	Uber	or	Lyft	can	simply	call	a	ride	and	only	trade-off	the	time	to	travel	and	the	cost	of	the	ride.	Registered	voters	without	accessible	public	transportation	and	who	do	not	use	or	have	access	to	ride-sharing	apps	might	be	left	with	only	walking	to	the	polls.		The	trade-offs	associated	with	walking	or	biking	are	shaped	by	the	distance	the	voter	is	to	the	polls	as	well	as	by	the	person’s	physical	condition.		A	competitive	runner	would	have	no	problem	traveling	a	few	miles	on	foot	to	vote,	but	a	disabled	person	who	uses	a	wheelchair	would	likely	find	it	extraordinarily	difficult	to	travel	there	without	a	vehicle.	
VII.	Conclusion	Previous	literature	on	the	costs	of	voting	has	either	relied	on	SES	variables	as	proxies	for	costs	per	the	resource	model,	or	has	looked	at	a	few	individual	costs	separately.		I	have	not	identified	any	studies	that	have	attempted	to	comprehensively	measure	the	different	costs	of	voting	and	their	impacts	on	voter	turnout.		One	of	the	goals	of	this	project	is	to	provide	an	accounting	of	these	different	costs	and	to	examine	their	impacts	on	the	probability	that	registered	voters	turn	out	to	cast	ballots.	
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In	order	to	fully	understand	the	costs	of	voting,	we	must	first	adopt	a	cost-benefit	rational	utility	framework.		Since	the	costs	and	benefits	both	vary	to	each	specific	voter	based	on	his	or	her	experiences,	circumstances,	and	personality,	we	must	account	for	individual	variation	in	costs	as	well	as	benefits.		Costs	enter	the	utility	model	by	individuals	perceiving	the	trade-offs	they	must	make	in	order	to	perform	the	tasks	needed	to	vote.		Since	costs	will	vary	by	both	the	tasks	themselves	as	well	as	the	trade-offs	or	opportunity	costs	voters	must	face	to	perform	them,	a	proper	accounting	of	the	costs	of	voting	will	include	measures	of	both	the	specific	tasks	(registration,	finding	the	polls,	traveling	to	the	polls,	and	finding	time	to	vote)	and	voters’	trade-offs,	which	are	shaped	by	individual-specific	factors	like	employment	and	job	flexibility.		In	the	next	chapter,	I	detail	how	I	created	an	original	survey	to	measure	perceived	voting	costs,	the	difficulty	of	the	tasks	necessary	to	vote,	and	the	individual-specific	trade-offs	needed	to	perform	these	tasks.		I	also	provide	descriptive	statistics	on	all	the	measures	that	I	will	use	in	the	subsequent	chapters.		 	
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Chapter	2:	An	Original	Survey	Measuring	the	Costs	of	
Voting	
I.	Introduction	In	order	to	measure	all	of	the	types	of	costs	associated	with	voting,	we	need	survey	data	that	contains	information	on	potential	voters’	tasks	needed	to	vote	(e.g.	how	far	do	they	have	to	travel	to	the	polls)	as	well	as	information	relating	to	their	trade-offs	associated	with	those	tasks.		For	example,	if	a	potential	voter	has	a	vehicle	and	drivers’	license,	the	trade-offs	attendant	with	the	task	of	traveling	to	the	polling	place	are	relatively	small	compared	to	another	potential	voter	without	vehicle	access.		For	the	person	with	the	car,	the	trade-offs	would	include	the	marginal	gas	and	maintenance	cost	of	traveling	in	the	vehicle,	and	parking	costs,	and	the	time	needed	to	drive	to	the	polling	place.		However,	for	the	person	who	has	no	car,	the	distance	to	the	polling	place	causes	different	trade-offs,	including	typically	longer	travel	time,	the	cost	of	public	transportation,	or	the	physical	exertion	of	walking	to	the	location.		We	need	survey	information	that	asks	about	all	the	relevant	factors	that	shape	these	trade-offs	as	well	as	the	tasks.	Unfortunately,	there	are	no	publicly	available	surveys	that	contain	this	type	of	data	on	both	the	tasks	and	the	factors	affecting	their	associated	trade-offs.		Some	of	the	tasks	can	be	measured	unobtrusively,	for	instance	by	using	a	voter	file	and	geographical	information	systems	(GIS)	to	calculate	the	distances	between	voters	and	their	polling	places.		Similarly,	past	researchers	have	used	changes	in	the	institutional	setting,	such	as	a	re-assignment	of	polling	places,	to	proxy	for	the	cost	of	figuring	out	where	to	vote.	However,	these	unobtrusive	measures	do	not	include	the	personal	information	that	is	needed	to	know	what	the	trade-offs	for	the	voters	are.		Due	to	this	lack	of	existing	survey	information,	I	created	and	fielded	a	unique	survey	measuring	factors	that	affect	both	tasks	and	trade-offs	for	voting	costs.	 	
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II.	Creating	an	Original	Survey	Due	to	the	lack	of	available	data	on	both	of	the	cost	dimensions,	I	created	and	fielded	an	original	survey	prior	to	the	November	2016	general	election	designed	to	measure	three	of	the	main	areas	of	voting	costs,	namely	knowing	where	and	how	to	vote,	traveling	to	the	polling	place,	and	finding	the	time	to	vote.		The	cost	of	the	registration	task	is	excluded	due	to	the	research	design	and	population	of	survey	respondents,	which	I	will	explain	further	in	the	next	subsection.		To	connect	the	survey	information	with	verified	turnout	information,	I	sampled	from	a	registered	voter	file	in	order	to	match	subjects’	responses	with	validated	voting	records	for	the	2016	general	election.		
II.	i.	Survey	Design	and	Context	For	my	original	survey	on	the	costs	of	voting,	I	drew	the	sample	of	respondents	by	starting	with	the	registered	voter	list	for	the	state	of	Pennsylvania.		I	drew	my	respondents	from	the	registered	voter	file	for	several	reasons.		Using	the	voter	file	provided	me	with	some	information	about	the	respondents	that	I	might	not	have	been	able	to	ask	about	directly,	such	as	the	person’s	name,	age,	address,	gender,	and	party	affiliation.		It	also	allowed	me	to	easily	match	respondents	to	their	validated	voting	records	after	the	election.		This	is	a	critical	characteristic	of	these	data	that	allows	me	to	measure	the	impact	of	these	voting	costs	on	actual,	objectively	measured	voter	turnout.		Although	I	cannot	measure	the	costs	of	registration	since	I	am	only	looking	at	voters	who	already	registered,	this	method	provided	enough	other	advantages	that	this	omission	must	be	tolerated.		Furthermore,	thanks	to	reforms	such	as	motor-voter	policies,	these	costs	are	relatively	minimal	compared	to	the	costs	of	voting	itself,	and	increasing	registration	would	not	necessarily	increase	turnout	(Highton	2004).	I	chose	to	use	subjects	only	from	Pennsylvania	since	it	is	one	of	the	only	states	with	the	combination	of	no	early	voting	and	no	ability	to	vote	absentee	by	mail	without	having	a	valid	excuse.		Valid	excuses	include	traveling	out	of	the	jurisdiction	on	Election	Day	and	disability,	but	do	not	include	the	elderly	by	default.		
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These	characteristics	mean	that	all	voters	are	faced	with	relatively	comparable	voting	tasks	of	traveling	to	the	polling	place	on	Election	Day,	rather	than	voting	at	their	own	convenience	or	filling	out	a	mailed	ballot	at	home.		Using	one	state	for	the	data	source	also	made	it	easier	to	obtain	the	registered	voter	file	to	recruit	respondents	and	annotated	voting	histories	for	the	subjects.	
II.	ii.	Survey	Solicitation	and	Responses	In	order	to	recruit	the	subjects,	I	obtained	registered	voter	files	from	the	state	and	sent	postcards	to	voters	with	a	message	soliciting	them	to	fill	out	an	online	survey.		To	encourage	participation,	I	provided	a	small	monetary	incentive	of	$5	Amazon.com	gift	cards	to	those	who	completed	the	survey.		Figure	2a	shows	the	front	design	of	the	postcard,	and	Figure	2b	shows	the	back	of	the	postcard.		The	back	includes	a	brief	solicitation,	the	website	URL	to	begin	the	survey,	and	a	five-letter	code	that	was	unique	to	each	respondent.	
Figure	2a:	Front	of	Postcard	
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Figure	2b:	Back	of	Postcard	
	In	total,	I	randomly	selected	35,000	registered	voters	to	receive	postcards	with	survey	solicitations	from	the	Pennsylvania	voter	file	that	I	retrieved	in	October	2017.		To	ensure	my	sample	was	not	composed	of	only	frequent	voters	who	were	might	underestimate	the	difficulties	of	the	voting	tasks,	I	oversampled	on	recently	registered	voters.		I	did	this	by	randomly	selected	half	(17,500)	of	the	solicited	population	from	voters	who	registered	between	2015	and	2016,	and	the	other	half	from	voters	who	registered	prior	to	2015.		I	spent	considerable	effort	cleaning	up	the	address	information	for	these	35,000	voters	to	ensure	they	would	receive	the	postcards.		However,	the	printing	and	mailing	company	informed	me	that	700	addresses	were	rejected	by	the	postal	service,	so	these	voters	were	skipped.		In	total,	I	sent	postcards	to	34,300	registered	voters,	and	of	these	postcards	approximately	600	were	returned	as	undeliverable,	meaning	that	around	33,700	postcards	reached	potential	respondents.		The	postcard	requested	for	subjects	to	go	to	a	website	and	fill	out	an	online	survey,	using	
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a	unique	login	code	for	each	respondent	which	allowed	me	to	match	the	survey	responses	to	the	voter	file.		The	survey	was	conducted	through	the	internet-based	service	QuestionPro.com.		This	website	allowed	me	to	set	up	a	unique	login	for	each	respondent,	employ	branching	logic	in	the	survey	questions,	and	provide	gift	cards	as	rewards	to	respondents.	In	total,	I	received	800	responses	for	a	response	rate	of	2.37%.		This	rate	could	have	been	higher	given	other	circumstances,	but	two	main	factors	limited	my	response	number.		First,	due	to	delays	with	the	printing	company	the	registered	voters	received	the	surveys	less	than	a	week	before	Election	Day,	rather	than	two	weeks	before	as	planned.		Second,	and	more	importantly,	I	had	to	cap	the	responses	at	800	due	to	limited	funding	for	the	Amazon	gift	cards.		I	received	all	of	the	respondents	my	budget	could	afford	after	just	4	days	in	the	field.		Of	the	800	responses,	786	could	be	successfully	matched	to	the	voter	file	after	the	election.		Of	these	respondents,	19	of	them	reported	that	they	already	voted	through	using	absentee	ballots.		This	leaves	766	valid	respondents	that	could	be	used	to	estimate	the	costs	of	voting	and	their	effects.			This	survey	used	two	different	techniques	for	assessing	the	costs	of	voting:	specific	questions	measuring	tasks	and	difficulty,	and	general	questions	on	the	perceived	difficulty	of	the	tasks.		The	specific	questions	were	included	both	to	measure	the	impacts	of	the	specific	factors	influencing	tasks	as	well	as	to	test	if	the	general	questions	are	sufficient	to	capture	the	costs	of	voting.	
II.	iii.	Survey	Questions:	The	Perceived	Difficulty	of	Voting	As	I	described	in	detail	in	Chapter	1,	the	factors	that	shape	both	the	tasks	and	the	trade-offs	of	voting	vary	at	the	individual	level.		These	individual-specific	opportunity	costs	of	performing	the	tasks	of	voting	are	difficult	to	measure	since	they	depend	on	a	large	number	of	factors	about	a	person’s	daily	life,	including	his	commitments,	resources,	and	responsibilities.		Although	I	also	included	many	specific	questions	to	attempt	to	measure	all	the	factors	shaping	voters’	opportunity	costs,	it	is	very	likely	that	I	left	out	relevant	questions	since	personal	circumstances	
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vary	in	a	number	of	ways.		However,	since	the	respondents	are	acutely	aware	of	their	own	circumstances,	they	should	be	able	to	better	estimate	and	compile	these	opportunity	costs	themselves	if	properly	primed	to	think	about	the	tasks.	In	order	to	see	if	respondents’	perceptions	of	costs	perform	as	well	or	better	than	measuring	specific	cost	factors,	I	included	perceived	cost	questions	for	each	voting	task	as	well	as	for	overall	voting.		The	survey	included	four	questions	on	the	perceived	difficulty	of	voting,	one	of	which	asked	about	overall	perceived	difficulty	and	the	other	three	asking	about	the	difficulty	of	each	task.		For	the	text	of	the	specific	questions,	see	questions	V5,	V6,	V9,	and	V11	in	Appendix	A.		Since	most	voters	may	not	think	of	these	actions	as	having	“costs,”	I	framed	them	in	terms	of	“difficulty	/	convenience.”		The	responses	were	given	by	a	four-point	scale	from	“very	easy	/	convenient”	to	“very	difficult	/	inconvenient.”		To	encourage	respondents	to	think	about	the	factors	shaping	these	tasks’	difficulties,	I	included	some	examples	of	the	factors	that	could	shape	these	costs	in	the	wording	of	the	questions.		I	wanted	respondents	to	be	primed	to	think	about	performing	these	tasks	in	order	to	receive	sensible	answers.		However,	I	placed	these	questions	prior	to	the	questions	on	each	specific	factor	to	avoid	respondents	from	feeling	guided	toward	a	particular	type	of	response.	If	my	theory	about	the	different	areas	of	costs	is	accurate,	then	the	specific	cost	factor	questions	should	relate	to	overall	costs	and	to	voting	only	through	the	perceived	cost	(difficulty)	questions.		In	other	words,	the	perceived	difficulty	of	each	task	should	subsume	all	of	the	specific	factors	that	I	theorize	influence	this	cost.		Figure	3	shows	the	structure	of	this	theory	graphically.		Chapter	3	measures	how	these	factors	relate	to	each	other	to	demonstrate	that	this	structure	of	dividing	voting	costs	into	the	three	tasks	is	accurate.		In	Chapter	3,	I	also	conduct	analysis	to	see	whether	or	not	the	specific	factors	need	to	be	measured	in	order	to	capture	the	costs	of	voting,	or	if	the	perceived	cost	questions	are	sufficient.		
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Figure	3:	Theorized	Structure	of	Voting	Costs	
	
II.	iv.	Survey	Questions:	Objectively	Measuring	Specific	Costs	I	followed	each	of	the	perceived	cost	questions	by	asking	about	specific	factors	that	I	expected	would	influence	the	cost	of	each	task,	as	well	as	overall	voting	as	an	overarching	task.		Of	course,	I	was	limited	by	the	survey	length	and	by	the	breadth	of	my	own	thinking	in	which	factors	I	included.		In	hindsight,	I	can	think	of	some	questions,	like	asking	about	disabilities,	that	I	should	have	included.		I	did	my	best	at	the	time	of	the	survey’s	creation	to	think	of	and	include	as	many	relevant	factors	as	I	could.		To	describe	these	questions,	I	first	categorize	them	by	the	task	of	voting	that	the	factor	applies	to.	
II.	iv.	a.	Task:	Locating	the	Polling	Place	The	perceived	difficulty	question	for	locating	the	polling	place	(V6)	included	a	response	category	for	“I	already	know	where	to	go	to	vote.”		This	category	allowed	respondents	to	show	that	this	task	is	essentially	irrelevant	to	them,	since	they	already	possessed	the	knowledge	of	where	they	are	assigned	to	vote.		I	did	not	
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follow	up	with	any	additional	specific	questions	on	the	factors	that	could	make	this	information	search	more	costly.		In	order	to	complete	the	survey,	respondents	had	to	know	how	to	use	the	internet	and	basic	computer	skills,	so	asking	about	these	was	unnecessary.		In	retrospect,	asking	respondents	how	skilled	they	are	at	using	Google	and	navigating	websites	would	provide	valuable	information	on	the	difficulty	of	information	searches.		For	this	project,	the	perceived	difficulty	question	combined	with	prior	knowledge	represented	the	totality	of	the	factors	I	measured	on	locating	the	polling	place.	
II.	iv.	b.	Task:	Traveling	to	the	Polls	A	number	of	questions	measured	factors	that	I	expected	would	influence	the	costs	of	traveling	to	the	polling	place	to	vote.			The	first	question	I	asked	about	traveling	(V7)	inquired	about	where	the	respondent	would	be	during	the	day	on	Election	Day.		This	question	mostly	served	to	prime	respondents	for	thinking	about	getting	to	the	polls	from	the	location	they	will	be	at.		I	followed	this	question	with	how	long	the	respondent	thought	it	would	take	them	to	travel	to	their	polling	place	(V8).		This	question	assumes	the	respondent	knows	where	their	voting	location	is,	but	provides	a	heuristic	of	two	miles	away	for	those	who	do	not	know	where	they	vote.		There	are	other	ways	to	get	at	travel	difficulty	like	distance	and	impedance,	but	since	both	of	these	factors	influence	travel	time,	this	measure	should	also	represent	these	concepts.		The	perceived	difficulty	question	(V9)	followed	these	first	two	questions,	allowing	the	respondent	to	have	location	and	transportation	considerations	foremost	in	her	mind	when	she	answered	the	perceived	cost	question.	After	some	questions	about	waiting	in	line	and	finding	time	to	vote,	the	survey	asked	about	other	transportation	factors	such	as	whether	the	respondent	has	a	current	driver’s	license	(V12)	and	access	to	a	vehicle	on	a	Tuesday	(V13).		For	respondents	who	answered	no	to	either	question,	these	questions	were	followed	by	a	series	of	questions	on	alternative	transportation	options.		They	were	first	asked	about	whether	they	use	public	transportation	(V14),	which	addresses	both	its	
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availability	and	accessibility	in	one	question.		If	respondents	said	they	use	public	transportation,	they	were	then	asked	how	difficult	it	is	to	use	these	services	to	“get	around	town”	(V15).		These	questions	were	followed	by	similar	questions	about	whether	respondents	use	Uber	or	ride-sharing	services	(V16)	and	how	accessible	these	services	are	(V17).			In	retrospect,	this	survey	could	have	been	improved	by	adding	questions	on	disabilities	to	the	travel	task	questions.		Voters	who	are	disabled	might	have	more	difficulty	driving	and	getting	themselves	into	the	polling	place	from	their	cars,	even	with	ADA-compliant	facilities.		A	question	on	walking	speed	or	physical	disability	should	probably	be	included	in	any	future	survey	asking	about	traveling	to	the	polling	place.	
II.	iv.	c.	Task:	Finding	Time	to	Vote	The	cost	area	that	the	largest	amount	of	the	survey’s	questions	focused	on	was	finding	time	to	vote.		The	first	question	on	this	area	of	voting	costs	asked	about	the	respondent’s	expected	wait	time	(V10).		Since	waiting	in	line	consumes	the	largest	percentage	of	time	for	the	overall	task	of	voting,	this	question	is	attempting	to	measure	the	difficulty	of	the	task	itself—the	more	time	needed,	the	more	difficult	it	is	to	find	the	time.		I	also	asked	respondents	how	much	they	dislike	waiting	in	lines	(V30).		For	those	who	like	to	talk	to	their	neighbors	or	listen	to	music	while	waiting,	standing	in	line	may	not	be	as	odious	as	it	seems	to	others,	representing	a	difference	in	trade-offs	for	the	same	task.	I	tried	three	different	approaches	for	understanding	the	trade-offs	inherent	in	setting	aside	time	to	vote.		The	first	approach	used	an	analogous	activity	to	voting	that	doesn’t	carry	the	same	social	desirability	as	voting	to	see	how	costly	this	time	is	to	the	respondent.		Question	V32	asked	respondents	if	they	could	get	someone	to	wait	in	line	at	the	Department	of	Motor	Vehicles	(DMV)	for	them,	how	much	would	they	pay?		This	question	is	intended	to	measure	respondents’	opportunity	cost	of	time	directly	by	seeing	how	much	they	would	pay	per	hour	for	someone	to	perform	a	time-costly	activity.	
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The	second	approach	I	used	to	measure	respondents’	trade-offs	with	time	was	asking	about	respondents’	responsibilities	in	their	lives.		The	idea	behind	these	questions	is	that	people	with	more	daily	tasks	like	childcare	and	working	will	find	it	harder	to	set	aside	time	to	vote	due	to	their	busy	schedules.		Question	V18	asks	about	whether	the	respondent	is	working,	followed	by	how	many	hours	per	week	(V19).		These	questions	are	followed	by	the	flexibility	of	the	worker’s	schedule	(V20),	and	the	times	they	work	in	a	typical	day	(V21).		To	measure	the	other	types	of	important	responsibilities	voters	have,	I	also	asked	whether	the	respondent	is	in	school	(V24)	and	whether	he	takes	care	of	children	or	other	dependents	(V27).			The	third	approach	I	employed	to	measure	respondents’	opportunity	cost	of	time	was	by	asking	about	what	they	are	doing	on	a	typical	Tuesday.		Since	all	voters	in	Pennsylvania	(except	for	absentee)	must	cast	their	ballots	on	Election	Day,	these	questions	ask	about	what	responsibilities	they	usually	have	on	a	Tuesday.		Rather	than	measuring	the	overall	“busy-ness”	of	a	schedule	like	the	second	approach,	this	approach	intends	to	measure	the	opportunity	costs	that	come	with	the	voter	leaving	his	designated	duties	for	part	of	the	day	to	go	vote.		To	get	at	this	concept,	question	V21	asks	the	respondent	what	times	she	works	on	a	typical	Tuesday.		Similarly,	V25	asks	about	classes	and	labs	on	Tuesdays,	and	V28	asks	about	watching	children/dependents	on	Tuesdays.			When	considering	the	opportunity	cost	of	leaving	responsibilities	for	a	period	of	time,	the	flexibility	of	these	responsibilities	is	important.		A	stay	at	home	parent	who	can	rely	on	a	cheap	babysitter	faces	a	cheaper	“time	cost”	than	one	who	can’t	leave	her	child	alone	or	take	her	along.		Question	V29	asks	about	how	difficult	it	is	for	caretakers	to	find	someone	else	to	take	their	duties.		For	students,	V26	asks	a	similar	question	about	the	difficulty	of	skipping	class.		When	workers	are	scheduled	and	need	to	leave	work,	the	difficulty	of	leaving	work	matters	as	well.		Question	V22	asks	how	difficult	it	is	to	find	time	off	work,	and	V23	inquires	if	the	respondent	would	be	paid	for	this	time	off.	
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II.	v.	Other	Questions		In	addition	to	the	questions	measuring	both	the	perceived	costs	and	specific,	objective	factors,	I	asked	a	few	additional	questions	that	allow	me	to	test	relationships	between	different	concepts.		First,	I	asked	about	respondents’	intention	to	vote	in	the	election	that	was	only	a	few	days	away	(V1).		I	included	this	question	since	the	relationship	between	the	costs	of	voting	and	vote	intention	has	not	received	much	attention	in	the	literature.		There	are	only	a	few	studies	that	examine	the	difference	between	reported	voting	intention	vs.	validated	voting	behavior,	and	none	of	these	studies	look	at	the	impact	of	voting	costs	differentially	on	these	two	measures	(Ansolabehere	&	Hersh	2012).		This	question	allows	me	to	look	at	whether	and	to	what	degree	the	costs	of	voting	are	included	in	the	development	of	vote	intention.		I	also	asked	about	past	voting	frequency	(V2)	to	see	if	frequent	voters	might	be	more	likely	to	over-report	voting	intention	and	to	see	if	the	costs	impact	frequent	voters	less	than	others.	I	also	asked	a	few	demographic	questions	about	respondents’	children	(V36	and	V37)	and	their	race/ethnicity	(V35).		These	questions	allow	me	to	see	if	different	racial	and	ethnic	groups	perceive	the	costs	of	voting	differently,	and	if	having	children	causes	people	to	perceive	some	costs	as	higher.		I	also	asked	about	respondents’	living	situation	(homeownership)	in	V34,	their	household	income	in	V38,	and	their	education	in	V33.		These	questions	measure	socio-economic	status	(SES),	allowing	me	to	see	how	much	SES	influences	the	costs	of	voting.		By	looking	at	the	relationship	between	SES	factors	and	voting	costs,	I	can	see	how	much	of	the	SES	effect	on	voting	goes	through	high	SES	making	costs	“easier	to	bear”	(or	in	my	framework,	by	affecting	the	trade-offs	dimension	of	the	costs)	vs.	how	much	of	the	SES	effect	might	be	explained	through	other	factors.	
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III.	Descriptive	Statistics	on	the	Respondents	
III.	i.	Demographics	of	Respondents	Although	the	solicitation	to	participate	in	the	survey	was	given	randomly	to	registered	voters	in	Pennsylvania,	the	relatively	low	response	rate	(2.37%)	means	that	the	survey	respondents	are	not	a	random	sample	of	the	population	of	registered	voters.		There	is	some	sort	of	selection	process	that	influenced	whether	people	responded	to	the	survey,	and	unfortunately	this	process	cannot	be	directly	observed.		Because	of	this	unobserved	selection	bias,	it	is	important	to	understand	how	the	sample	from	my	survey	compares	to	the	population	of	registered	voters	in	Pennsylvania.	Tables	1	through	7	show	descriptive	statistics	on	the	respondents	of	the	survey.		Some	of	the	demographic	measures	for	the	survey	sample	can	be	matched	with	data	from	the	35,000	solicited	registered	voters	to	see	how	much	the	response	bias	affects	the	sample	demographics.		Table	1	compares	the	survey	sample	to	the	solicited	population	for	gender,	Table	2	compares	the	age	distributions	of	the	populations,	and	Table	3	shows	the	voting	frequencies	of	the	respondents	and	compares	them	to	the	verified	voting	rate	for	the	2016	general	election.		As	Table	1	shows,	the	sample	is	evenly	balanced	between	men	and	women,	although	there	is	a	lot	of	missing	data	on	this	variable.		Table	2	shows	the	survey	respondents	skew	slightly	younger	than	the	solicited	sample,	but	only	by	a	small	amount.		In	the	survey	sample,	69.05%	of	the	respondents	are	under	50	years	old,	compared	with	62.55%	of	the	solicited	population.		This	is	partially	a	result	of	my	over-sampling	on	recently	registered	voters,	who	tend	to	be	younger	than	established	registrants,	but	may	also	be	due	to	younger	people	having	more	technological	skills	enabling	them	to	complete	the	online	survey	easier.			
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Table	1:	Gender	of	Respondents	
Gender	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Solicited	Sample	Male	 244	 31.85%	 27.97%	Female	 240	 31.33%	 30.51%	Unknown	 83	 10.84%	 12.46%	Missing	Data	 199	 25.98%	 29.07%	
	
Table	2:	Age	of	Respondents	
Age	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Solicited	Sample	Less	than	20	 56	 7.31%	 7.34%	20	to	30	 224	 29.24%	 26.97%	30	to	40	 152	 19.84%	 15.27%	40	to	50	 97	 12.66%	 12.97%	50	to	60	 107	 13.97%	 14.45%	60	to	70	 87	 11.36%	 12.27%	70	to	80	 37	 4.83%	 6.71%	80	to	90	 5	 0.65%	 3.19%	90	to	100	 0	 0.00%	 0.79%	Over	100	 1	 0.13%	 0.03%		 Tables	3	to	8	show	the	remaining	demographic	measures	that	could	not	be	compared	to	the	solicited	population	since	the	measures	are	not	included	in	the	voter	file.		As	Table	3	shows,	the	vast	majority	(82%)	of	the	respondents	are	Anglo,	with	the	majority	of	the	others	fairly	evenly	split	between	African	American,	Hispanic,	and	Asian.		The	percentage	of	white	respondents	corresponds	to	the	demographics	of	Pennsylvania	residents	(79%	non-Hispanic	white),	and	the	minority	numbers	are	not	far	off,	although	with	fewer	African	American	respondents	than	would	be	expected.		However,	it	is	unclear	how	these	numbers	
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compare	to	the	population	of	registered	voters	in	Pennsylvania	since	race	and	ethnicity	are	not	included	in	the	voter	information.		
Table	3:	Race	and	Ethnicity	of	Respondents	
Race	or	Ethnicity	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	White	or	Anglo	 632	 82.51%	Black	or	African	American	 41	 5.35%	Hispanic	or	Latino	 35	 4.57%	Asian	or	Pacific	Islander	 34	 4.44%	Native	American	or	Alaskan	Native	 4	 0.52%	Other	 20	 2.61%		Table	4	shows	a	slight	majority	of	the	respondents	have	a	bachelor’s	degree	or	higher,	which	is	substantially	more	than	the	average	of	37.10%	for	registered	voters.		However,	the	respondents’	income	distribution	appears	similar	to	the	national	registered	voter	population’s	distribution.		Table	5	reveals	that	41%	of	respondents	earn	more	than	$70,000	in	household	income.		When	this	is	compared	to	census	information	on	the	registered	voter	population,	it	appears	slightly	lower	than	average,	although	the	income	classes	are	not	exactly	equivalent	(43.20%	of	registered	voters	had	>	$75,000	in	income).		A	slightly	higher	percentage	of	survey	respondents	had	incomes	under	$30,000	compared	to	the	registered	voter	population	(14.49%	compared	to	11.44%).		A	slight	majority	of	the	respondents	also	own	their	houses,	although	a	substantial	portion	(18%)	live	with	their	parents	or	other	family	in	their	homes.				 	
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Table	4:	Education	of	Respondents	
Highest	Level	of	
Education	
Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Less	than	9th	grade	 3	 0.39%	10th	grade	 1	 0.13%	11th	grade	 3	 0.39%	12th	grade,	no	HS	diploma	 7	 0.91%	High	school	graduate	or	equivalent	 125	 16.32%	Some	college,	no	degree	 144	 18.80%	Associate	degree	 69	 9.01%	Bachelor’s	degree	 238	 31.07%	Master’s	degree	 116	 15.14%	Professional	school	degree	 32	 4.18%	Doctoral	degree	 28	 3.66%	
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Table	5:	Income	of	Respondents	
Household	Income	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Less	than	$10,000	 34	 4.44%	$10,000	to	$30,000	 77	 10.05%	$30,000	to	$50,000	 113	 14.75%	$50,000	to	$70,000	 126	 16.45%	$70,000	to	$90,000	 84	 10.97%	$90,000	to	$120,000	 96	 12.53%	$120,000	to	$150,000	 48	 6.27%	$150,000	to	$180,000	 29	 3.79%	$180,000	to	$210,000	 26	 3.39%	Above	$210,000	 31	 4.05%	I	don’t	know	 28	 3.66%	I	prefer	not	to	answer	 74	 9.66%	
	
Table	6:	Homeownership	and	Housing	of	Respondents	
Housing	Situation	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Own	my	home	 400	 52.22%	Rent	my	home	 181	 23.63%	In	a	dorm	or	other	community	housing	 34	 4.44%	With	parents	or	other	family	in	their	home	 138	 18.02%	In	an	assisted	care	facility	or	nursing	home	 1	 0.13%	Other	 12	 1.57%	
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Table	7:	Respondents’	Numbers	of	Children	under	12	
Number	of	Children	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	No	children	under	12	 563	 73.50%	One	child	 99	 12.92%	Two	children	 70	 9.14%	Three	children	 24	 3.13%	Four	children	 10	 1.31%	More	than	four	children	 0	 0%		
Table	8:	Respondents’	Numbers	of	Children	between	12	and	18	
Number	of	Children	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	No	children	over	12	 630	 82.25%	One	child	 91	 11.88%	Two	children	 37	 4.83%	Three	children	 5	 0.65%	Four	children	 3	 0.39%	More	than	four	children	 0	 0%		Overall,	it	appears	that	the	sample	is	slightly	biased	toward	subjects	with	higher	education	levels	than	the	average	Pennsylvanian	registered	voter,	but	not	toward	those	earning	higher	incomes—in	fact,	there	is	a	slight	bias	toward	lower	income	voters.		Depending	on	how	one	looks	at	SES,	this	suggests	two	opposing	types	of	biases	since	SES	includes	both	income	and	education.		If	the	sample	is	more	educated	but	lower	income,	is	it	higher	SES	than	the	population?		If	one	believes	that	the	sample	is	biased	toward	higher-SES	respondents,	it	is	possible	that	the	costs	of	voting	may	be	under-estimated.		Lower-SES	registered	voters	may	face	higher	voting	costs	due	to	less	flexible	working	schedules	and	less	access	to	vehicles.		
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Further	research	on	the	demographics	is	needed	to	see	if	this	bias	exists	and	to	what	extent	it	affects	the	data.	
III.	ii.	Descriptive	Statistics	on	Voting	and	Voting	Intention	Table	9	reports	descriptive	statistics	on	the	percentage	of	respondents	who	reported	intending	to	vote	in	the	November	2016	election.		The	vast	majority	of	the	respondents	(95%)	reported	intending	to	vote	in	the	election	and	only	1.6%	reported	not	intending	to	vote,	with	the	remainder	uncertain.		Table	10	shows	that	the	largest	observed	difference	between	the	survey	sample	and	the	randomly	selected	solicitation	population	is	in	the	rate	of	voting.		Almost	90%	of	the	survey	respondents	voted	in	the	2016	election	compared	to	just	over	63%	of	the	solicited	population.		Although	I	do	not	have	information	on	voting	frequency	for	the	non-respondents,	a	vast	majority	of	respondents	(81.6%)	reported	voting	at	least	once	every	four	years	and	66.72%	of	the	respondents	reported	voting	at	least	once	every	two	years,	which	is	a	larger	amount	than	expected.		It	seems	that	frequent	voters	are	more	likely	to	have	responded	to	my	survey	than	less	frequent	voters,	which	may	bias	my	estimates	of	the	voting	costs	downward.		However,	just	over	15%	reported	having	never	voted	before,	likely	due	to	the	survey’s	oversampling	of	newly	registered	voters.	
Table	9:	Voting	Intention	of	Respondents	
Voting	Intention	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Yes	 730	 95.30%	Maybe	 16	 2.09%	No	 12	 1.57%	I	don’t	know	 8	 1.04%			 	
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Table	10:	Voting	History	of	Respondents	
Voting	Since	2011	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Solicited	Sample	Voted	in	2016	G.E.	 689	 89.95%	 63.16%	More	than	once	a	year	 142	 18.54%	 	At	least	once	a	year	 232	 30.29%	 	At	least	once	every	two	years	 137	 17.89%	 	At	least	once	every	four	years	 114	 14.88%	 	Rarely	 21	 2.74%	 	I’ve	never	voted	before	 116	 15.14%	 	I	don’t	know	 4	 0.52%	 		
III.	iii.	Descriptive	Statistics	on	the	Perceived	Costs	of	Voting	Table	11	presents	descriptive	statistics	on	the	respondents’	self-reported	overall	costs	of	voting	(reported	as	difficulty/inconvenience).		Surprisingly,	around	83.8%	reported	that	voting	was	either	very	or	fairly	easy	or	convenient,	and	only	1.2%	of	the	respondents	reported	that	voting	was	very	difficult	or	inconvenient.		Tables	12	through	14	report	descriptive	statistics	on	the	costs		(difficulty/inconvenience)	of	finding	out	where	to	vote,	traveling	to	the	polls,	and	finding	time	to	vote,	respectively.		A	majority	(66.5%)	of	respondents	reported	already	knowing	where	to	vote,	and	an	additional	26%	reported	that	finding	out	where	to	vote	is	fairly	or	very	easy.		Only	6.2%	reported	it	being	fairly	or	very	difficult	to	find	out	where	their	neighborhood	polling	places	is.		Similarly,	only	6.4%	of	respondents	reported	it	being	fairly	or	very	difficult	to	travel	to	their	neighborhood	polling	place.		The	voting	task	that	the	most	respondents	reported	being	costly	or	difficult	was	finding	the	time	to	go	vote.		Just	over	15%	of	
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respondents	described	finding	time	to	vote	as	either	fairly	or	very	difficult	for	them,	and	only	43%	reported	finding	time	to	vote	as	very	easy	or	convenient.	
Table	11:	Perceived	Overall	Costs	of	Voting	
Difficulty	of	Voting	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Very	easy	/	convenient	 319	 41.64%	Fairly	easy		/	convenient	 323	 42.17%	Fairly	difficult		/	inconvenient	 81	 10.57%	Very	difficult	/	inconvenient	 17	 2.22%	I	don’t	know	 26	 3.39%		
Table	12:	Perceived	Cost	of	Locating	the	Polling	Place	
Difficulty	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	I	already	know	where	I	go	vote	 509	 66.45%	Very	easy	/	convenient	 103	 13.45%	Fairly	easy		/	convenient	 97	 12.66%	Fairly	difficult		/	inconvenient	 43	 5.61%	Very	difficult	/	inconvenient	 5	 0.65%	I	don’t	know	 9	 1.17%			 	
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Table	13:	Perceived	Cost	of	Traveling	to	the	Polls	
Difficulty	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Very	easy	/	convenient	 498	 65.01%	Fairly	easy		/	convenient	 210	 27.42%	Fairly	difficult		/	inconvenient	 40	 5.22%	Very	difficult	/	inconvenient	 9	 1.17%	I	don’t	know	 9	 1.17%		
Table	14:	Perceived	Cost	of	Finding	Time	to	Vote	
Difficulty	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Very	easy	/	convenient	 328	 42.82%	Fairly	easy		/	convenient	 314	 40.99%	Fairly	difficult		/	inconvenient	 94	 12.27%	Very	difficult	/	inconvenient	 22	 2.87%	I	don’t	know	 8	 1.04%		
III.	iv.	Descriptive	Statistics	on	the	Specific	Cost	Factors	While	the	previous	section	described	how	the	survey	sample	described	the	difficulty	(or	perceived	cost)	of	voting	and	of	each	voting	task,	this	section	will	focus	on	the	objectively	measureable	factors	that	influence	both	the	tasks	and	trade-offs	of	voting.		For	the	task	of	finding	the	polling	place,	the	only	objective	question	I	asked	that	related	to	this	task	was	whether	respondents	already	knew	where	the	polling	place	was.		Since	I	already	described	this	measure,	I	will	focus	on	the	other	two	task	areas	and	the	factors	that	influence	them,	beginning	with	traveling	to	the	polls.	
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III.	iv.	a.	Traveling	to	the	Polls	As	Table	15	shows,	the	vast	majority	of	respondents	(92.83%)	expected	that	traveling	to	their	polling	place	would	take	less	than	30	minutes.		It	seems	most	respondents	did	not	expect	to	travel	far,	although	a	few	(under	1%)	thought	it	would	take	over	an	hour	to	reach	the	polls.	
Table	15:	Expected	Travel	Time	
Expected	travel	time	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Less	than	10	minutes	 539	 70.37%	10	to	20	minutes	 137	 17.89%	20	to	30	minutes	 35	 4.57%	30	to	40	minutes	 16	 2.09%	40	to	50	minutes	 11	 1.44%	50	minutes	to	an	hour	 11	 1.44%	1	hour	to	2	hours	 4	 0.52%	Over	2	hours	 2	 0.26%	I	Don’t	know	 11	 1.44%			 	
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Table	16:	Driver’s	License	and	Vehicle	Access	on	a	Typical	Tuesday	(among	those	
with	a	license)	
Vehicle	access	&	License	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Vehicle	&	license	 667	 87.08%	License,	no	vehicle	 45	 5.87%	Neither	 51	 6.66%	I	don’t	know	 3	 0.39%		Table	16	reveals	that	a	vast	majority	of	respondents	had	both	a	current	driver’s	license	and	access	to	a	vehicle	on	a	typical	Tuesday.		Since	the	vehicle	access	question	was	only	asked	of	those	with	a	license,	it	is	unclear	if	anyone	had	a	car	but	no	license.		Although	some	people	who	can	drive	may	choose	other	transportation	options,	I	would	consider	the	87.08%	with	both	a	license	and	a	vehicle	as	likely	to	drive	to	their	polling	place.	
Table	17:	Use	of	Public	Transportation	&	Ride-Sharing	(among	those	with	no	vehicle)	
Public	trans.	&	Ride	
shares	
Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	I	use	public	transportation	&	ride-sharing	 55	 55.56%	I	use	public	trans.	only	 26	 26.26%	I	use	ride-sharing	only	 4	 4.04%	Neither	 14	 14.14%		 Fortunately,	the	majority	of	the	people	who	cannot	drive	to	the	polls	use	some	form	of	public	transportation	or	ride-sharing	service	like	Uber.		Only	14	respondents	(1.83%	of	the	total	sample)	reported	that	they	have	never	used	neither	public	transportation	nor	ride-sharing.		 	
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Table	18:	Difficulty	of	Use	of	Public	Transportation	
Difficulty	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Very	easy	 33	 40.74%	Fairly	easy	 36	 44.44%	Fairly	difficult	 5	 6.17%	Very	difficult	 5	 6.17%	I	don’t	know	 2	 2.47%		
Table	19:	Difficulty	of	Use	of	Ride-Sharing	
Difficulty	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Very	easy	 25	 42.37%	Fairly	easy	 22	 37.29%	Fairly	difficult	 3	 5.08%	Very	difficult	 3	 5.08%	I	don’t	know	 6	 10.17%		For	those	who	use	some	form	of	alternative	transportation	to	driving,	the	vast	majority	(85.18%	for	public	transit	and	79.66%	for	ride-sharing)	report	that	it	is	either	fairly	or	very	easy	to	get	around	town	using	these	services.		Taken	together	with	Table	17,	this	means	that	24	people	reported	it	is	difficult	to	use	either	service	or	they	don’t	know	how	difficult	it	is,	and	14	people	do	not	use	either	service,	for	a	total	of	38	people	(4.96%	of	respondents)	who	may	face	large	transportation	difficulties	in	getting	to	the	polls.	
III.	iv.	b.	Finding	Time	to	Vote	As	shown	in	the	previous	section	on	how	respondents	answered	the	perceived	cost	questions,	finding	time	to	vote	was	the	task	that	the	largest	proportion	of	respondents	reported	as	difficult.		Which	specific	factors	influence	this	
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self-reported	cost?		This	sub-section	provides	descriptive	statistics	on	these	objectively-measured	factors,	including	both	factors	that	influence	the	amount	of	time	needed	to	vote	(task	factors)	and	factors	that	shape	the	opportunity	costs	associated	with	this	time	(trade-off	factors).	There	are	two	primary	task	factors	that	I	asked	about	regarding	finding	time	to	vote.		The	first	is	the	expected	time	that	the	respondent	believes	it	will	take	to	reach	his	or	her	polling	place.		This	was	previously	detailed	in	Table	15,	as	it	overlaps	with	factors	influencing	travel	cost.		Table	15	shows	that	the	vast	majority	of	respondents	(92.83%)	expected	that	traveling	to	their	polling	place	would	take	less	than	30	minutes.		It	seems	most	respondents	did	not	expect	to	travel	far,	although	a	few	(under	1%)	thought	it	would	take	over	an	hour	to	reach	the	polls.	
	
Table	20:	Expected	Wait	Time	
Expected	wait	time	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Less	than	10	minutes	 281	 36.68%	10	to	20	minutes	 234	 30.55%	20	to	30	minutes	 93	 12.14%	30	to	40	minutes	 42	 5.48%	40	to	50	minutes	 9	 1.17%	50	minutes	to	an	hour	 11	 1.44%	1	hour	to	2	hours	 4	 0.52%	2	hours	to	3	hours	 7	 0.91%	Over	3	hours	 0	 0.00%	I	Don’t	know	 85	 11.10%		The	next	factor	that	influences	the	difficulty	of	the	task	of	finding	time	to	vote	is	the	expected	wait	time	at	the	polls.		While	the	act	of	filling	out	the	ballot	takes	some	time,	the	time	spent	in	line	is	more	variable	and	is	usually	seen	as	more	of	a	
55		
	
barrier	to	voting	since	one	cannot	vote	without	filling	out	the	ballot,	but	one	can	potentially	vote	without	waiting	in	line.			Table	20	shows	the	distribution	of	expected	wait	times	at	the	polls	for	the	survey	respondents.		In	my	data,	67%	of	the	respondents	expected	to	spend	20	minutes	or	less	in	line	waiting	to	vote,	and	79%	expected	to	spend	less	than	30	minutes.		However,	there	were	a	few	(just	under	3%)	who	reported	they	expected	to	wait	over	an	hour	to	vote.		In	general,	people	in	my	survey	expected	to	face	longer	wait	times	than	travel	times.	Next,	I	will	provide	descriptive	statistics	on	the	factors	that	influence	the	opportunity	costs	of	time,	or	as	I	call	them,	the	trade-offs	associated	with	taking	the	time	to	vote.		As	I	discuss	in	Chapter	1,	the	cost	of	an	hour	of	time	can	vary	greatly	depending	on	alternative	uses	for	that	time	and	whether	those	alternative	uses	can	be	postponed	or	skipped.	The	first	trade-off	factor	has	to	do	with	the	unpleasantness	of	waiting	in	line.		Some	people	are	more	patient	than	others,	and	some	people	actually	may	not	mind	waiting	at	all	as	it	gives	them	a	chance	to	talk	with	their	neighbors.		As	a	result,	the	cost	of	waiting	in	line	should	be	shaped	by	how	much	people	dislike	waiting.		Question	V30	asked	people	to	rank,	on	a	scale	from	1	to	5,	how	much	they	dislike	waiting	in	lines.	
Table	21:	Preferences	Against	Waiting	
Dislike	Waiting	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	1	(Don’t	mind	waiting	at	all)	 60	 7.83%	2	 123	 16.06%	3	 254	 33.16%	4	 181	 23.63%	5	(I	really	hate	waiting)	 146	 19.06%	I	don’t	know	 2	 0.26%		
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Table	21	provides	descriptive	statistics	on	peoples’	preferences	against	waiting	in	line.		The	modal	category	was	that	people	showed	a	moderate	(3	on	a	5-point	scale)	amount	of	dislike	for	waiting	in	lines,	but	the	distribution	is	clearly	skewed	where	more	people	dislike	waiting	than	do	not	mind	it.	The	next	set	of	trade-off	factors	have	to	do	with	general	life	situations	that	can	potentially	shape	how	valuable	one’s	time	is.		For	example,	someone	who	is	employed	could	potentially	be	making	money	during	the	time	they	are	voting,	and	a	single	parent	may	need	to	obtain	childcare.		In	my	survey,	these	situations	are	represented	by	a	series	of	questions	on	whether	someone	is	employed	(V18),	is	a	student	(V24),	or	is	a	caretaker	for	dependents	(V27).	Table	22	provides	descriptive	statistics	on	all	three	questions	regarding	general	responsibilities.		Note	that	the	percentages	will	not	necessarily	add	up	to	100%	across	the	three	categories	since	they	are	not	mutually	exclusive.		In	this	table,	I	count	a	response	of	“I	have	a	job	at	the	moment”	for	V18	as	employed	and	any	other	response	as	unemployed.		For	being	a	student,	anyone	who	responds	“I	am	currently	a	student”	of	any	type	is	counted	as	a	student.		For	caretaking,	anyone	who	said	he	or	she	is	a	caretaker,	a	nanny,	take	care	of	children,	or	sometimes	take	care	of	children	is	counted	as	a	caretaker.	
Table	22:	General	Responsibilities	of	Respondents	
General	Responsibilities	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	I	am	currently	employed	 484	 63.19%	I	am	currently	a	student	 62	 8.09%	I	am	currently	a	caretaker	 276	 36.03%	Employed	&	Student	 0	 0.00%	Student	&	Caretaker	 5	 0.65%	Employed	&	Caretaker	 192	 25.07%	None	of	the	three	 141	 18.41%		
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Table	22	shows	that	the	majority	of	the	sample	is	currently	employed,	over	a	third	of	the	sample	takes	care	of	some	sort	of	dependent	person,	and	less	than	a	tenth	of	the	sample	are	students	of	any	type.		Around	a	quarter	of	the	sample	reported	that	they	both	work	and	take	care	of	dependents,	but	less	than	1%	was	a	student	and	a	caretaker,	and	no	one	reported	both	being	a	student	and	working.		However,	a	substantial	portion	of	the	sample	(around	18%)	reported	not	having	any	of	these	three	responsibilities.	Since	trade-offs	involve	a	notion	of	alternative	activities	that	are	being	sacrificed,	they	apply	most	obviously	when	the	activities	being	sacrificed	occur	at	the	time	of	voting—that	is,	on	Election	Day.		For	example,	whether	or	not	someone	has	a	child	at	home	may	not	be	relevant	if	they	only	have	custody	of	the	child	on	weekends.		To	capture	voters’	responsibilities	on	Election	Day,	I	asked	a	series	of	questions	about	the	respondents’	responsibilities	“on	a	typical	Tuesday.”		I	asked	about	taking	care	of	dependents	on	a	typical	Tuesday	(V28),	as	well	as	“classes,	labs,	or	other	school	activities”	(V25),	and	about	what	times	of	the	day	or	night	the	respondent	is	working	on	a	typical	Tuesday	(V21).		Anyone	who	reported	any	amount	of	working	on	Tuesday	is	counted	as	working	on	a	Tuesday,	anyone	who	reported	having	school	activities	as	“attending	school”	on	a	Tuesday,	and	anyone	who	watches	a	dependent	for	any	part	of	the	day	as	“watching	dependents.”	
Table	23:	Responsibilities	on	Election	Day	(a	Typical	Tuesday)	
Responsibilities	on	Tues.	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	I	am	working	 364	 47.52%	I	am	attending	school	 86	 11.23%	I	am	watching	dependents	 188	 24.54%	Working	&	School	 0	 0.00%	School	&	Dependents	 5	 0.65%	Working	&	Dependents	 85	 11.10%	None	of	the	three	 218	 28.46%		
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Table	23	shows	the	distribution	of	respondents’	responsibilities	on	a	typical	Tuesday.		The	responses	look	similar	to	the	general	responsibilities	shown	in	Table	21,	but	some	clear	differences	emerge.		More	people	reported	being	in	class	or	lab	on	Tuesday	than	being	a	student,	possibly	because	they	might	not	consider	themselves	a	student	if	they	are	attending	class	part-time.		About	16%	fewer	people	reported	working	on	Tuesday	than	being	employed	in	general,	and	about	12%	fewer	people	reported	taking	care	of	dependents	on	Tuesday	than	in	general.		Over	a	quarter	of	the	sample	reported	not	having	any	of	these	three	responsibilities	on	Tuesdays,	meaning	they	would	not	face	these	trade-offs	on	Election	Day.	There	is	one	more	factor	that	needs	to	be	considered	when	looking	at	the	trade-offs	that	shape	voters’	costs	of	finding	time	to	vote.		As	mentioned	in	Chapter	1,	the	flexibility	of	a	person’s	responsibilities	on	Election	Day	shapes	their	opportunity	cost	of	time.		If	a	registered	voter	can	easily	take	off	work	for	a	few	hours	using	their	saved	up	vacation	time,	taking	time	off	to	go	vote	carries	a	lower	opportunity	cost	from	the	missed	work	than	if	they	have	an	inflexible	schedule.		Voters	who	work	hourly	jobs	that	do	not	have	flexible	schedules	should	face	higher	trade-offs	associated	with	missing	work	since	they	cannot	be	paid	for	this	time	and	may	even	risk	punishment	for	missed	time.		Similarly,	caretakers	who	can	easily	find	someone	else	to	watch	their	dependents	for	a	while	face	lesser	trade-offs	than	those	who	struggle	to	find	a	babysitter.		Students	also	face	a	range	of	punishments	for	missing	classes	or	assignments	ranging	from	negligible	to	receiving	a	failing	grade.	To	measure	the	flexibility	of	peoples’	responsibilities,	I	asked	follow-up	questions	for	every	person	who	reported	they	would	be	attending	school,	working,	or	watching	dependents	on	a	typical	Tuesday.		The	questions	(V22,	V26,	and	V29)	were	phrased	as	“Sometimes	people	need	to	(take	off	work	/	miss	school	/	leave	dependents	with	a	caretaker)	for	a	few	hours	for	reasons	like	a	family	emergency,	a	doctor’s	visit,	or	running	important	errands.		In	general,	how	difficult	is	it	for	you	to	(leave	work	/	miss	school	/	have	someone	else	watch	your	dependents)	for	a	few	hours?”	
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Table	24:	Difficulty	of	Taking	off	Work	
Difficulty	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Very	easy	 124	 23.44%	Fairly	easy	 228	 43.10%	Fairly	difficult	 101	 19.09%	Very	difficult	 61	 11.53%	I	don’t	know	 15	 2.84%		 Table	24	shows	the	distribution	of	responses	to	how	easily	people	who	reported	working	said	it	would	be	to	take	time	off	work.		The	majority	(66%)	of	people	reported	leaving	work	would	be	easy,	but	a	substantial	portion	(11%)	reported	it	would	be	“very	difficult”	to	leave	work	for	even	a	few	hours.		These	people	face	the	largest	trade-offs	in	that	even	scheduling	time	off	to	vote	could	be	challenging.	
Table	25:	Difficulty	of	Skipping	School	
Difficulty	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Very	easy	 18	 14.52%	Fairly	easy	 51	 41.13%	Fairly	difficult	 33	 26.61%	Very	difficult	 17	 13.71%	I	don’t	know	 5	 4.03%		Table	25	shows	the	distribution	of	responses	for	students	regarding	the	flexibility	of	their	classes,	labs,	and	other	activities.		Compared	to	Table	24,	a	larger	percentage	(40%)	reported	missing	school	assignments	was	difficult	than	reported	leaving	work	was	difficult	(30%).	
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Table	26:	Difficulty	of	Finding	Alternative	Care	
Difficulty	 Number	of	
Respondents	
Percentage	of	
Respondents	Very	easy	 50	 26.60%	Fairly	easy	 62	 32.98%	Fairly	difficult	 42	 22.34%	Very	difficult	 25	 13.30%	I	don’t	know	 9	 4.79%		Table	26	shows	a	distribution	of	responses	for	the	difficulty	of	finding	alternative	care	for	dependents	that	looks	somewhat	in	between	the	responses	for	missing	school	and	work.		A	majority	(59%)	reported	that	finding	a	babysitter	or	caretaker	was	easy,	but	over	13%	said	this	would	be	very	hard.		Although	I	did	not	ask	follow-up	questions,	this	could	be	due	to	unique	care	circumstances	that	make	it	hard	to	find	a	caretaker	(like	special	needs	children	or	adults	with	dementia),	or	due	to	the	cost	of	care	itself.	
IV.	Conclusion	Since	there	were	no	existing	surveys	that	contain	comprehensive	information	on	the	costs	of	voting	and	the	factors	that	affect	them,	I	fielded	my	own	unique	survey	of	registered	voters	in	the	state	of	Pennsylvania	to	measure	these	concepts.		Using	registered	voters	prevents	me	from	measuring	the	costs	of	registration,	but	has	the	benefit	of	providing	validated	voter	turnout	information.	Although	there	are	a	few	concerns	that	the	survey	sample	is	over-populated	with	frequent	voters,	it	matches	the	overall	population	of	Pennsylvania	or	the	registered	voter	population	fairly	well	on	gender,	age,	and	income,	with	a	slight	bias	toward	more	educated	people.		If	anything,	this	sampling	bias	should	result	in	reduced	estimates	of	the	impacts	of	voting	costs.	The	survey	contained	a	number	of	specific	questions	on	factors	that	should	influence	voting	costs	as	well	as	four	perceived	difficulty	questions.		In	Chapter	3,	I	
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test	whether	the	costs	of	voting	seem	to	divide	into	the	three	task	areas	of	locating	the	polls,	traveling	to	the	polls,	and	finding	time	to	vote.		I	also	examine	whether	the	perceived	cost	measures	reflect	objectively	measureable	factors	and	whether	the	specific	factors	are	needed	to	measure	costs	accurately.		 	
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Chapter	3:	Measuring	the	Costs	of	Voting	
I.	Introduction	Since	this	survey	contained	the	first	comprehensive	battery	of	questions	intended	to	measure	the	individual	costs	of	voting,	it	is	important	to	demonstrate	the	performance	of	the	questions.		Although	I	do	not	have	other	instruments	or	objective	cost	measures	to	which	I	can	compare	these	data,	I	can	examine	how	the	different	cost	measures	relate	to	each	other.		If	the	questions	are	measuring	the	costs	associated	with	the	different	tasks	needed	to	vote,	they	should	relate	to	each	other	in	ways	that	demonstrate	they	are	measuring	these	concepts.		One	of	the	goals	of	this	chapter	is	to	demonstrate	that	the	costs	group	into	the	three	task	areas	and	that	each	task	cost	contains	some	unique	information.	Another	goal	of	this	chapter	is	to	explore	whether	or	not	voters’	perceptions	of	costs	reflect	objectively	measureable	factors	that	we	believe	should	affect	these	costs.		For	example,	the	self-reported	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls	should	reflect	whether	or	not	a	voter	has	access	to	a	vehicle.		If	perceived	costs	seem	to	capture	these	specific	factors,	then	voters	can	identify	the	costs	of	voting	as	well	or	better	than	researchers	trying	to	impute	the	cost	for	them.		The	final	goal	of	this	chapter	is	to	examine	whether	or	not	the	specific	factors	need	to	be	measured	if	we	have	perceived	cost	information.	
II.	Performance	of	the	Perceived	Voting	Cost	Measures	First,	I	need	to	demonstrate	whether	the	question	on	the	overall	perceived	cost	of	voting	is	measuring	the	costs	of	the	three	voting	tasks.		To	explore	this	question,	I	employ	three	techniques	showing	how	the	overall	perceived	cost	measure	relates	to	the	three	perceived	task	cost	measures.		The	first	of	these	employs	factor	analysis	to	see	whether	the	measures	load	onto	shared	factors.		If	the	three	task	questions	are	all	contributing	to	the	overall	cost	measure,	they	should	share	a	common	factor	of	costs.	
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Table	27:	Factor	Analysis	of	the	Voting	Cost	Measures	
Factors	 Eigenvalue	 Proportion	Factor	1	 1.4355	 1.2592	Factor	2	 -0.0975	 -0.0855	Factor	3	 -0.1980	 -0.1737	
Factor	Loadings	 Factor	1	 Uniqueness	Finding	out	where	to	vote	 0.5810	 0.6625	Traveling	to	the	polling	place	 0.7297	 0.4675	Finding	time	to	vote	 0.7520	 0.4345		 Table	27	shows	that	the	three	task	cost	questions	all	share	one	factor	with	an	eigenvalue	greater	than	1,	which	is	suggestive	that	they	share	a	loading	onto	a	common	dimension.		Additionally,	the	three	questions	all	load	strongly	onto	this	first	factor	but	each	contribute	uniquely	to	the	factor,	which	is	consistent	with	three	separate	tasks	that	all	share	one	overall	dimension.	The	next	test	of	the	relationship	between	the	measures	regresses	the	three	task	cost	measures	on	the	overall	difficulty	measure.		If	the	overall	difficulty	of	voting	is	actually	composed	of	the	difficulty	of	these	three	tasks	plus	registration,	then	the	difficulties	of	each	of	the	three	tasks	should	each	positively	and	significantly	affect	the	overall	perceived	difficulty	of	voting.	Table	28	shows	that	all	three	of	the	cost	areas	have	positive	and	highly	statistically	significant	relationships	with	the	overall	cost	of	voting.		Furthermore,	the	R-squared	measure	shows	that	the	three	task	costs	explain	around	40%	of	the	variance	in	the	overall	difficulty	of	voting.		This	demonstrates	that	the	three	tasks	explain	much	of	the	overall	difficulty	of	voting,	but	some	unmeasured	factors	also	contribute	to	this	perceived	difficulty.		Since	I	did	not	measure	the	cost	of	registration,	this	is	consistent	with	what	I	expect.		
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Table	28:	Predicting	Overall	Difficulty	of	Voting	with	Tasks	
Difficulty of Voting Coefficient (standard 
error) 
Statistical Significance 
Finding out where to vote 0.154 
(0.026) 
0.000 
Traveling to the polling 
place 
0.169 
(0.043) 
0.000 
Finding time to vote 0.377 
(0.037) 
0.000 
Constant 0.563 
(0.056) 
0.000 
R-squared .403 
Observations 723 	 The	third	test	of	the	relationship	of	the	three	task	cost	measures	to	overall	costs	involves	how	the	measures	predict	actual	verified	voter	turnout.		First,	all	four	measures	should	have	significant	and	negative	relationships	with	voting	when	measured	in	bivariate	relationships.		Next,	when	the	three	task	measures	are	included	together	as	predictors	of	voting,	the	relationships	should	remain	significant	if	they	are	truly	measuring	the	difficulties	of	three	separate	tasks.		Finally,	if	the	overall	perceived	cost	measure	captures	the	information	contained	in	the	three	perceived	cost	measures,	then	the	overall	difficulty	measure	should	become	a	statistically	insignificant	predictor	of	voting	when	the	three	tasks	are	included	as	predictors.	
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Table	29:	Predicting	Voting	with	Difficulty	Measures	
Voting in the 2016 
Election 
Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Statistical 
Significance 
Observations 
Overall difficulty of 
voting 
-0.725 
(0.151) 
0.000 740 
Finding out where to 
vote 
-0.535 
(0.106) 
0.000 757 
Traveling to the polls -0.876 
(0.155) 
0.000 757 
Finding time to vote -0.728 
(0.144) 
0.000 758 
	 Table	29	shows	the	relationships	between	the	four	difficulty	measures	and	voting	when	they	are	regressed	in	separate	logistic	models.		The	dependent	variable	in	these	models	is	validated	voting	in	the	November	2016	election,	operationalized	as	voted	=	1	and	did	not	vote	=	0.		As	I	expect,	the	three	task	difficulty	measures	and	the	overall	difficulty	measure	all	have	highly	significant	and	negative	relationships	with	voting.	Table	30	shows	that	when	the	three	task	measures	are	included	in	the	same	model	as	predictors	of	voting,	only	finding	out	where	to	vote	has	a	statistically	significant	relationship	with	voting	by	the	conventional	standard	of	p	<	0.05.		Traveling	to	the	polling	place	approaches	statistical	significance,	but	it	appears	that	finding	time	to	vote	no	longer	has	a	statistically	significant	relationship	with	voting	in	this	model.		Clearly	the	three	cost	measures	are	correlated	with	each	other	to	a	degree	that	including	them	in	the	same	model	creates	multi-collinearity,	and	they	do	not	retain	the	significant	relationships	with	voting	that	they	have	when	regressed	separately.		
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Table	30:	Predicting	Voting	with	Difficulty	Measures	
Voting in the 2016 Election Coefficient (standard 
error) 
Statistical Significance 
Finding out where to vote -0.303 
(0.132) 
0.022 
Traveling to the polling 
place 
-0.422 
(0.222) 
0.057 
Finding time to vote -0.250 
(0.210) 
0.234 
Constant 3.944 
(0.357) 
0.000 
Pseudo R-squared .068 
Observations 745 	It	is	not	clear	why	the	three	perceived	task	difficulty	questions	are	correlated	with	each	other,	as	I	would	expect	that	by	measuring	different	tasks	they	should	not	share	much	correlation.		It	is	possible	that	some	personal	characteristics,	such	as	income	level	or	education,	could	make	all	these	task	costs	higher	for	some	people.		It	seems	plausible	that	people	working	hourly	low-wage	jobs	should	be	less	able	to	afford	a	vehicle	and	will	face	higher	travel	costs	as	well	as	and	inflexible	schedule	raising	their	time	cost.		Additionally,	if	they	are	working	an	hourly	job	due	to	a	low	educational	attainment	level,	this	low	education	may	make	it	harder	for	them	to	find	out	where	to	vote.			It	is	also	possible	that	some	people	perceive	everything	to	be	more	difficult	due	to	their	personalities.		Since	these	questions	measure	perceived	costs	instead	of	objective	measures,	it	is	possible	that	some	people	perceive	the	difficulty	of	everything	to	be	higher	than	other	people	in	a	systematic	fashion	across	any	task.	Table	31	shows	that	when	the	three	cost	measures	are	added	as	predictors	to	a	logistic	model	that	predicts	voting	with	overall	costs,	the	overall	perceived	cost	
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measure	becomes	statistically	insignificant.		This	is	consistent	with	my	expectations	in	that	the	three	cost	measures	capture	all	the	information	contained	in	the	overall	cost	measure.	
Table	31:	Predicting	Voting	with	Difficulty	Measures	
Voting in the 2016 Election Coefficient (standard 
error) 
Statistical Significance 
Overall difficulty of voting 0.013 
(0.223) 
0.954 
Finding out where to vote -0.324 
(0.139) 
0.020 
Traveling to the polling 
place 
-0.423 
(0.227) 
0.063 
Finding time to vote -0.274 
(0.230) 
0.233 
Constant 4.011 
(0.388) 
0.000 
Pseudo R-squared .074 
Observations 723 	 In	summary,	it	seems	that	the	task	cost	measures	mostly	relate	to	each	other	in	ways	that	I	expect	if	they	are	actually	measuring	the	difficulty	of	three	separate	tasks	that	all	contribute	to	the	difficulty	of	the	overall	task	of	voting.		All	three	questions	are	related	to	the	overall	difficulty	question,	and	they	all	show	the	expected	relationships	with	voting.		The	only	evidence	that	my	measures	are	not	performing	well	is	the	correlation	between	the	three	task	difficulty	questions.			The	relationship	between	the	three	perceived	difficulty	questions	could	be	a	result	of	two	possible	explanations.		The	first	theory	is	that	some	people	have	higher	costs	across	all	three	tasks	due	to	personal	characteristics	like	income	and	education	that	make	all	the	tasks	more	difficult.		Alternatively,	these	people	could	
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have	personality	traits	that	cause	them	to	perceive	the	same	objective	tasks	as	more	difficult.		Since	the	rational	utility	model	of	voting	involves	people	comparing	perceived	costs	to	perceived	benefits	of	voting,	it	ultimately	does	not	matter	much	which	theory	is	correct.		If	some	people	perceive	the	same	objective	costs	to	be	higher	than	others	do,	that	should	still	decrease	their	likelihood	of	voting	by	the	rational	utility	theory.	
III.	Relationship	between	Cost	Factors	and	SES	Part	of	the	motivation	for	this	project	is	that	SES	variables	are	not	good	proxy	measures	for	costs.		Although	my	conceptualization	of	costs	makes	a	clear	distinction	between	SES	factors	like	education	and	income	vs.	specific	opportunity	costs,	it	is	possible	that	the	costs	of	voting	are	strongly	correlated	with	SES.		Even	if	they	are	very	different	theoretical	concepts,	SES	could	still	serve	as	a	good	proxy	measure	for	voting	costs	if	individuals	with	low	SES	experience	higher	or	lower	opportunity	costs	associated	with	the	voting	tasks.	To	test	these	relationships,	I	run	a	series	of	regressions	predicting	the	perceived	voting	cost	measures	using	each	SES	characteristic	(education,	income,	and	homeownership).		Table	32	shows	the	results	of	the	regressions,	which	reveal	almost	no	large	correlations	between	the	measures.	
Table	32:	Relationship	between	Costs	and	SES	
 Overall 
Difficulty 
Locating Polling 
Place 
Traveling to 
Polls 
Finding 
Time 
Education 0.014 
(0.016) 
-0.004 
(0.020) 
-0.014 
(0.014) 
0.009 
(0.017) 
Income -0.002 
(0.013) 
-0.035* 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
0.007 
(0.014) 
Homeownership -0.152** 
(0.055) 
-0.221** 
(0.069) 
-0.146** 
(0.047) 
-0.185** 
(0.056) Note:	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.		t	p	<	0.1;	*	p	<	0.05;	**	p	<0.01		
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The	traditional	measures	of	socio-economic	status,	income	and	education,	do	not	show	statistically	significant	correlations	with	any	of	the	cost	measures	except	for	locating	the	polling	place.		Those	with	higher	incomes	report	significantly	less	difficulty	in	finding	the	polling	place,	but	this	correlation	is	rather	small	at	-0.035.		When	income	is	changed	from	the	lowest	level	(<	$10,000)	to	the	highest	($210,000+),	the	expected	perceived	cost	of	locating	the	polls	drops	by	only	0.31	on	a	4-point	scale.	Unlike	income	and	education,	homeownership,	which	is	sometimes	used	as	an	SES	measure,	is	negatively	and	significantly	correlated	with	all	four	cost	measures.		Owning	one’s	home	lowers	one’s	perceived	overall	costs	of	voting	by	0.152,	the	cost	of	locating	the	polls	by	0.221,	the	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls	by	0.146,	and	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	by	0.185.		Although	these	relationships	are	much	stronger	than	that	between	income	and	locating	the	polling	place	and	all	four	relationships	are	statistically	significant,	these	effects	are	still	relatively	small.		Owning	one’s	home	only	changes	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	by	-0.185	on	a	4-point	scale,	which	is	only	23.7%	of	a	standard	deviation	(0.782)	on	this	measure.		Similarly,	homeownership	changes	the	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls	by	22.5%	of	an	S.D.	and	overall	costs	by	20.4%	of	an	S.D.	The	relationship	between	homeownership	and	locating	the	polling	place	appears	stronger	than	for	the	other	factors,	but	this	cost	measure	is	unique	in	that	it	has	a	five-point	scale	which	includes	an	option	for	“I	already	know	where	to	go	vote.”		When	I	break	this	question	out	into	a	binary	measure	for	already	knowing	where	to	vote	and	a	four-point	difficulty	scale	for	those	who	do	not	know	where	to	go,	the	relationship	looks	much	different.		Table	33	shows	the	relationships	between	SES	factors	and	the	binary	measure	as	well	as	the	four-point	difficulty	scale	for	those	who	said	they	do	not	already	know	where	to	vote.		The	four-point	measure	has	no	strong	correlations	with	any	SES	measures.		On	the	other	hand,	both	income	and	homeownership	are	significantly	and	positively	related	to	already	knowing	where	to	vote.		Going	from	the	lowest	to	the	highest	income	changes	one’s	probability	of	
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knowing	where	to	vote	by	18.7%,	and	owning	one’s	home	increases	this	probability	by	12.2%.	
Table	33:	Relationships	between	SES	and	Knowing	Where	to	Vote	
 Already Know 
Where to Vote 
Locating the 
Polls 
Education 0.008 
(0.010) 
0.020 
(0.029) 
Income 0.021** 
(0.008) 
0.026 
(0.024) 
Homeownership 0.121** 
(0.034) 
0.006 
(0.102) Note:	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.		t	p	<	0.1;	*	p	<	0.05;	**	p	<0.01		 Why	would	owning	one’s	home	and	income	be	positively	correlated	with	already	knowing	where	to	go	vote?		Since	polling	places	are	usually	kept	in	the	same	location	every	election,	people	who	live	in	the	same	location	for	a	longer	period	of	time	and	vote	even	occasionally	are	more	likely	to	know	where	their	polling	place	is	than	new	arrivals.		Those	with	higher	incomes	tend	to	be	more	residentially	stable,	and	this	is	especially	true	of	homeowners	due	to	the	transaction	costs	in	buying	and	selling	property.		This	means	the	effects	of	income	and	homeownership	on	locating	the	polling	place	are	positive	in	that	they	give	voters	prior	knowledge	of	where	to	vote.		This	effect	is	likely	attributable	to	the	residential	stability	of	these	voters.	It	is	curious	that	homeownership	is	also	significantly	related	to	lower	costs	of	traveling	to	the	polls	and	finding	time	to	vote,	since	we	would	not	expect	these	costs	to	be	related	to	residential	stability.		It	is	possible	that	home	owners	live	in	areas	where	traveling	to	the	polls	is	easier	due	to	shorter	distances	and	less	traffic	on	their	routes.		Regarding	the	time	cost,	it	is	possible	that	homeowners	have	more	flexible	or	less	busy	schedules	on	average	compared	to	renters.		However,	these	are	merely	speculative	ideas,	and	this	correlation	between	homeownership	and	costs	needs	more	investigation.		
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In	summary,	the	correlation	between	all	the	costs	and	homeownership	is	strong	enough	to	consider	homeownership	as	a	possible	weak	proxy	for	the	costs	of	voting,	but	it	does	not	explain	enough	of	the	variance	in	the	cost	measures	to	be	an	effective	substitute	for	them.		Since	owning	a	home	at	best	explains	less	than	25%	of	a	standard	deviation	on	the	cost	measures,	it	seems	that	most	of	the	variation	in	costs	is	explained	by	non-SES	factors.	There	is	a	possibility	that	the	correlations	visible	between	the	observed	cost	measures	and	voting	are	artificially	small	due	to	the	sample	population.		Since	the	survey	sample	is	composed	of	more	highly	educated	people	than	the	population	of	registered	voters,	the	sample	is	drawing	from	people	who	are	mostly	on	the	upper	end	of	the	education	distribution.		As	a	result,	the	correlation	between	education	and	the	costs	of	voting	in	the	sample	may	be	smaller	than	we	would	observe	in	the	larger	registered	voter	population	if	we	could	eliminate	the	sampling	bias	problem.		Unfortunately,	it	is	difficult	to	overcome	this	limitation	of	the	sampling	framework.		This	is	an	area	that	deserves	more	study	in	order	to	demonstrate	that	SES	is	not	a	reasonable	proxy	for	the	costs	of	voting	in	the	larger	population.	
IV.	Going	Deeper:	Are	Perceived	Costs	Enough?	Since	this	is	the	first	in-depth	exploration	of	individual-specific	cost	factors	and	which	factors	have	the	largest	impact	on	voter	participation,	it	is	unclear	what	the	best	measurement	strategies	are	for	understanding	the	costs	of	voting.		The	most	fundamental	question	regarding	measuring	voting	costs	is	whether	or	not	voters	can	accurately	self-identify	the	costs	of	voting	for	themselves.		As	I	describe	in	detail	in	Chapter	1,	there	are	a	number	of	environmental	factors	that	shape	the	difficulty	of	performing	each	task	of	voting,	such	as	the	distance	between	the	voter	and	her	polling	place.		At	the	same	time,	the	voter’s	costs	of	performing	each	task	are	also	shaped	by	personal	factors,	like	whether	or	not	she	is	the	primary	caretaker	for	a	child.		The	question	considered	in	this	section	is:	Do	researchers	need	to	measure	all	the	individual-specific	environmental	and	personal	factors	shaping	the	
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costs	of	voting?		Or	can	voters	identify	the	costs	accurately	using	their	own	perceptions	of	these	costs?	
IV.	i.	Going	Deeper:	Finding	Time	to	Vote	To	address	the	question	of	whether	researchers	need	to	measure	each	individual	factor	influencing	costs,	I	first	focus	on	one	particular	task:	finding	time	to	vote.		Of	all	the	three	tasks,	this	was	the	task	that	the	largest	number	of	people	reported	was	difficult.		However,	it	is	also	the	task	that	contains	the	largest	number	of	possible	factors	that	might	influence	its	difficulty.		Potential	voters	must	consider	both	the	tasks	they	perform	on	a	regular	basis,	tasks	specific	to	Election	Day	(or	Tuesdays),	the	flexibility	of	these	tasks,	and	the	difficulty	of	substituting	other	solutions	to	these	tasks.		These	complexities	mean	that	answering	how	costly/difficult	it	is	to	find	time	to	vote	is	much	more	complicated	than	answering	how	difficult	it	is	to	find	or	travel	to	the	polling	place.		Therefore,	this	task	area	provides	the	toughest	test	of	registered	voters’	abilities	to	self-identify	the	costs	of	voting.	In	order	to	see	how	well	voters	perform	at	self-identifying	the	costs	they	face	when	voting,	I	employ	two	strategies.		While	the	second	strategy	is	detailed	in	subsection	IV.	i.	c.,	the	first	strategy	employed	here	is	to	use	the	self-reported	task	difficulty/cost	as	a	dependent	variable	and	regress	the	various	cost	factors	on	this	measure.		If	respondents	are	considering	these	various	factors	when	self-reporting	their	costs,	then	these	factors	should	demonstrate	significant	relationships	with	the	cost	measure	in	directions	that	are	consistent	with	their	predicted	impacts.		I	predict	the	following:	
1.	The	relationships	between	tasks	and	perceived	costs	will	be	stronger	for	factors	that	
apply	specifically	to	Election	Day	rather	than	generally.	If	when	reporting	their	perceived	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	voters	are	actually	considering	the	tasks	they	must	work	around	or	sacrifice	in	order	to	make	it	to	the	polls,	then	responsibilities	on	Election	Day	should	matter	more	than	one’s	general	responsibilities.	
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2.	Voters	who	are	responsible	for	more	tasks	are	more	likely	to	report	a	higher	cost	for	
finding	time	to	vote.	Since	more	responsibilities	leads	to	more	trade-offs	with	regard	to	spending	time,	voters	who	have	more	tasks	they	are	responsible	for	should	report	higher	perceived	time	costs	than	those	with	fewer	tasks.	
3.	Voters	who	are	responsible	for	tasks	that	have	less	flexibility	are	more	likely	to	
report	a	higher	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote.	Tasks	that	are	less	flexible	on	when	they	can	be	performed	or	that	cannot	be	delayed	require	paying	larger	opportunity	costs	to	skip	or	delay	their	completion	than	more	flexible	tasks.		For	example,	someone	who	is	a	sole	caretaker	for	an	elderly	parent	may	need	to	find	a	substitute	to	perform	her	duties,	which	is	difficult	and	likely	costs	money.		Since	tasks	that	are	less	flexible	require	more	potential	trade-offs	that	must	be	made	in	order	to	sacrifice	them,	the	opportunity	cost	of	time	is	higher	and	therefore	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	should	be	higher.	
IV.	i.	a.	Predicting	Perceived	Time	Cost	using	Specific	Factors	I	will	begin	with	testing	Hypothesis	1	by	comparing	the	impacts	of	tasks	that	voters	must	perform	generally	(at	any	time	throughout	the	week)	and	those	that	are	specific	to	“a	typical	Tuesday.”		Using	the	phrasing	of	“a	typical	Tuesday”	is	intended	to	prime	the	respondents	to	think	about	their	responsibilities	on	Election	Day	without	making	them	think	specifically	about	how	they	will	adapt	these	tasks	for	voting.		Since	Election	Day	falls	on	a	Tuesday,	any	tasks	they	consistently	must	perform	on	Tuesdays	should	capture	their	responsibilities	on	Election	Day.		I	will	compare	the	impacts	of	these	tasks	on	the	perceived	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	to	general	responsibilities	throughout	the	week,	such	as	watching	children,	working,	or	being	in	school.		 	
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Table	34:	Comparing	Tasks	on	Election	Day	to	General	Responsibilities		 Model	1	 	 Model	2	
	 Coefficient	(Standard	
Error)	 Significance	 	 Coefficient	(Standard	Error)	 Significance	Employed	 0.263	(0.063)	 .000	 Tuesday:	At	Work	 0.456	(0.057)	 .000	Student	 0.528	(0.114)	 .000	 Tuesday:	At	School	 0.647	(0.093)	 .000	Has	Dependents	 0.069	(0.059)	 .245	 Tuesday:	Watching	Dependents	 0.186	(0.063)	 .003	Constant	 1.517	(0.056)	 .000	 Constant	 1.414	(0.046)	 .000	Adjusted	R-squared	 .037	 Adjusted	R-Squared	 .099	AIC	 1755.7	 AIC	 1702.8	Obs.	 758	 Obs.	 758		 Table	34	shows	the	results	of	two	linear	regressions	predicting	the	perceived	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote;	Model	1	uses	dummy	variables	for	general	responsibilities	as	predictors,	while	Model	2	uses	dummy	variables	for	responsibilities	on	a	typical	Tuesday	as	predictors.		Although	being	employed	and	being	a	student	have	significant,	positive	effects	on	the	perceived	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote,	having	dependents	at	home	does	not.		As	I	predicted	in	Hypothesis	1,	all	of	the	coefficients	for	responsibilities	specifically	on	Election	Day	are	larger	and	estimated	with	more	statistical	certainty	than	the	general	responsibilities.		Further	evidence	for	Hypothesis	1	is	that	watching	dependents	on	Tuesdays	has	a	significant	effect	on	perceived	time	cost,	but	merely	having	children	or	other	dependents	does	not.		Additionally,	the	variables	in	Model	2	explain	more	of	the	variance	in	the	cost	measure,	which	demonstrates	that	responsibilities	on	Election	Day	specifically	are	the	ones	that	matter	for	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote.		Table	32	also	demonstrates	
75		
	
evidence	for	Hypothesis	2.		Each	additional	responsibility	significantly	increases	voters’	self-reported	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote.			
Table	35:	Testing	the	Impact	of	Responsibility	Flexibility		 Model	1	 Model	2	
	 Coefficient	(Standard	
Error)	 Significance	 Coefficient	(Standard	Error)	 Significance	Tuesday:	At	Work	 0.343	(0.064)	 .000	 0.078	(0.102)	 .448	Flex	(work)	 0.085	(0.024)	 .000	 0.026	(0.030)	 .385	Flex	*	Work	 	 	 0.158	(0.048)	 .001	Tuesday:	At	School	 0.110	(0.138)	 .425	 -0.203	(0.207)	 .329	Flex	(school)	 0.228	(0.044)	 .000	 0.169	(0.053)	 .002	Flex	*	School	 	 	 0.186	(0.093)	 .047	Tuesday:	Watching	Dependents	 -0.510	(0.133)	 .000	 -0.475	(0.132)	 .000	Flex	(Dep.)	 0.309	(0.053)	 .000	 0.302	(0.052)	 .000	Flex	*	Dep.	 	 	 (omitted)	 	Constant	 1.324	(0.050)	 .000	 1.379	(0.052)	 .000	Adjusted	R-squared	 .183	 .198	Obs.	 732	 732		 To	test	whether	the	flexibility	of	responsibilities	matters,	there	is	a	complication	with	these	models	since	respondents	only	answered	flexibility	
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questions	for	the	responsibilities	that	they	reported	having.		To	test	whether	the	flexibility	of	the	tasks	matters	on	top	of	the	tasks	themselves,	I	have	to	make	an	assumption	about	the	flexibility	variable.		I	make	the	assumption	that	flexibility	=	0	(the	least	difficulty	of	leaving	the	task	for	a	few	hours)	for	those	who	do	not	face	the	task	at	all.		So,	someone	who	works	will	have	the	variable	for	working	=	1	and	a	flexibility	variable	=	somewhere	from	1	to	4,	while	someone	who	doesn’t	work	will	have	both	variables	=	0.		Note	that	flexibility	is	reverse	coded,	so	a	positive	relationship	would	reflect	that	a	more	inflexible	responsibility	increases	costs.		For	these	models,	the	flexibility	of	each	task	is	measured	by	a	question	asking	how	difficult	it	is	to	leave	the	responsibility	for	a	few	hours	(for	example,	to	attend	a	doctor’s	appointment).			Model	1	in	Table	35	shows	that	the	flexibility	of	one’s	schedule	with	regard	to	all	three	tasks	has	a	significant	and	positive	relationship	with	the	perceived	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote.		Interestingly,	the	variable	for	attending	school	becomes	insignificant	and	the	variable	for	watching	dependents	remains	significant	but	becomes	negative	when	the	flexibility	measures	are	included.		These	changes	in	the	significance	and	direction	of	the	dummy	variable	coefficients	suggest	that	these	responsibilities	do	not	impose	large	opportunity	costs	of	time	unless	they	are	inflexible.		For	example,	attending	school	on	a	Tuesday	seems	to	have	no	impact	unless	the	respondent	stated	that	it	is	difficult	for	him	to	miss	class.		This	supports	Hypothesis	3	in	that	the	opportunity	costs	of	time	are	shaped	by	the	ability	to	re-schedule	tasks	or	extricate	oneself	from	one’s	responsibilities	easily.	Model	2	in	Table	35	adds	interaction	terms	between	the	responsibilities	and	their	respective	flexibility	measures.		Hypothesis	3	predicts	that	the	responsibilities	only	matter	in	conjunction	with	their	opportunity	costs,	meaning	the	dummy	variables	for	the	tasks	by	themselves	should	not	matter	except	through	their	interactions	with	flexibility.		We	would	observe	support	for	Hypothesis	3	if	the	constituent	terms	become	statistically	insignificant	while	the	interaction	terms	become	statistically	significant.		With	the	exception	of	the	interaction	between	watching	dependents	and	flexibility,	which	was	omitted	due	to	multi-collinearity,	
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the	results	are	consistent	with	this	expectation.		The	parameters	for	working	and	attending	school	become	insignificant,	but	the	interaction	terms	between	these	responsibilities	and	their	flexibility	become	significant	in	the	expected	directions.	Overall,	I	find	strong	support	for	all	three	hypotheses	about	how	voters’	responsibilities	and	their	flexibility	affect	their	self-reported	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote.		More	tasks	increase	voters’	perceived	time	costs,	but	the	tasks	on	Election	Day	have	stronger	and	more	consistently	estimated	impacts	on	the	cost	of	finding	time	than	general	responsibilities.		Furthermore,	the	flexibility	of	these	tasks	matters,	as	the	tasks	have	little	impact	on	perceived	time	cost	if	they	are	flexible	in	their	nature.		These	findings	suggest	that	when	they	are	asked	about	the	cost/difficulty	of	finding	time	to	vote,	voters	are	accurately	picturing	their	responsibilities	on	Election	Day	and	the	trade-offs	they	need	to	make	to	leave	these	responsibilities	for	a	few	hours	to	go	vote.	
IV.	i.	b.	Adding	in	More	Factors:	What	about	Voting	Time?	Although	I	have	demonstrated	that	the	perceived	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	corresponds	to	the	different	duties	that	registered	voters	face	on	Election	Day,	I	have	not	yet	included	all	of	the	factors	that	should	influence	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote.		Peoples’	large	life	responsibilities	like	watching	children,	working,	and	attending	school	all	influence	the	trade-offs	they	must	make	for	the	time	that	they	vote.		However,	voters	also	show	significant	variance	in	their	estimates	of	the	time	it	takes	them	to	complete	the	task	of	voting.		They	must	travel	on	Election	Day	to	a	voting	location,	typically	wait	in	a	line	before	they	can	vote,	and	then	fill	out	the	ballot	itself.		Although	people	vary	slightly	in	how	long	they	spend	in	the	voting	booth,	it	is	safe	to	assume	that	the	majority	of	the	variance	in	the	time	spent	voting	occurs	due	to	traveling	to	and	from	the	polls	and	waiting	in	line.				 	
78		
	
Table	36:	Estimated	wait	times	
Expected wait time Number of Respondents Percentage of Respondents 
Less than 10 minutes 281 36.68% 
10 to 20 minutes 234 30.55% 
20 to 30 minutes 93 12.14% 
30 to 40 minutes 42 5.48% 
40 to 50 minutes 9 1.17% 
50 minutes to an hour 11 1.44% 
1 hour to 2 hours 4 0.52% 
2 hours to 3 hours 7 0.91% 
Over 3 hours 0 0.00% 
I Don’t know 85 11.10% 	 Table	36	shows	descriptive	information	on	how	long	voters	reported	they	expected	to	spend	waiting	in	line.		In	my	data,	67%	of	the	respondents	expected	to	spend	20	minutes	or	less	in	line	waiting	to	vote.		However,	there	were	a	few	(just	under	3%)	who	reported	they	expected	to	wait	over	an	hour	to	vote.	
Table	37:	Expected	Travel	Times	
Expected travel time Number of Respondents Percentage of Respondents 
Less than 10 minutes 539 70.37% 
10 to 20 minutes 137 17.89% 
20 to 30 minutes 35 4.57% 
30 to 40 minutes 16 2.09% 
40 to 50 minutes 11 1.44% 
50 minutes to an hour 11 1.44% 
1 hour to 2 hours 4 0.52% 
Over 2 hours 2 0.26% 
I Don’t know 11 1.44% 	
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Table	37	shows	similar	descriptive	statistics	for	how	long	voters	expected	it	would	take	them	to	travel	to	their	polling	place.		Just	over	88%	of	them	reported	they	expected	their	travel	time	to	be	under	20	minutes,	which	is	encouraging.		Less	than	1%	reported	it	would	take	them	over	an	hour	to	travel	to	the	polls.	Both	tables	clearly	show	a	wide	amount	of	variation	in	the	amount	of	time	people	expected	to	spend	voting.		Considering	the	opportunity	costs	of	time	should	correspond	to	the	amount	of	time	spent	voting,	we	would	expect	that	voters	consider	both	travel	time	and	wait	time	when	they	report	how	difficult	it	is	to	find	time	to	vote.		More	formally:	
4.	Respondents	who	expect	to	spend	more	time	traveling	should	be	more	likely	to	
report	a	higher	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote.	
5.	Respondents	who	expect	to	spend	more	time	waiting	in	line	should	be	more	likely	to	
report	a	higher	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote.	Additionally,	some	people	do	not	mind	waiting	as	much	as	other	people.		For	some	people,	waiting	can	impose	an	“irritation	cost”	regardless	of	what	they	are	sacrificing	to	be	there.		In	the	language	of	tasks	and	trade-offs,	the	sub-task	of	waiting	in	line	entails	a	higher	trade-off	for	some	people.		I	would	expect	that	this	interacts	with	the	cost	of	waiting	to	vote:	
6.	The	impact	of	expected	wait	time	on	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	should	be	
stronger	for	those	who	dislike	waiting	to	vote	more.	To	test	these	hypotheses,	I	run	linear	models	predicting	perceived	time	costs	with	predictors	being	the	voter’s	major	tasks	on	Election	Day	and	adding	additional	variables	for	expected	travel	time,	wait	time,	a	dislike	for	waiting,	and	an	interaction	between	a	dislike	for	waiting	and	wait	time.		These	models	will	not	include	the	flexibility	measures	from	the	previous	section	in	order	to	preserve	observations	and	reduce	the	complexity	of	the	model.		If	my	hypotheses	are	correct,	we	should	observe	statistically	significant	coefficients	for	both	travel	time	and	wait	time.		
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Additionally,	a	dislike	for	waiting	should	have	a	significant	effect,	but	the	constituent	interaction	terms	should	become	insignificant	when	the	interaction	term	is	added.	
Table	38:	Predicting	Perceived	Time	Cost	with	Additional	Factors		 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	 Model	4		 Coef.	(S.E.)	 Coef.	(S.E.)	 Coef.	(S.E.)	 Coef.	(S.E.)	
At	Work	 0.46***		(0.06)	 0.36***		(0.05)	 0.35***		(0.05)	 0.35***		(0.05)	At	School	 0.65***		(0.09)	 0.42***		(0.09)	 0.43***		(0.09)	 0.42***		(0.09)	Watching	Dependents	 0.19**				(0.06)	 0.21***		(0.06)	 0.20**		(0.06)	 0.20**		(0.06)	Travel	Time	 	 0.14***		(0.03)	 0.13***		(0.03)	 0.14***		(0.03)	Wait	Time	 	 0.18***		(0.02)	 0.16***		(0.02)	 0.01				(0.07)	Hate	Waiting	 	 	 0.11***		(0.02)	 0.03				(0.04)	Wait	*	Hate	 	 	 	 0.04*		(0.02)	Constant	 1.41***		(0.046)	 0.86***		(0.060)	 0.54***		(0.09)	 0.82***		(0.14)	Psuedo	R-sq.	 .099	 .257	 .286	 .291	AIC	 1702.8	 1352.1	 1322.9	 1319.0	Observations	 758	 674	 672	 672	Note:	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.		t	p	<	0.1;	*	p	<	0.05;	**	p	<0.01		 Table	38	shows	multiple	models,	each	one	adding	an	additional	parameter	as	described	in	the	previous	paragraph.		As	we	can	see,	each	factor	has	a	strong,	significant	impact	on	voters’	perceived	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote.		Additionally,	the	
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interaction	term	added	in	Model	4	between	a	dislike	for	waiting	and	expected	wait	time	in	is	significant	while	the	constituent	terms	for	the	interaction	both	become	statistically	insignificant.		This	means	that	these	data	demonstrate	strong	support	for	all	three	hypotheses	described	above.		Voters	seem	to	be	considering	factors	that	shape	the	time	they	spend	voting	as	well	as	the	trade-offs	associated	with	this	time.		Furthermore,	voters	appear	to	consider	their	dislike	for	waiting	and	weigh	their	wait	time	in	conjunction	with	this	preference.		These	findings	suggest	that	voters	are	making	quite	complicated	assessments	of	many	different	factors	when	they	report	their	perceived	costs	of	voting.	
IV.	i.	c.	Comparing	Specific	Factors	and	Perceived	Cost	In	the	previous	section,	I	regressed	the	task	factors	on	the	perceived	task	cost	to	show	that	voters	are	considering	all	the	individual-specific	factors	when	self-reporting	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote.		The	second	strategy	I	use	to	see	if	perceived	costs	are	accurate	relies	on	information	theory.		Under	information	theory,	adding	more	predictive	factors	is	not	necessarily	desirable	if	the	additional	factors	are	not	contributing	much	to	the	predictive	power	of	a	model.		Information	theory	relies	on	the	idea	that	theories	should	be	parsimonious	in	explaining	phenomena,	and	adding	more	complexity	should	always	be	balanced	against	the	amount	of	information	added	by	the	new	factors	(Schwarz	1978).	It	may	seem	obvious	that	the	self-reported	difficulty	of	a	task	by	itself	is	a	much	more	parsimonious	predictor	of	the	task’s	cost	than	a	multitude	of	individual-specific	factors.		However,	if	the	perceived	difficulty	of	the	task	does	not	incorporate	these	specific	factors	into	its	measure,	it	will	not	predict	the	cost	well	and	thus	will	not	be	parsimonious,	since	this	requires	predictive	power.		The	task	at	hand,	then,	is	to	use	information	theory	measures	to	compare	models	that	contain	the	specific	cost	factors	to	models	that	only	contain	the	one	perceived	difficulty	measure.			How	can	these	models	be	compared	without	some	measure	of	the	“true”	cost	of	this	task?		Although	an	individual’s	utility	function	weighing	costs	and	benefits	is	unobservable,	I	argue	we	can	consider	the	impact	of	these	factors	on	participation	
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as	a	proxy	for	their	impacts	on	the	“true”	cost	of	the	task.		If	we	assume	that	respondents	vary	randomly	in	how	they	perceive	the	benefits	of	voting,	then	any	systematic	relationships	between	cost	factors	and	participation	result	from	the	impact	of	these	factors	on	costs,	and	costs	on	participation.		This	analysis	relies	on	the	assumption	that	there	are	no	systematic	relationships	between	the	costs	and	the	benefits	of	voting,	which	is	a	strong	assumption	that	should	be	tested	in	further	research.	Based	on	this	assumption,	my	approach	is	to	use	logistic	models	of	whether	or	not	a	registered	voter	cast	a	ballot	in	the	2016	general	election	and	include	different	cost	measures	as	predictors.		If	adding	in	the	individual-specific	factors	does	not	increase	the	information	of	the	model,	then	we	can	conclude	that	the	individual-specific	factors	are	not	needed	and	the	perceived	cost	measure	is	sufficient	for	measuring	this	cost	area.		On	the	other	hand,	if	I	find	that	the	individual-specific	factors	substantially	increase	the	information	contained	in	the	model,	we	would	conclude	that	accurately	measuring	this	cost	requires	more	specific	and	objective	measurements	than	the	perceived	difficulty	measure.		As	an	objective	measure	of	the	information	in	the	model,	I	employ	Akaike’s	Information	Criterion	(AIC).		The	AIC	uses	the	likelihood	of	the	model	and	the	number	of	parameters	to	generate	a	statistic	that	is	comparable	among	models	with	the	same	observations	and	dependent	variables.		Although	it	is	only	a	relative	statistic,	it	is	useful	for	comparing	more	complex	models	to	simpler	models	by	adding	and	subtracting	variables	from	what	is	otherwise	the	same	model	using	the	same	data	(Burnham	&	Anderson	2002).	Table	39	shows	the	results	of	a	model	predicting	voting	in	the	2016	general	election	as	a	function	of	just	the	perceived	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	(Model	1),	just	the	specific	factors	that	influence	this	perceived	task	cost	(Model	2),	or	the	perceived	task	cost	in	addition	to	the	specific,	objectively	measureable	factors.		The	first	takeaway	is	that	while	we	observed	earlier	that	the	specific	cost	factors	influence	the	perceived	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote,	many	of	these	specific	factors	do	not	have	a	significant	impact	on	the	behavior	of	voting.	
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Table	39:	Predicting	Voting	using	Perceived	Costs	vs.	Specific	Factors	
	 Perceived	Difficulty	 Individual	Factors	 Perceived	Difficulty	and	Indiv.	Factors		 Coef.	(S.E.)	 Coef.	(S.E.)	 Coef.	(S.E.)	Perceived	Difficulty	of	Finding	Time	 -0.638***	(0.161)	 	 -0.461*	(0.203)	At	Work	 	 0.405	(0.312)	 -0.623t	(0.333)	At	School	 	 -0.129	(0.464)	 0.108	(0.477)	Watching	Dependents	 	 -0.590t	(0.303)	 -0.466	(0.311)	Travel	Time	 	 -0.289**	(0.106)	 -0.242*	(0.109)	Wait	Time	 	 -0.141	(0.326)	 -0.137	(0.322)	Hate	Waiting	 	 -0.223	(0.219)	 -0.200	(0.220)	Wait	*	Hate	 	 0.0001	(0.080)	 0.018	(0.079)	Constant	 3.527***	(0.354)	 3.916	(0.845)	 4.300***	(0.861)	Psuedo	R-sq.	 .038	 .059	 .072	AIC	 388.64	 392.04	 388.92	Observations	 672	 672	 672	Note:	t	p	<	.1;	*	p	<	.05;	**	p	<	.01;	***	p	<	.001	
	 However,	the	main	finding	from	Table	39	is	that	using	the	specific	cost	factors	does	not	increase	the	information	in	the	model	over	using	the	perceived	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	by	itself.		The	model	with	the	lowest	AIC	is	the	model	which	only	uses	the	perceived	cost	to	predict	voting,	although	it	is	basically	indistinguishable	in	its	information	score	from	the	model	with	both	the	specific	factors	and	the	perceived	cost.		What	this	means	is	that	the	specific,	objectively	measureable	factors	like	travel	time,	being	at	school	on	Tuesday,	etc.	do	not	contribute	enough	new	information	to	justify	their	inclusion	in	the	model.		However,	Table	39	only	shows	models	with	all	or	none	of	the	specific	factors,	this	finding	does	not	necessarily	hold	true	for	any	combination	of	one	or	more	
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specific	factors	with	the	perceived	difficulty.		Although	it	would	be	beyond	the	scope	(and	purpose)	of	this	project	to	analyze	every	possible	combination	of	variables	to	attain	the	lowest	possible	AIC,	it	is	worth	looking	at	what	happens	to	this	comparison	if	some	of	the	least	predictive	variables	are	removed.			
Table	40:	Predicting	Voting	using	Perceived	Costs	vs.	Specific	Factors	
	 Perceived	Difficulty	 Individual	Factors	 Perceived	Difficulty	and	Indiv.	Factors		 Coef.	(S.E.)	 Coef.	(S.E.)	 Coef.	(S.E.)	Perceived	Difficulty	of	Finding	Time	 -0.638***	(0.161)	 	 -0.679**	(0.175)	At	Work	 	 0.163	(0.297)	 0.535	t	(0.322)	At	School	 	 -0.570	(0.424)	 -0.067	(0.454)	Watching	Dependents	 	 -0.612*	(0.296)	 -0.413		(0.306)	Constant	 3.527***	(0.354)	 2.522***	(0.241)	 3.496***	(0.362)	Psuedo	R-sq.	 .038	 .015	 .052	AIC	 388.64	 401.57	 388.85	Observations	 672	 672	 672	Note:	t	p	<	.1;	*	p	<	.05;	**	p	<	.01;	***	p	<	.001		 Table	40	shows	the	results	of	the	same	logistic	regressions	predicting	voting	as	Table	39,	but	excluding	the	variables	for	travel	time,	wait	time,	a	dislike	for	waiting,	and	the	interaction	term	between	the	last	two.		Although	travel	time	is	a	good	predictor	of	voting,	I	exclude	it	from	this	model	since	it	overlaps	two	task	costs:	finding	time	to	vote	and	traveling	to	the	polls.		It	would	not	be	a	fair	test	of	the	perceived	time	cost	to	include	a	predictive	measure	whose	effect	is	probably	overlapping	also	with	the	perceived	travel	cost.		With	the	specific	cost	factors	reduced	to	the	most	important	terms,	Models	1	and	3	are	still	equivalent	in	their	AIC	scores.			
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There	are	a	few	conclusions	that	we	can	draw	from	this	subsection.		First,	the	perceived	cost	factor	is	definitely	needed	to	predict	voting	accurately,	as	by	itself	it	is	a	better	predictor	of	voting	than	the	combination	of	many	cost	factors.		Second,	adding	in	too	many	predictive	terms,	such	as	the	6	specific	cost	factors	plus	an	interaction	like	in	Model	3	in	Table	39,	is	inefficient	in	that	it	includes	too	many	unnecessary	variables.	Since	the	specific	cost	factors	do	not	add	a	very	large	amount	of	additional	information,	voters	are	for	the	most	part	reporting	very	sensible	perceived	costs	that	largely	line	up	with	their	specific,	objectively	measureable	factors	like	working	or	attending	school.		These	data	largely	support	my	hypothesized	structure	of	costs	as	grouping	into	task	areas	(like	finding	time	to	vote)	and	they	support	the	idea	that	voters	are	aware	of	what	shapes	their	costs,	and	they	can	sensible	self-report	costs	without	having	to	go	through	a	multitude	of	specific	questions.	Now	we	can	formulate	an	answer	to	one	of	the	questions	posed	at	the	beginning	of	this	section:	Do	we	need	the	specific	cost	factors	to	predict	voting?		The	answer	is	yes	if	we	are	trying	to	use	all	present	information	to	create	the	best	predictive	model	as	judged	by	the	pseudo	R-squared	measure.		However,	this	need	must	be	balanced	against	the	need	of	survey	instruments	to	be	as	parsimonious	as	possible	in	order	to	have	low	costs	and	short	survey	times.		The	AIC	measure,	which	is	based	on	information	theory,	clearly	shows	that	a	model	without	the	specific	cost	factors	uses	the	information	just	as	efficiently	as	a	more	complicated	model	with	the	specific	factors.		Given	the	need	for	shorter	survey	instruments	to	reduce	costs,	these	data	suggest	that	surveys	need	only	include	a	measure	of	the	perceived	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	in	order	to	capture	this	task	cost.	
IV.	ii.	Going	Deeper:	Traveling	to	the	Polling	Place	The	other	task	for	which	the	perceived	cost	measure	needs	to	be	validated	is	the	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polling	place.		For	the	third	task	(finding	the	polling	place),	I	did	not	ask	any	questions	on	objectively	measureable	specific	factors	that	allow	this	type	of	validation.		Although	I	do	not	have	as	many	measured	factors	that	
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influence	the	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls	as	I	do	for	finding	time	to	vote,	there	are	enough	questions	about	transportation	options	and	travel	time	to	warrant	an	investigation.	
IV.	ii.	a.	Predicting	Perceived	Travel	Cost	using	Specific	Factors	My	theory	in	Chapter	1	lays	out	the	idea	that	the	costs	of	each	task	are	shaped	by	both	environmental	factors	that	affect	the	task	itself,	and	personal	factors	that	affect	one’s	trade-offs	associated	with	the	task.		For	the	task	of	traveling	to	the	polls,	environmental	factors	include	the	voting	system	(like	vote	by	mail	vs.	in-person	balloting),	the	distance	to	the	polling	place,	and	the	impedance	of	the	route	to	the	polls	(traffic,	obstacles	like	intersections,	etc.).		To	measure	these	environmental	factors,	I	chose	to	ask	about	expected	travel	time	rather	than	separate	questions	on	distance,	impedance,	etc.		Expected	travel	time	is	a	concept	that	people	can	answer	even	if	they	do	not	know	exactly	where	the	polling	place	is,	while	the	other	questions	rely	on	more	personal	experience.		Question	V8	asks	respondents	how	long	they	expect	it	would	take	them	to	travel	to	the	polling	place,	and	is	the	only	question	in	my	survey	to	measure	a	specific	factor	influencing	the	task	itself.		My	first	hypothesis	for	this	subsection	is	that	longer	travel	times	should	increase	travel	costs:	
7.	Respondents	who	report	longer	expected	travel	times	should	be	more	likely	to	report	
higher	costs	of	traveling	to	the	polls.	I	asked	a	series	of	several	questions	regarding	the	trade-offs	that	voters	face	when	trying	to	accomplish	the	task	of	traveling	to	the	polls.		Question	V12	asks	respondents	if	they	have	a	current	drivers’	license,	and	Question	V13	asks	voters	if	they	have	access	to	a	vehicle	on	Tuesdays.		Both	of	these	measures	together	provide	information	on	whether	the	respondent	can	drive	herself	to	the	polls	on	Election	Day.		My	next	hypothesis	in	this	section	is	that	vehicle	access	should	reduce	travel	costs:	
8.	Respondents	who	can	drive	themselves	to	the	polling	place	should	be	less	likely	to	
report	higher	costs	of	traveling	to	the	polls.	
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For	respondents	who	answered	that	they	did	not	have	a	vehicle	or	a	license,	I	assume	that	they	must	walk,	bike,	use	public	transportation,	or	a	ride-sharing	service	to	get	to	the	polls.		I	asked	a	series	of	questions	about	their	use	of	these	services	and	how	convenient	they	are	to	use.		Question	V14	asks	if	respondents	use	public	transportation,	and	V15	asks	how	difficult	it	is	to	travel	around	town	using	this	service.		I	asked	equivalent	question	about	ride-sharing	services	like	Uber	or	Lyft	(V16	and	V17).		My	next	hypotheses	are	that	these	services	should	reduce	travel	costs,	and	more	so	if	they	are	convenient:	
9.	Respondents	who	use	public	transportation	or	ride-sharing	services	should	be	less	
likely	to	report	higher	costs	of	traveling	to	the	polls.	
10.		The	impact	of	using	public	transportation	or	ride-sharing	services	on	the	cost	of	
traveling	should	be	larger	for	those	who	report	the	services	are	more	convenient.	I	test	these	three	hypotheses	using	a	similar	design	to	what	I	employed	for	the	analysis	of	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote.		I	use	dummy	variables	for	vehicle	access,	public	transportation	use,	and	ride-sharing	use	to	predict	the	self-reported	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls	in	a	linear	regression.		If	Hypothesis	7	is	correct,	those	who	report	a	longer	travel	time	to	the	polls	should	report	a	higher	traveling	cost.		Table	41	shows	the	results	of	a	linear	regression	where	expected	travel	time	is	regressed	on	perceived	travel	cost.	Table	41	provides	strong	support	for	Hypothesis	7.		As	expected	travel	time	increases,	respondents’	self-reported	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls	increases.		A	4-unit	change	in	the	travel	time	(40	minutes	for	most	of	the	range)	would	increase	the	expected	travel	cost	by	over	1	unit	on	the	4-point	difficulty	scale,	for	example	from	“fairly	easy”	to	“fairly	difficult.”				 	
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Table	41:	Predicting	Travel	Cost	with	Time	
Difficulty of Traveling Coefficient (standard 
error) 
Statistical Significance 
Expected travel time 0.287 
(0.019) 
0.000 
Constant 0.972 
(0.035) 
0.000 
R-squared .239 
Observations 750 	 If	hypotheses	8	and	9	are	correct,	the	dummy	variables	for	each	of	these	factors	should	be	statistically	significant	and	negative,	as	they	should	each	significantly	reduce	the	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls.		Table	42	shows	the	results	of	a	linear	regression	where	the	three	transportation	options	are	used	as	dummy	variables	to	predict	self-reported	traveling	cost.	
Table	42:	Predicting	Travel	Cost	with	Transportation	Options	
Difficulty of Traveling Coefficient (standard 
error) 
Statistical Significance 
Vehicle Access -0.323 
(0.161) 
0.045 
Public Transportation -0.185 
(0.183) 
0.310 
Ride-Sharing Services 0.271 
(0.144) 
0.060 
Constant 1.701 
(0.159) 
0.000 
R-squared .033 
Observations 755 	
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The	results	in	Table	42	provide	mixed	evidence	for	Hypothesis	8.		Vehicle	access	is	a	statistically	significant	predictor	of	travel	costs	and	shows	the	expected	negative	relationship	with	costs;	having	a	vehicle	makes	most	people	report	traveling	to	the	polls	is	less	difficult.		Using	public	transportation	has	the	expected	negative	coefficient,	but	the	variable	is	statistically	insignificant	so	no	conclusions	can	be	drawn	about	its	impact.		The	use	of	ride-sharing	services	is	almost	significant	at	conventional	levels,	but	actually	shows	the	opposite	of	the	predicted	coefficient	from	Hypothesis	9;	it	appears	that	use	of	ride-sharing	services	could	increase	this	cost.		It	is	possible	that	the	small	number	of	observations	on	people	who	use	ride-sharing	and	public	transit	prevents	us	from	finding	a	relationship	with	travel	costs.		It	is	also	possible	that	no	relationship	can	be	seen	until	we	consider	the	convenience	of	these	transportation	options	as	well;	riding	the	bus	may	not	decrease	travel	costs	unless	the	bus	provides	a	convenient	enough	route	and	schedule	to	make	it	preferable	to	walking.	If	hypothesis	10	is	correct,	there	should	be	an	interactive	effect	between	the	convenience	of	using	public	transit	and	ride-sharing	and	the	use	of	these	options.		To	test	this	hypothesis,	I	first	run	a	model	adding	in	the	convenience	of	each	option	as	additional	predictive	variables.		Then,	ideally	I	would	interact	these	terms	with	the	dummy	variables	for	using	these	options	to	see	how	they	affect	self-reported	travel	costs.		As	I	describe	below,	this	was	not	possible	with	these	data.		 	
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Table	43:	Predicting	Travel	Cost	with	Transportation	Options	and	Convenience	
Difficulty of Traveling Coefficient (standard 
error) 
Statistical Significance 
Public Transportation -0.586 
(0.289) 
0.046 
Convenience (Public Trans) 0.339 
(0.106) 
0.002 
Ride-Sharing Services -0.188 
(0.258) 
0.469 
Convenience (Ride-Sharing) 0.252 
(0.121) 
0.041 
Constant 1.616 
(0.194) 
0.000 
R-squared .178 
Observations 93 	 Table	43	shows	the	results	of	the	first	model,	which	adds	in	the	convenience	variables	for	public	transportation	usage	and	ride-sharing.		Since	the	convenience	questions	were	not	asked	of	people	who	had	vehicles,	I	have	reduced	the	observations	for	this	model	to	just	the	people	who	cannot	drive	themselves.		Although	this	reduces	the	statistical	power	of	the	model,	I	still	find	interesting	relationships.		Both	access	to	public	transportation	and	to	ride-sharing	now	have	the	negative	relationships	predicted	by	Hypothesis	9,	although	ride-sharing	is	still	insignificant.		However,	the	main	interesting	result	is	that	the	convenience	of	both	forms	of	transportation	has	a	significant	and	positive	relationship	with	the	travel	cost.		Options	that	are	more	difficult	seem	to	increase	the	travel	cost,	but	interactive	models	are	needed	to	confirm	this.		Unfortunately,	due	to	the	few	number	of	observations,	I	could	not	run	interactive	models	as	it	would	result	in	omitted	variables	for	each	interaction	term.		However,	the	evidence	in	Table	43	is	strongly	
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suggestive	that	the	effect	of	the	presence	of	transportation	options	is	mediated	by	how	convenient	they	are	to	the	voter.	
IV.	ii.	b.	Comparing	Specific	Factors	and	Perceived	Cost	The	final	subsection	of	this	chapter	uses	information	theory	to	see	if	the	perceived	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls	captures	the	information	present	in	the	specific	cost	factors	like	vehicle	access	and	transportation	convenience.		To	see	if	the	specific	measures	add	more	information	that	is	not	contained	in	the	perceived	measure,	I	employ	the	same	strategy	as	I	did	for	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote.		I	run	logistic	regressions	on	voting	using	the	perceived	cost	measure	and	specific	objective	cost	measures	to	see	which	model	captures	the	information	most	efficiently.	
Table	44:	Predicting	Voting	using	Perceived	Cost	vs.	Specific	Factors	
	 Perceived	Difficulty	 Individual	Factors	 Perceived	Difficulty	and	Indiv.	Factors		 Coef.	(S.E.)	 Coef.	(S.E.)	 Coef.	(S.E.)	Perceived	Difficulty	of	Transportation	 -0.875***	(0.155)	 	 -0.867***	(0.161)	Vehicle	Access	 	 0.690	(0.698)	 0.505	(0.710)	Public	Trans.	 	 2.981*	(1.522)	 2.875t	(1.630)	Conv.	(Public	Trans.)	 	 -0.578	(0.491)	 -0.356	(0.499)	Ride-Sharing	 	 -1.934	(1.364)	 -2.327	(1.510)	Conv.	(Ride-Sharing)	 	 0.177	(0.449)	 0.421	(0.483)	Constant	 3.607***	(0.299)	 1.580***	(0.686)	 3.086***	(0.759)	Psuedo	R-sq.	 .062	 .017	 .073	AIC	 458.40	 488.22	 462.99	Observations	 755	 755	 755	Note:	t	p	<	.1;	*	p	<	.05;	**	p	<	.01;	***	p	<	.001	
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Table	44	shows	the	results	of	logistic	regressions	on	voting	with	and	without	different	predictive	variables.			Judging	by	the	AIC,	the	model	containing	solely	the	perceived	difficulty	of	traveling	to	the	polls	makes	the	most	efficient	use	of	the	information	present	in	these	data.			When	the	specific	factors	are	used	in	Model	2	without	the	perceived	cost	measure,	they	predict	voting	very	poorly	as	seen	by	the	much	higher	AIC	and	substantially	lower	pseudo	R-squared.			Although	adding	in	the	specific	factors	in	Model	3	increases	the	pseudo	R-squared,	these	variables	are	all	insignificant	at	conventional	levels	and	are	unnecessary	by	the	AIC	measure	as	they	are	not	adding	any	substantial	information	not	already	captured	by	the	perceived	cost	measure.	Similarly	to	the	analysis	on	the	perceived	cost	factor	for	finding	time	to	vote,	this	analysis	shows	the	perceived	cost	factor	is	definitely	needed	to	predict	voting	accurately.		None	of	the	specific	cost	factors	come	close	to	explaining	as	much	variance	in	voter	turnout	as	the	perceived	difficulty	of	traveling	to	the	polls.		This	means	that	much	like	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote,	voters	are	for	the	most	part	reporting	very	sensible	perceived	traveling	costs	that	largely	correspond	with	their	objectively	measureable	factors	like	vehicle	access	or	use	of	public	transportation.		These	data	largely	support	my	hypothesized	structure	of	costs	as	grouping	into	task	areas	(like	traveling	to	the	polls)	and	they	support	the	theory	that	voters	can	self-report	their	own	costs	for	each	task	without	having	to	report	on	a	number	of	specific	factors.	In	subsection	IV.	i.	c.,	I	showed	that	we	do	not	need	the	specific	cost	factors	for	finding	time	to	vote	to	create	a	parsimonious	model	of	voting.		Now,	we	can	formulate	an	answer	to	this	question	for	transportation	costs	as	well.		If	we	are	trying	to	use	all	present	information	to	create	the	best	predictive	model,	then	we	would	want	to	include	as	many	measures	as	possible.		However,	if	we	want	a	parsimonious	survey	instrument	that	can	easily	be	fielded	and	will	yield	good	predictive	power,	information	theory	shows	that	we	only	need	to	use	the	perceived	cost	measure	for	traveling	to	the	polls.	
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V.	Conclusion	In	this	chapter,	I	demonstrated	that	consistent	with	my	theory	from	Chapter	1,	the	costs	of	voting	group	into	three	distinct	task	areas	of	finding	time	to	vote,	locating	the	polls,	and	traveling	to	the	polls.		The	self-reported	perceived	costs	for	each	task	area	accurately	reflect	objectively	measureable	factors	that	should	influence	the	costs	of	each	task	and	these	cost-shaping	factors	mostly	do	not	contribute	information	except	through	these	perceived	costs.		Presumably	if	I	had	measured	details	on	finding	the	polls	and	if	I	could	have	measured	registration	costs	they	would	have	also	shown	unique	information	that	corresponds	to	specific	factors	shaping	the	registration	task	and	its	trade-offs.			However,	the	cost	areas	share	some	correlation,	as	seen	by	their	loading	on	a	common	factor	and	how	the	parameters	react	when	all	the	costs	are	included	in	the	same	model.		This	correlation	is	not	unexpected,	first	because	psychological	factors	may	cause	respondents	to	report	difficulty	in	different	ways,	with	some	consistently	over-	or	under-estimating.		Additionally,	SES	factors	may	cause	respondents	to	experience	costs	that	are	correlated	in	a	more	objective	sense.		People	working	low-income	hourly	jobs	probably	face	higher	costs	in	other	areas	in	addition	to	how	this	job	affects	their	time.		Even	if	it	is	not	surprising,	this	correlation	presents	some	difficulties	in	estimating	the	impacts	of	the	costs	in	the	next	chapter	and	should	be	a	topic	for	further	research.	One	interesting	question	motivating	this	project	was	the	relationship	between	the	costs	of	voting	and	socio-economic	factors.		In	this	chapter	I	demonstrated	that	the	task	costs	are	largely	separate	from	SES	factors,	which	implies	that	the	resource	theory	is	insufficient	as	an	explanation	for	how	SES	affects	voting.		Although	homeownership	is	correlated	with	voting	costs,	the	correlation	is	not	enough	to	explain	most	of	the	variation	in	the	costs,	which	seems	to	come	more	from	non-SES	factors	like	having	childcare	responsibilities	or	an	inflexible	schedule.	for	their	separation	as	distinct	concepts	rather	than	as	proxies	for	each	other.	
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Finally,	I	showed	that	at	least	for	the	tasks	of	finding	time	to	vote	and	traveling	to	the	polls,	the	perceived	cost	measures	are	sufficient	for	measuring	the	costs	of	voting	in	surveys.		Although	adding	specific	cost-shaping	factors	like	vehicle	access	can	improve	the	predictive	power	of	models,	information	theory	shows	that	these	factors	are	not	necessary	for	an	efficient	model	predicting	voting.		This	is	good	news	for	future	studies	because	it	means	researchers	only	need	to	ask	three	or	four	questions	to	capture	the	totality	of	voting	costs.			 	
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Chapter	4:	Impacts	of	the	Costs	of	Voting	
I.	Introduction	In	the	previous	chapters,	I	laid	out	a	theory	for	the	structure	of	the	costs	of	voting,	created	an	instrument	to	measure	them,	and	showed	which	measures	are	needed	to	capture	the	costs	of	voting.		Now	that	I	have	established	the	utility	of	the	survey	instrument	for	measuring	costs,	the	remaining	questions	my	project	aims	to	answer	have	to	do	with	the	impact	of	these	costs.		Specifically,	how	much	do	the	costs	of	voting	impact	political	participation	in	terms	of	validated	voter	turnout?		If	we	know	how	much	different	voting	costs	affect	turnout,	then	we	can	combine	this	information	with	predictions	or	information	on	how	different	election	reforms	affect	costs.		Combined	together,	these	data	would	allow	us	to	see	how	much	voting	policies	affect	voting	specifically	through	the	cost	pathway.		This	would	also	allow	us	to	generate	more	accurate	answers	to	the	question:	If	we	adopted	a	specific	policy	that	changed	the	costs	of	different	tasks,	how	much	would	these	changes	impact	turnout	in	the	electorate?	Additionally,	I	am	interested	in	how	much	these	costs	impact	peoples’	intentions	to	vote	as	well	as	actual	behavior.		Vote	intention	is	often	used	as	a	proxy	for	voting	in	surveys,	so	it	is	useful	to	know	if	voters	have	considered	the	costs	of	voting	when	reporting	vote	intention.		Although	multiple	studies	have	looked	at	vote	intention	and	the	factors	that	shape	it	or	connect	it	to	behavior,	none	have	examined	the	effects	of	voting	costs	on	intention	to	vote.		As	I	describe	in	section	III	of	this	chapter,	behavioral	theories	connecting	intention	to	behavior	suggest	different	possibilities	for	how	costs	affect	intention	to	perform	an	action.		One	goal	of	this	chapter	is	to	see	if	these	behavioral	theories	can	be	joined	in	some	way	to	the	rational	utility	model	by	seeing	whether	costs	affect	vote	intention	like	they	do	voting	behavior.	
II.	Impacts	of	the	Costs	of	Voting	on	Validated	Voting	Behavior	
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II.	i.	Statistical	Models	How	much	does	each	of	the	three	tasks	of	voting	for	registered	voters	affect	their	likelihood	of	showing	up	to	cast	a	ballot	on	Election	Day?		In	Chapter	3	I	showed	that,	at	least	for	the	two	task	areas	I	had	enough	specific	questions	on,	the	perceived	task	costs	provide	succinct	summaries	of	all	the	specific	factors	that	influence	voters’	costs	of	performing	each	of	the	tasks	of	voting.		Voters	are	aware	of	the	specific	influences	on	their	costs,	and	they	seem	to	report	perceived	difficulty	of	each	task	based	on	their	unique	combinations	of	factors.		Therefore,	we	can	get	a	good	idea	of	how	much	costs	can	impact	voter	turnout	by	looking	at	these	perceived	difficulty	questions	and	their	substantive	effects	on	predicted	voter	turnout.	There	is	a	challenge	in	accurately	reporting	the	impact	of	each	task	cost	on	voting—the	correlations	between	the	task	costs	among	the	survey	respondents.		As	I	pointed	out	at	the	beginning	of	Chapter	3,	there	is	some	correlation	between	the	different	cost	factors	from	an	uncertain	origin.		It	could	be	the	case	that	some	people	have	substantially	higher	costs	across	all	three	tasks	as	a	result	of	their	particular	life	circumstances.		If	people	who	have	childcare	responsibilities	or	inflexible	work	hours	are	also	less	likely	to	have	a	vehicle,	this	could	create	a	correlation	between	the	cost	areas.		For	example,	a	fast	food	worker	may	not	have	the	money	for	a	car	due	to	his	job’s	low	wages,	and	he	also	has	an	inflexible	schedule	that	increases	his	time	cost	since	the	service	industry	provides	strict	hourly	shifts.		However,	it	could	also	be	the	case	that	some	people	tend	to	perceive	everything	to	be	more	difficult	than	other	people.		If	some	survey	respondents	see	everything	as	more	costly,	they	might	report	all	task	costs	as	higher	just	due	to	the	way	they	perceive	survey	questions	or	the	concept	of	difficulty.	The	correlation	between	factors	presents	a	predicament	for	seeing	their	“true”	impacts	on	voter	turnout.		If	they	all	tend	to	vary	together	due	to	life	circumstances	as	in	the	first	explanation,	then	the	“true”	impact	of	a	task	cost	is	its	direct	effect	on	voting	as	well	as	its	indirect	effect	through	other	task	costs	on	voting.		For	example,	if	finding	time	to	vote	is	difficult	for	a	voter	because	of	his	
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inflexible	schedule	from	a	low-paying	job,	and	transportation	is	also	difficult	because	his	job	does	not	pay	enough	to	afford	a	car,	then	looking	at	the	effect	of	the	time	cost	alone	is	not	an	accurate	reflection	of	his	costs.		This	would	suggest	we	should	not	control	for	the	other	cost	areas	when	predicting	a	cost’s	impact	in	order	to	see	its	full	effect.	On	the	other	hand,	if	the	costs	vary	together	because	of	some	psychological	mechanism	that	causes	some	people	to	answer	all	the	questions	with	higher	or	lower	costs,	then	we	should	only	look	at	the	direct	impact	of	a	cost	on	turnout.		This	would	suggest	that	we	should	control	for	the	other	cost	areas	so	as	to	not	inflate	the	impact	of	a	task	cost	on	voting.	
Table	45:	Impact	of	Cost	Areas	on	Validated	Voter	Turnout	
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Locating Polling 
Place 
-0.535*** 
(0.106) 
  -0.303* 
(0.132) 
Traveling to the 
Polls 
 -0.876*** 
(0.0155) 
 -0.422t 
(0.222) 
Finding Time to 
Vote 
  -0.728*** 
(0.144) 
-0.250 
(0.210) 
Constant 3.190*** 
(0.250) 
3.607*** 
(0.299) 
3.667*** 
(0.332) 
3.944*** 
(0.357) 
Psuedo R-
squared 
.049 .062 .052 .068 
Observations 757 757 758 745 Note:	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.		t	p	<	0.1;	*	p	<	0.05;	**	p	<	0.01;	***	p	<	0.001		Since	I	am	not	sure	which	strategy	is	more	justified	in	this	situation,	I	run	both	types	of	analyses:	one	in	which	I	estimate	the	impact	of	each	cost	independently,	and	one	in	which	I	estimate	the	impact	of	each	cost	while	controlling	for	the	other	costs.		Table	45	reports	the	results	of	both	of	these	analyses	for	the	
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costs	of	all	three	tasks	needed	to	vote.		Each	of	Models	1	through	3	examines	the	impact	of	individual	task	costs	separately	on	the	probability	of	voting,	while	Model	4	examines	the	impact	of	each	task	cost	when	all	three	are	included	in	the	same	model.		Comparing	the	magnitude	and	statistical	significance	of	each	of	the	cost	variables’	impacts	between	the	separate	models	and	Model	4	reveals	how	the	correlation	of	these	cost	factors	substantially	reduces	their	calculated	effects	when	they	are	all	placed	in	the	same	model.	
II.	ii.	Substantive	Effects	Since	these	are	logistic	models	of	voter	turnout,	the	coefficients	from	Table	45	are	not	easily	interpretable	as	substantive	effects.		To	clearly	show	the	substantive	effect	of	each	cost	in	the	different	models,	I	generate	substantive	effects	by	calculating	predicted	probabilities	while	holding	all	variables	at	their	median	values	and	modifying	only	the	variable	of	interest.		To	generate	confidence	intervals	for	the	predicted	probabilities,	I	use	Clarify	software	to	perform	parametric	bootstraps	on	the	models.		The	figures	below	show	the	substantive	impacts	of	the	different	task	costs	with	95%	confidence	intervals	generated	through	this	process.	Figure	4	shows	the	substantive	impact	of	the	cost	of	locating	the	polling	place	on	the	predicted	probability	that	a	voter	will	cast	a	ballot.		This	substantive	effect	is	calculated	from	Model	1	without	controlling	for	the	other	task	costs.		Figure	1	shows	that	changing	this	task	from	the	least	difficult	(already	knowing	where	to	vote)	to	the	most	difficult	decreases	the	probability	of	voting	by	.243.		
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Figure	4:	Substantive	Effect	of	Locating	the	Polls	(without	controls)	
	
Figure	5:	Substantive	Effect	of	Locating	the	Polls	(with	controls)	
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Figure	5	shows	the	same	substantive	impact	of	locating	the	polls,	but	it	is	calculated	from	Model	4,	in	which	the	other	task	costs	are	control	variables.		When	the	impact	of	finding	the	polling	place	is	isolated	from	the	other	factors,	its	direct	effect	is	much	smaller	than	its	full	effect	shown	in	Figure	4.		Now	the	substantive	effect	is	only	.128,	which	although	substantial	is	around	half	of	the	effect	seen	by	this	cost	without	controlling	for	the	other	costs.		
Figure	6:	Substantive	Effect	of	Traveling	to	the	Polls	(without	controls)	
	Figure	6	shows	the	substantive	effect	of	the	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polling	place	on	the	predicted	probability	of	voting.		This	substantive	effect	is	calculated	from	Model	2	without	controlling	for	the	other	task	costs.		Figure	6	shows	that	changing	this	task	from	the	least	difficult	to	the	most	difficult	decreases	the	probability	of	voting	by	.413.		Clearly	this	task	has	a	very	large	impact	on	the	probability	of	voting,	suggesting	that	increasing	transportation	options	may	be	a	good	strategy	for	increasing	voter	turnout.	
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Figure	7:	Substantive	Effect	of	Traveling	to	the	Polls	(with	controls)	
		However,	Figure	7	shows	that	this	substantive	effect	is	substantially	reduced	when	the	other	task	costs	are	controlled	for.		This	substantive	effect	is	calculated	from	Model	4,	and	it	shows	that	changing	the	difficulty	of	traveling	from	“very	easy”	to	“very	difficult”	decreases	the	probability	of	voting	by	only	.058.		This	is	less	than	1/7	of	the	substantive	effect	calculated	from	Model	2	without	controls!		Clearly	the	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls	is	highly	correlated	with	the	other	task	costs.		
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Figure	8:	Substantive	Effect	of	Finding	Time	(without	controls)	
		Figure	8	shows	the	substantive	effect	of	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	on	the	predicted	probability	of	voting.		This	substantive	effect	is	calculated	from	Model	3	without	controlling	for	the	other	task	costs.		Figure	8	shows	that	changing	this	task	from	the	least	difficult	to	the	most	difficult	decreases	the	probability	of	voting	by	.270.		
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Figure	9:	Substantive	Effect	of	Finding	Time	(with	controls)	
	Figure	9	shows	this	same	substantive	effect,	except	calculated	from	Model	4	with	control	variables	for	the	other	cost	areas.		The	impact	of	changing	the	difficulty	of	finding	time	to	vote	from	the	easiest	to	the	hardest	decreases	the	probability	of	voting	by	.142,	which	is	more	than	half	the	substantive	effect	from	Model	3	without	controls.		This	is	also	the	largest	substantive	effect	of	all	three	cost	areas	when	the	other	cost	areas	are	controlled	for	at	their	median	values.	In	summary,	all	three	task	costs	have	substantial	impacts	on	the	probability	of	a	registered	voter	casting	a	ballot	on	Election	Day.		The	impacts	of	each	task	cost	are	calculated	as	much	larger	if	the	other	costs	are	not	included	as	control	variables,	which	is	a	clear	indication	of	correlation	between	these	task	costs.		This	correlation	makes	interpretation	of	the	results	rather	difficult.	If	the	full	(both	direct	and	indirect)	impact	of	each	cost	area	is	considered,	then	traveling	to	the	polling	place	is	the	cost	area	that	has	the	largest	impact	on	the	probability	of	voting.		However,	if	only	the	direct	impact	of	transportation	is	
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considered,	this	area	has	the	smallest	impact	on	the	probability	of	voting.		This	suggests	that	the	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls	is	not	necessarily	prohibitive	by	itself—rather,	people	who	report	difficulty	traveling	also	report	difficulty	with	other	tasks,	which	in	total	make	them	less	likely	to	vote.	When	controlling	for	the	other	cost	areas	and	only	looking	at	the	direct	impact	of	costs,	finding	the	polling	place	and	finding	time	to	vote	are	approximately	tied	in	the	magnitude	and	statistical	certainty	of	their	effects.		Both	reduce	the	probability	of	voting	by	around	.13	to	.14	even	after	controlling	for	their	correlations	with	the	other	cost	areas.		This	suggests	that	even	if	we	account	for	all	the	other	factors	that	make	people	less	likely	to	vote,	people	who	have	trouble	locating	their	polling	place	still	are	much	less	likely	to	cast	a	ballot.		Similarly,	having	high	opportunity	costs	of	time	make	people	much	less	likely	to	vote	even	when	the	other	costs	are	low	for	them.	These	findings	have	some	implications	for	policies	that	might	increase	voter	turnout	by	decreasing	costs.		Decreasing	the	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls	may	not	have	much	impact	by	itself	since	this	cost	area	is	highly	correlated	with	other	costs—those	who	have	difficulty	with	transportation	also	face	high	time	and	locating	costs	and	will	still	face	challenges	in	voting.		However,	policies	aimed	at	making	it	easier	to	find	the	polling	place	could	have	a	rather	large	impact	(up	to	a	.128	change	in	probability)	if	they	successfully	reduce	this	cost	by	itself.		Public	officials	can	introduce	public	education	campaigns	about	how	to	find	polling	places,	introduce	mobile	apps	with	this	information,	and	make	convenient	websites	to	make	locating	the	polls	easier.	Similarly,	policies	aimed	at	making	it	easier	to	find	time	to	vote	can	have	a	large	impact	of	up	to	a	.142	change	in	probability.		While	election	officials	cannot	change	one’s	work	schedule	or	other	obligations,	they	can	reduce	this	cost	by	enacting	policies	like	early	voting	that	allow	people	a	longer	time	window	in	which	to	vote.		Other	possibilities	include	a	mandatory	election	holiday	or	laws	that	force	employers	to	give	employees	time	off	to	vote.	
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III.	Impacts	of	the	Costs	of	Voting	on	Vote	Intention	Although	validated	voter	turnout	is	the	most	accurate	measure	of	voting	behavior	since	it	avoids	the	social	desirability	bias,	researchers	often	have	to	use	other	measures.		Most	surveys	do	not	collect	enough	personally	identifying	information	to	match	survey	responses	with	voting	records,	and	collecting	this	information	may	not	be	allowed	by	institutional	review	boards.		Even	when	matching	is	allowed,	the	matching	process	can	miss	many	records	if	the	sampling	process	was	post-hoc	matching	rather	than	through	an	initial	sampling	from	the	voter	file	using	voter	IDs.		For	this	reason	many	surveys	rely	on	self-reported	voting	behavior	rather	than	validated	turnout.	My	survey	does	not	contain	a	self-reported	voting	measure	since	it	was	conducted	prior	to	Election	Day	with	no	follow-up	survey	after	the	election.		However,	it	does	include	a	measure	of	voting	intention.		Since	the	survey	was	fielded	less	than	a	week	before	Election	Day,	this	measure	of	intention	is	very	proximate	to	the	voting	period.		Reporting	intention	is	clearly	different	from	reporting	behavior,	although	the	two	are	clearly	linked	in	psychological	models	of	behavior	(Sheeran	2002).		Few	studies	have	measured	the	difference	between	voting	intention	and	actual	voter	behavior,	but	the	authors	of	one	study	have	pointed	out	that	the	measures	are	not	equivalent	and	seem	to	respond	differently	to	variables	that	predict	voting	(Achen	&	Blais	2010).		These	authors	point	out	that	intention	is	widely	used	as	a	proxy	variable	substituting	for	reported	or	validated	turnout,	even	though	intention	is	clearly	a	separate	concept	from	a	fulfilled	action.	Given	that	vote	intention	is	often	used	in	political	science	literature	as	a	proxy	measure	for	voting	behavior	(Achen	&	Blais	2010),	how	the	costs	of	voting	affect	intention	should	be	of	interest	to	many	scholars	of	political	participation.		It	should	also	be	of	interest	to	psychologists	who	study	theories	of	behavior,	such	as	the	“theory	of	planned	behavior”	(Ajzen	1985).		The	psychological	theories	connecting	intention	to	behavior	do	not	directly	address	the	concept	of	costs	since	they	do	not	begin	from	a	cost-benefit	rational	utility	framework.		However,	they	do	
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address	topics	like	“perceived	behavioral	control”	and	“actual	control”	which	can	either	prevent	an	intention	from	being	formed	or	prevent	its	implementation	(Fishbein	&	Ajzen	2015).		As	I	describe	in	the	following	section,	it	is	unclear	how	the	concept	of	control	relates	to	the	concept	of	costs	and	benefits,	or	how	the	rational	utility	model	can	be	joined	with	the	generalized	“reasoned	action	approach”	of	researchers	like	Fishbein	and	Ajzen.		Understanding	if	and	how	voting	costs	affect	intention	to	vote	can	shed	some	light	on	the	connections	between	these	theories.	
III.	i.	Motivation:	The	Reasoned	Action	Approach	vs.	Rational	Utility	Over	the	last	few	decades,	researchers	in	the	field	of	psychology	have	created	a	set	of	theories	regarding	the	relationships	between	goals,	intentions,	and	actions.		For	the	most	part	these	theories	have	become	unified	under	the	“reasoned	action	approach”	(Fishbein	&	Ajzen	2015).		According	to	these	theories,	a	behavior	is	preceded	by	an	intention	to	perform	the	behavior,	which	is	preceded	by	the	development	of	a	desire	to	perform	the	behavior	(Perugini	&	Bagozzi	2004;	Sheeran	2002).		Although	these	terms	seem	similar,	they	are	distinguished	as	separate	concepts	in	the	social	psychology	literature	and	proceed	in	this	causal	order	(Sheeran	2002).		Desires	are	vague	concepts	of	preferred	end-states	of	being	that	precede	intentions	(Perugini	&	Bagozzi	2004).		They	reflect	a	vague	desire	to	perform	an	action	that	is	not	accompanied	by	consideration	of	how	the	goal	may	be	accomplished.		In	the	context	of	a	survey	question,	a	desire	to	vote	might	be	measured	by	agreement	with	the	statement,	“I	want	to	vote	in	this	upcoming	election.”		On	the	other	hand,	behavior	is	directly	influenced	by	the	individual,	his	environment,	and	the	ease	by	which	he	can	perform	the	action	(Sheeran	2002).		In	the	context	of	a	voter	survey,	the	act	of	voting	can	be	measured	either	by	self-reported	voting,	i.e.,	“I	voted	in	the	election	last	November,”	or	by	validated	voter	histories.		Therefore,	desires	and	actions	can	be	seen	as	two	extremes	of	a	continuum,	where	the	obstacles	to	performing	a	behavior	vary	from	unconsidered	to	actually	being	faced	and	possibly	overcome.	
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Intentions	lie	somewhere	between	desires	and	behaviors,	and	their	placement	on	this	scale	depends	on	how	much	the	impediments	and	alternatives	to	the	action	are	considered	(Perugini	&	Bagozzi	2004).		In	the	context	of	a	voter	survey,	intention	is	usually	measured	by	agreement	with	a	statement	like,	“I	intend	to	vote	in	this	upcoming	election.”		Since	an	individual’s	perceived	behavioral	control	is	linked	to	intention	formation,	scholars	advocating	the	“theory	of	planned	behavior”	(TOPB)	have	thought	that	intentions	capture	all	of	same	factors	as	those	affecting	behavior	with	the	exception	of	unforeseen	circumstances	(Ajzen	1985).		This	argument	has	been	made	concerning	voting	behavior	in	particular	(Netemeyer	&	Burton	1990;	Netemeyer,	Burton,	&	Johnston	1991).		Under	this	theory,	factors	affecting	implementation	are	included	in	intentions	because	intentions	involve	planning	for	how	to	undertake	the	action.	However,	intention	can	also	represent	a	more	vague	desire	to	undertake	an	action	without	an	accompanying	consideration	of	all	the	associated	impediments	and	alternatives	to	the	behavior.		This	type	of	intention	has	been	labeled	as	a	“goal	intention”—it	has	a	definitive	desired	end	state	and	a	discrete	action	needed	to	achieve	it,	but	lacks	the	consideration	of	how	that	action	can	be	performed	(Gollwitzer	1993).		There	is	considerable	evidence	that	a	statement	of	intention	is	closer	to	a	vague	goal	unless	the	individual	considers	different	strategies	to	implement	this	intention	under	various	conditions	that	may	arise	(Gollwitzer	et	al.	2009;	Gollwitzer	1993).			So,	we	can	consider	the	causal	pathway	as	desires	à	goal	intentions	à	implementation	intentions	à	behaviors.		Scholars	have	found	that	following	through	on	intention	to	vote	is	subject	to	the	effect	of	prompting	consideration	of	implementation	scenarios	(Nickerson	&	Rogers	2010).		Among	single-voter	households,	considering	implementation	plans	and	predicting	how	to	respond	to	barriers	increased	turnout	by	over	nine	percentage	points.		This	implies	that	for	most	people	who	state	“I	intend	to	vote,”	they	have	not	considered	all	of	obstacles	to	performing	this	action.		Similarly,	Imai	et	al.	(2007)	show	that	even	simply	asking	how	people	intend	to	vote	leads	to	an	increase	in	turnout	over	intention	alone.		If	a	statement	of	an	intention	to	vote	can	
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be	viewed	as	a	goal	intention	rather	than	an	implementation	intention,	then	the	obstacles	to	voting	are	not	considered	until	after	an	intention	is	formed.		The	effect	of	prompting	implementation	scenarios	may	be	partly	due	to	the	self-erasing	nature	of	errors	of	prediction	(Sherman	1980),	which	would	also	apply	to	self-predictions	like	pledges	to	vote	(Burgess	et	al.	2000).		However,	it	seems	likely	that	at	least	part	of	the	effect	of	implementation	consideration	is	through	the	forming	of	plans	that	prompt	specific	actions	in	response	to	particular	circumstances	(Gollwitzer	&	Brandstatter	1997).	Other	evidence	that	suggests	that	the	statement	“I	intend	to	vote”	is	a	goal	intention	devoid	of	implementation	considerations	comes	from	the	literature	comparing	intention	to	vote	to	reported	or	validated	votes.		First,	many	people	who	say	they	intend	to	vote	do	not	follow	through	with	the	behavior	of	voting	(Achen	&	Blais	2010;	Glaser	1958).		This	implies	that	they	did	not	fully	consider	the	factors	that	could	make	the	act	costly	to	them	when	stating	their	intention.		Additionally,	researchers	have	found	that	different	characteristics	of	voters	influence	intention	differently	from	actual	voting	(Achen	&	Blais	2010).		For	example,	political	interest	and	a	sense	of	civic	duty	are	more	closely	correlated	with	intention	than	with	the	act	of	voting.		In	the	rational	utility	model	of	voting,	these	variables	fall	on	the	“benefit”	side	of	the	equation	rather	than	the	“cost”	term.		This	implies	that	there	are	some	factors	that	intervene	in	the	actualization	of	the	intention	to	vote,	which	are	likely	related	to	the	costs	of	voting.			Achen	and	Blais’s	(2010)	findings	suggest	that	only	the	“benefits”	of	voting,	whether	they	come	from	social	rewards,	psychological	benefits,	or	expected	policy	outcomes,	lead	to	the	goal	intention	of	voting.		Some	people	have	this	intention	due	to	the	habit	of	performing	this	action	many	times	in	the	past	(Aldrich,	Montgomery,	&	Wood	2011;	Gerber,	Green,	&	Shachar	2003).		Others	develop	the	intention	from	interacting	with	their	friends	and	coworkers	in	their	social	networks	who	subtly	or	directly	pressure	them	to	vote	as	well	(Gerber	et	al.	2015;	McClurg	2003).		Still	other	people	are	activated	and	mobilized	by	campaigns	through	advertisements	and	political	messaging	(Huber	&	Arceneaux	2007)	or	directly	through	canvassing	or	
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other	forms	of	contact	(Arceneaux	&	Nickerson	2009).		Regardless	of	the	process	that	led	them	to	this	point,	they	all	develop	the	goal	of	voting	and	its	attendant	intention	to	achieve	the	goal.	
III.	ii.	Theory	and	Hypotheses	According	to	the	psychological	literature	on	intention,	people	develop	the	goal	intention	for	an	action	prior	to	considering	how	to	actually	perform	this	action	in	specific	detail.		After	the	goal	is	formed,	they	consider	how	to	implement	this	intention	via	the	opportunities	available	to	them.		This	suggests	that	the	goal	intention	of	voting	is	formed	independently	and	causally	prior	to	the	voters	considering	the	costs	associated	with	casting	a	ballot.		When	the	literature	on	creating	voting	plans	(aka	implementation	intentions)	is	considered	together	with	Achen	and	Blais’s	(2010)	findings	about	which	factors	affect	intention,	one	implication	becomes	clear:	reporting	intention	to	vote	may	merely	reflect	a	vague	goal	intention	rather	than	a	carefully	planned	implementation	intention.		If	implementation	intention	is	the	stage	at	which	costs	enter	the	decision	whether	or	not	to	vote	by	being	seen	as	obstacles	or	behavioral	“control,”	this	implies	that	vote	intention	should	not	reflect	the	costs	of	voting.		This	implication	of	the	behavioral	theories	and	these	findings	is	the	motivation	for	the	following	sub-section	and	my	first	hypothesis	for	this	section:	
11:	The	costs	of	voting	should	not	significantly	decrease	the	likelihood	of	reporting	an	
intention	to	vote.	On	the	other	hand,	it	is	possible	that	the	intentions	reported	in	my	survey	are	not	vague	goal	intentions,	but	rather	well-defined	“implementation	intentions”	to	use	the	language	of	Gollwitzer	(1993).		In	the	theory	of	reasoned	action,	these	types	of	intentions	are	shaped	by	“actual	control”	as	well	as	the	prior	goal	intention.		Factors	that	shape	“actual	control”	are	environmental	factors	as	well	as	skills	and	abilities	of	the	person	(Fishbein	&	Ajzen	2015).		These	factors	share	much	similarity	to	the	factors	that	I	describe	in	Chapter	1	in	regards	to	what	shapes	the	costs	of	voting.		This	suggests	that	if	my	survey	respondents	were	reporting	
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“implementation	intentions”	that	already	incorporated	factors	of	control,	they	may	have	already	considered	the	costs	of	voting	and	reported	intention	accordingly.		Those	who	face	high	costs	of	voting	may	consider	that	they	have	little	control	over	performing	the	behavior,	and	therefore	would	not	report	an	intention	to	vote.		Since	my	survey	was	fielded	in	the	last	4	days	prior	to	Election	Day,	it	is	possible	that	many	respondents	considered	these	costs	or	“actual	control”	and	reported	their	intentions	after	already	considering	these	factors.		This	leads	to	a	second	hypothesis	that	is	directly	counter	to	Hypothesis	11:	
12:	Those	who	report	higher	costs	of	voting	should	be	less	likely	to	report	an	intention	
to	vote.	
III.	iii.	Statistical	Models	Testing	the	effects	of	the	costs	of	voting	on	vote	intention,	at	least	to	extent	possible	with	my	dataset,	is	a	fairly	straightforward	process.		Similar	to	the	earlier	analysis	on	the	effects	of	voting	costs	on	validated	voter	turnout,	I	employ	logistic	regressions	of	vote	intention,	where	1	=	“I	intend	to	vote”	and	0	=	”otherwise,”	including	if	the	respondent	replied	with	“maybe”	or	“I	don’t	know.”		I	first	regress	the	general	perceived	cost	of	voting	on	intention	to	see	this	bivariate	relationship,	and	then	I	use	the	three	perceived	task	costs	to	see	which	of	the	tasks,	if	any,	shapes	self-reported	intention	to	vote.		Table	46	shows	the	results	of	these	models.		It	is	clear	from	Model	1	that	the	respondents	in	my	survey	were	significantly	less	likely	to	report	intending	to	vote	if	they	reported	higher	overall	costs	of	voting.		This	relationship	is	not	just	highly	statistically	significant,	but	also	substantively	meaningful.		Moving	from	a	2	(“fairly	easy”)	to	a	3	(“fairly	difficult”)	on	the	difficulty/cost	measure	decreases	one’s	likelihood	of	voting	by	.197,	which	is	a	considerable	effect!		This	is	strong	evidence	against	the	null	effect	prediction	of	Hypothesis	11	and	in	favor	of	the	rival	Hypothesis	12.				
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Table	46:	Impact	of	the	Costs	of	Voting	on	Vote	Intention	
Intention to Vote in the 
2016 Election 
Model 1 Model 2 
Overall difficulty of voting -1.201*** 
(0.210) 
 
Finding out where to vote  -0.200 
(0.182) 
Traveling to the polling 
place 
 -0.238 
(0.287) 
Finding time to vote  -1.195*** 
(0.286) 
Constant 5.548*** 
(0.541) 
6.502*** 
(0.634) 
Pseudo R-squared .121 .192 
Observations 740 745 Note:	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.		t	p	<	0.1;	*	p	<	0.05;	**	p	<	0.01;	***	p	<	0.001		Model	2	in	Table	46	shows	that	the	relationship	between	overall	costs	of	voting	and	vote	intention	is	being	driven	almost	entirely	by	one	task	of	voting:	finding	time	to	vote.		While	the	perceived	costs	of	traveling	to	the	polls	and	finding	the	polls	were	completely	statistically	insignificant,	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	has	a	highly	significant	and	substantively	large	relationship	with	vote	intention.		Moving	from	a	2	(“fairly	easy”)	to	a	3	(“fairly	difficult”)	on	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	(while	the	other	costs	are	held	at	3)	decreases	one’s	likelihood	of	voting	by	.110.	 While	Model	2	provides	suggestive	evidence	that	finding	time	to	vote	is	the	only	task	that	affects	vote	intention,	this	model	may	be	hiding	relationships	between	the	other	task	costs	and	intention.		Since	the	model	includes	all	three	task	costs,	and	they	are	all	correlated	with	each	other,	the	presence	of	all	three	in	the	model	may	be	hiding	bivariate	relationships	between	the	costs	and	intention	to	vote.	
112		
	
Table	47:	Bivariate	Relationships	between	Costs	and	Vote	Intention	
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Locating Polling 
Place 
-0.739*** 
(0.144) 
  
Traveling to the 
Polls 
 -1.115*** 
(0.202) 
 
Finding Time to 
Vote 
  -1.513*** 
(0.215) 
Constant 4.514*** 
(0.389) 
4.938*** 
(0.439) 
6.422*** 
(0.604) 
Psuedo R-
squared 
.089 .100 .202 
Observations 757 757 758 Note:	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.		t	p	<	0.1;	*	p	<	0.05;	**	p	<	0.01;	***	p	<	0.001		 Table	47	shows	the	results	of	bivariate	logistic	regressions	of	the	three	task	costs	separately	on	intention	to	vote.		When	the	task	costs	are	regressed	on	intention	separately,	they	all	show	highly	significant	relationships	with	vote	intention.		However,	the	strongest	relationship	is	between	finding	time	to	vote	and	intention,	and	finding	time	to	vote	explains	twice	the	amount	of	variance	in	vote	intention	as	the	other	measures.	
III.	iv.	Implications	of	Findings	on	Costs	and	Vote	Intention		What	can	be	concluded	from	this	analysis?		First,	vote	intention	as	measured	in	my	survey	is	definitely	affected	by	the	costs	of	voting,	as	shown	by	all	five	models	in	both	tables.		This	is	clear	evidence	against	Hypothesis	11	and	in	favor	of	Hypothesis	12,	but	this	conclusion	should	be	limited	to	the	context	of	this	survey.		The	survey	was	fielded	only	a	week	prior	to	Election	Day,	with	some	people	completing	it	the	day	before	voting.		This	means	that	my	measure	of	vote	intention	is	very	proximate	to	the	action	itself,	which	by	the	reasoned	action	model	makes	it	more	likely	to	reflect	factors	that	influence	“actual	control”	over	the	action	(Fishbein	
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&	Ajzen	2015).		In	the	pathway	from	goals	to	intentions	to	actions,	the	point	at	which	actual	control	factors	are	being	considered	is	when	planning	occurs.		In	the	terms	of	Gollwitzer	(1993),	the	reported	intention	should	be	considered	an	“implementation	intention”	since	the	respondents	had	already	considered	control	factors	and	made	plans	accordingly.		Essentially	the	finding	of	support	for	Hypothesis	12	means	that	the	respondents	to	my	survey	were	reporting	intentions	that	were	already	thoroughly	considered.		At	least	to	some	extent,	they	had	planned	how	they	would	vote	and	considered	the	behavioral	control	factors	that	might	present	as	obstacles	to	them	fulfilling	their	intentions.		This	relationship	between	costs	and	intention	may	only	be	present	later	in	the	election	season	when	people	have	begun	to	plan	how	and	when	they	will	vote.		If	I	had	conducted	this	survey	much	earlier	in	the	campaign	season,	this	relationship	may	not	exist	to	the	same	degree.		Therefore,	we	cannot	conclude	that	voting	intention	always	reflects	the	costs	of	voting.		We	can,	however,	conclude	that	vote	intentions	measured	proximately	to	the	voting	period	will	be	influenced	by	these	costs,	suggesting	voters	consider	these	costs	as	they	plan	their	actions	for	Election	Day.	This	finding	also	suggests	a	way	in	which	the	reasoned	action	approach	can	be	connected	with	the	rational	utility	model.		The	“actual	control”	factors	are	analogous	to	the	costs	of	voting	in	that	to	the	individual	voter,	a	cost	that	is	too	high	(like	losing	one’s	job	to	go	vote)	can	appear	to	be	an	insurmountable	obstacle	that	prevents	“actual	control”	over	an	action.		As	the	trade-offs	associated	with	tasks	increase,	people	reach	a	point	at	which	the	costs	appear	to	prevent	their	control	over	taking	the	action	they	intended	to	take.		While	this	is	not	the	same	decision-making	logic	as	weighing	costs	vs.	benefits,	the	predictions	of	both	theories	would	be	equivalent.	Regarding	the	relationships	between	the	different	task	costs	and	vote	intention,	it	appears	that	voters	primarily	think	about	the	difficulty	of	finding	time	to	vote	when	they	report	whether	or	not	they	intend	to	vote.		While	all	three	task	
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costs	show	significant	correlations	with	intention	in	bivariate	regressions,	this	may	merely	be	a	result	of	the	correlation	between	the	three	task	costs.		It	is	unclear	whether	voters	consider	the	costs	of	finding	and	traveling	to	the	polls	when	reporting	vote	intention	since	these	relationships	are	only	present	when	the	other	costs	are	not	controlled	for.	
IV.	Overall	Conclusions	and	Implications	In	Chapter	1,	I	developed	a	new	conceptualization	of	the	costs	of	voting	that	depends	on	the	tasks	people	must	complete	to	vote	and	their	attendant	individual-specific	trade-offs.		While	the	tasks	are	shaped	by	environment	the	voter	is	situated	in,	including	election	administration	and	geography,	the	trade-offs	are	largely	shaped	by	individual	life	circumstances	and	personal	factors.		This	theory	moves	the	literature	on	the	costs	of	voting	forward	in	that	it	incorporates	the	economic	concept	of	opportunity	costs	and	considers	that	the	costs	of	voting	vary	as	much	from	personal	circumstances	as	they	do	from	the	tasks	that	must	be	completed.			In	Chapter	2,	I	created	a	unique	survey	to	measure	these	voting	costs	for	registered	voters	in	Pennsylvania	and	connect	them	to	vote	intention	and	validated	voter	turnout.		While	this	survey	sampling	shows	some	biases	toward	more	educated	and	more	frequent	voters,	there	is	considerable	variation	on	socio-economic	measures	and	life	circumstances	like	having	children.		This	survey	is	the	first	survey	in	the	political	science	literature	to	measure	all	three	task	costs	and	the	factors	that	influence	each	task,	and	is	also	the	first	in	the	United	States	to	connect	survey	measures	of	costs	to	validated	voter	turnout	information.		This	chapter	also	demonstrated	that	the	task	cost	most	often	reported	as	high	is	the	difficulty	of	finding	time	to	vote,	for	which	around	15%	of	respondents	reported	difficulty.	In	Chapter	3,	I	demonstrated	that	the	survey	responses	on	the	costs	of	voting	largely	reflect	my	hypothesized	structure	of	voting	costs,	in	which	overall	costs	are	shaped	by	the	three	task	costs	of	finding	time	to	vote,	locating	the	polls,	and	traveling	to	the	polling	place.		I	also	showed	how	self-reported	perceived	costs	for	each	task	area	accurately	reflect	objectively	measureable	factors	that	should	
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influence	the	costs	of	each	task.		The	finding	that	perceived	costs	largely	reflect	objective	factors	shows	that	voters	are	aware	of	the	costs	they	face	and	are	reporting	answers	consistent	with	these	costs	rather	than	based	on	a	social	desirability	bias	or	internal	motivation	to	vote.		While	some	have	pointed	out	a	concern	that	respondents	might	report	higher	perceived	difficulty	as	an	excuse	for	their	not	voting	(even	though	their	costs	are	actually	low),	the	finding	that	perceived	costs	correspond	to	objective	factors	is	evidence	against	this	problem.		This	finding	is	important	for	future	studies	on	the	costs	of	voting	because	surveys	can	efficiently	measure	the	costs	of	each	task	through	only	three	or	four	perceived	difficulty	questions.		Chapter	3	also	shows	that	the	costs	of	voting	are	mostly	distinct	from	the	usual	measures	of	socio-economic	status	(SES):	income	and	education.		Although	there	is	some	correlation	between	homeownership	and	costs,	likely	due	to	residential	stability,	this	correlation	explains	little	of	the	variance	in	the	costs.		This	means	that	when	voting	policies	are	enacted	that	reduce	costs,	they	may	end	up	mobilizing	medium-	or	high-SES	voters	instead	of	just	low-SES	voters	since	costs	may	be	high	even	for	a	middle-class	educated	person.		It	also	suggests	that	the	resource	theory	is	far	from	a	complete	explanation	for	how	SES	affects	participation.		Since	SES	does	not	affect	costs	very	much,	the	other	pathways	between	SES	and	participation	should	be	explored	further	to	see	how	SES	shapes	the	benefits	of	voting,	childhood	socialization	into	participation,	and	neighborhood	mobilization.		I	plan	to	explore	these	mechanisms	connecting	SES	to	participation	in	future	studies.	In	this	final	chapter	I	demonstrated	how	the	costs	of	voting	affect	both	validated	voter	turnout	and	self-reported	intention	to	vote.		The	correlation	between	the	task	costs	makes	it	difficult	to	specify	the	exact	impact	of	the	costs	on	voting,	but	it	is	clear	that	the	costs	of	voting	substantially	decrease	the	probability	of	voting.		Although	some	of	the	literature	on	vote	intention	would	suggest	that	self-reported	intention	may	not	incorporate	voting	costs,	my	survey	data	demonstrate	that	intention	to	vote	is	highly	influenced	by	the	costs	of	voting.		This	may	be	dependent	on	the	context	of	this	survey,	which	was	fielded	just	prior	to	Election	
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Day.		It	is	possible	that	intention	measured	weeks	or	months	before	the	voting	period	may	not	reflect	the	impact	of	these	costs	as	much,	as	voters	likely	make	their	voting	plans	as	Election	Day	approaches.		In	a	future	study,	I	plan	to	measure	voting	costs	and	vote	intention	at	different	time	points	prior	to	Election	Day.		This	would	allow	me	to	see	at	which	point	the	costs	of	voting	start	to	be	considered	by	potential	voters	and	suggest	when	voters	start	to	solidify	their	vote	intention	from	more	vague	goal	to	a	specific	implementation	intention.	Chapter	4	also	contains	some	interesting	findings	on	which	costs	of	voting	have	the	largest	impact	on	intention	and	validated	voting.		In	particular,	the	cost	of	traveling	to	the	polls	has	a	very	substantial	impact	on	the	likelihood	that	a	registered	voter	casts	a	ballot.		However,	this	effect	largely	disappears	when	the	other	costs	are	included	in	the	same	model,	and	locating	the	polls	and	finding	time	to	vote	have	larger	impacts	in	the	full	model	with	controls.		This	means	it	is	not	clear	how	much	impact	the	transportation	cost	has	on	the	probability	of	voting	by	itself.		Can	we	consider	the	impact	of	not	having	a	car	separately	from	the	circumstances	that	affect	the	other	costs	too,	like	working	a	low-paying	hourly	job?		It	is	not	clear	how	to	handle	the	cost	correlation,	but	it	is	interesting	that	different	task	costs	have	stronger	effects	on	behavior	than	on	intention.		For	intention	to	vote	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	has	the	largest	impact,	and	the	other	task	costs	only	have	significant	relationships	with	vote	intention	in	bivariate	relationships.	Taken	together,	these	findings	suggest	that	potential	voters	consider	different	factors	when	developing	an	intention	to	vote	vs.	when	they	actually	show	up	or	not.		Vote	intention	reflect	factors	that	shape	the	cost	of	finding	time	to	vote	like	taking	time	off	work	or	finding	childcare,	but	does	not	seem	to	reflect	transportation	or	poll-locating	difficulties	as	much.		However,	transportation	obstacles	may	have	a	very	large	effect	on	whether	a	voter	actually	shows	up	and	casts	a	ballot	even	if	they	were	not	considered	when	they	reported	a	vote	intention.		This	finding	means	that	intention	is	not	a	perfect	proxy	for	validated	voting	when	researchers	are	looking	at	the	impact	of	voting	costs	or	factors	that	shape	them,	such	as	election	laws.		It	also	means	that	while	voters	are	creating	implementation	
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plans	when	reporting	intention	(at	least	proximate	to	Election	Day),	they	may	not	consider	every	relevant	factor	or	cost.		Campaigns	seeking	to	increase	turnout	might	focus	on	helping	voters	develop	specific	plans	to	manage	their	transportation	to	and	from	the	polls	to	help	translate	vote	intention	into	actual	behavior.		In	a	future	study,	I	plan	to	see	how	inducing	implementation	intentions	through	prompting	potential	voters	to	make	plans	affects	each	of	these	task	costs	and	their	impacts	on	actual	turnout.		 	
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Appendix:	Survey	Questions		V1:	Do	you	intend	to	vote	in	the	upcoming	Presidential	election	in	November?	1. Yes	2. Maybe	3. No	4. I	don’t	know	5. I	already	voted		V2:	How	often	do	you	vote	in	local,	state,	and	national	elections?	1. More	than	once	a	year	2. At	least	once	a	year	3. At	least	once	every	two	years	4. At	least	once	every	four	years	5. Rarely	6. I’ve	never	voted	before	7. I	don’t	know		V3:	Do	you	like	to	go	vote	with	other	people	like	neighbors,	family,	friends,	or	coworkers?	Or	do	you	prefer	to	go	to	your	polling	place	by	yourself?	1. I	prefer	to	go	vote	with	others	2. I	prefer	to	go	vote	by	myself	3. I	don’t	know		V4:	When	you	go	to	your	polling	place	to	vote	do	you	usually	know	the	people	running	the	polls	or	waiting	to	vote?	Or	are	they	usually	strangers	to	you?	1. I	know	almost	everyone	where	I	vote	2. I	know	most	people	where	I	vote	3. I	know	some	people	where	I	vote,	but	not	most	4. I	know	a	few	people	where	I	vote	5. I	don’t	know	anyone	where	I	vote	6. I	don’t	know		V5:	Voting	often	can	be	difficult	or	inconvenient	for	people	because	it	requires	figuring	out	where	to	vote,	finding	time	to	vote,	travelling	to	the	polls,	and	waiting	in	line.	All	things	considered,	how	difficult	or	inconvenient	is	it	for	you	to	vote	in	a	typical	election?	1. Very	easy	/	convenient	2. Fairly	easy	/	convenient	3. Fairly	difficult	/	inconvenient	4. Very	difficult	/	inconvenient	5. I	don’t	know			 	
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V6:	How	difficult	is	it	for	you	to	figure	out	where	you	are	assigned	to	vote	in	this	Novembers	election?	In	other	words,	how	hard	is	it	to	find	out	where	your	neighborhood	polling	place	is?	1. I	already	know	where	I	go	to	vote	2. Very	easy	3. Fairly	easy	4. Fairly	difficult	5. Very	difficult	6. I	don’t	know		V7:	Where	do	you	expect	to	be	during	most	of	the	day	on	Tuesday,	November	8th	(Election	Day)?	1. At	home	2. At	work	3. At	school	4. Running	errands	5. Somewhere	else	6. I	don’t	know		V8:	If	you	vote	in	this	upcoming	election	on	Tuesday,	November	8,	how	long	do	you	expect	it	will	take	for	you	to	travel	to	your	polling	place	to	vote?	Think	about	where	you	would	be	during	the	day,	where	your	voting	location	is,	and	how	you	would	get	there.	If	you	don’t	know	where	your	polling	place	is,	assume	it	is	two	miles	away	from	your	home.	1. Less	than	10	minutes	2. 10	to	20	minutes	3. 20	to	30	minutes	4. 30	to	40	minutes	5. 40	to	50	minutes	6. 50	minutes	to	an	hour	7. 1	hour	to	2	hours	8. Over	2	hours	9. I	don’t	know		V9:	To	vote	in	Pennsylvania,	you	have	to	travel	to	your	assigned	neighborhood	polling	place	on	Election	Day	before	7:00	PM.	Considering	your	transportation	options	and	where	you	will	be	during	the	day	on	Tuesday,	how	difficult	is	it	for	you	to	travel	to	your	voting	location?	1. Very	easy	2. Fairly	easy	3. Fairly	difficult	4. Very	difficult	5. I	don’t	know			
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V10:	If	you	vote	in	this	election	on	November	8th,	how	long	do	you	expect	to	wait	in	line	at	your	polling	place?	1. Less	than	10	minutes	2. 10	to	20	minutes	3. 20	to	30	minutes	4. 30	to	40	minutes	5. 40	to	50	minutes	6. 50	minutes	to	an	hour	7. 1	hour	to	2	hours	8. 2	hours	to	3	hours	9. Over	3	hours	10.	I	don’t	know		V11:	Voting	requires	you	to	set	aside	some	time	to	travel	to	your	polling	place	and	wait	in	line.	How	difficult	is	it	for	you	to	find	time	to	vote	on	Election	Day?	1. Very	easy	2. Fairly	easy	3. Fairly	difficult	4. Very	difficult	5. I	don’t	know		V12:	Do	you	have	a	current	driver’s	license?	1. Yes	2. No	3. I	don’t	know		V13:	On	a	typical	Tuesday,	do	you	have	access	to	a	vehicle	you	can	drive?	1. Yes	2. No	3. I	don’t	know		V14:	Do	you	use	public	transportation	such	as	the	bus,	train,	or	subway	in	your	town	or	city?	1. Yes,	I	use	them	often	2. I	use	them	sometimes	3. I	have	used	them,	but	only	rarely	4. No,	I	have	never	used	these	services	5. I	don’t	know			 	
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V15:	From	where	you	are	during	the	day	on	a	typical	Tuesday,	how	difficult	is	it	for	you	to	use	public	transportation	(bus,	train,	subway,	etc.)	to	get	around	town?	1. Very	easy	2. Fairly	easy	3. Fairly	difficult	4. Very	difficult	5. I	don’t	know		V16:	Do	you	use	ride-sharing	services	like	Uber,	Lyft,	or	other	similar	services?	1. Yes,	I	use	them	often	2. I	use	them	sometimes	3. I	have	used	them,	but	only	rarely	4. No,	I	have	never	used	these	services	5. I	don’t	know		V17:	From	where	you	are	during	the	day	on	a	typical	Tuesday,	how	difficult	is	it	for	you	to	use	ride-sharing	services	like	Uber	and	Lyft	to	get	around	town?	1. Very	easy	2. Fairly	easy	3. Fairly	difficult	4. Very	difficult	5. I	don’t	know		V18:	What	is	your	employment	situation?	Are	you	currently	working	for	pay?	1. Yes,	I	have	a	job	at	the	moment	2. Yes,	but	I	am	temporarily	on	leave	3. No,	I	am	currently	unemployed	4. No,	I	am	disabled	or	retired	5. No,	I	am	currently	a	student	6. No,	I	am	a	homemaker	or	stay-at-home	parent	7. Other		V18o:	(Other	category	description)		V19:	How	many	hours	do	you	work	in	a	typical	week?	1. 35	to	45	hours	per	week	2. 45	of	more	hours	per	week	3. 20	to	35	hours	per	week	4. Other			 	
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V20:	Do	you	set	your	own	schedule	for	work?	Or	do	you	have	a	fixed	schedule	of	hours	you	must	be	at	work?	1. My	schedule	is	fixed	and	I	can’t	easily	change	it	2. Part	of	my	schedule	is	fixed,	and	I	set	the	rest	3. I	set	my	own	schedule	4. My	schedule	depends	on	the	week	5. Other		V21:	On	a	typical	Tuesday	what	times	of	the	day	are	you	usually	working?	Please	check	all	that	apply.		 V21m:	(mornings)	.	/	1		 V21a:	(afternoons)	.	/	1		V21e:	(evenings)	.	/	1		V21n:	(nighttime)	.	/	1		V21le:	(late	nights/early	mornings)	.	/	1		V21na:	(none)	.	/	1		V21d:	(it	depends	on	the	week)	.	/	1		V22:	Sometimes	people	need	to	take	off	work	for	a	few	hours	for	reasons	like	a	family	emergency,	a	doctor’s	visit,	or	running	important	errands.	In	general,	how	difficult	is	it	for	you	to	leave	work	for	a	few	hours?	1. Very	easy	2. Fairly	easy	3. Fairly	difficult	4. Very	difficult	5. I	don’t	know			 	
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V23:	Consider	a	situation	where	you	need	to	leave	work	for	a	couple	hours	during	your	normal	working	hours.	This	could	be	for	something	like	a	family	emergency,	doctor’s	appointment,	or	an	important	errand.	Would	you	still	be	paid	for	the	time	you	are	gone?	Or	would	you	not	be	paid	for	this	time?	1. I	would	still	be	paid	when	gone	from	work	for	a	couple	hours	2. I	would	not	be	paid	when	I’m	not	at	work	for	any	reason	3. It	depends	on	the	situation	4. I	don’t	know		V24:	Do	you	currently	attend	college	graduate	school	or	any	classes?	Please	choose	the	category	that	most	applies	to	you.	1. I	am	a	high	school	student	2. I	am	a	full-time	college	student	3. I	am	a	part-time	college	student	4. I	am	a	full-time	graduate	student	5. I	am	a	part-time	graduate	student	6. No,	I	am	not	currently	a	student	7. Other	__________		V24o:	(other	description)		V25:	On	a	typical	Tuesday,	do	you	have	classes,	labs,	or	other	required	school	activities?	1. Yes,	most	of	the	day	2. Yes,	part	of	the	day	3. Yes,	only	at	night	(after	7	PM)	4. No	5. Other		V26:	Sometimes	people	need	to	miss	school	due	to	things	like	a	family	emergency,	a	doctor’s	visit,	or	running	important	errands.	In	general,	how	difficult	is	it	for	you	to	miss	school	for	a	few	hours?	1. Very	easy	2. Fairly	easy	3. Fairly	difficult	4. Very	difficult	5. I	don’t	know		V27:	Do	you	currently	take	care	of	children	or	other	dependents?	1. Yes,	I	take	care	of	children	2. Yes,	I	am	a	caretaker	3. Yes,	I	am	a	nanny	4. Sometimes	5. No		
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V28:	During	the	day	on	a	typical	Tuesday,	are	you	taking	care	of	children	or	other	dependents?	1. Yes,	all	of	the	day	2. Yes,	part	of	the	day	3. No	4. It	depends	on	the	week		V29:	Sometimes	people	need	to	leave	their	children	or	dependents	with	a	caretaker	or	babysitter	for	a	few	hours	for	things	like	a	family	emergency,	a	doctor’s	visit,	or	running	important	errands.	In	general,	how	difficult	is	it	for	you	to	have	someone	else	watch	your	children	or	dependents	for	a	few	hours?	1. Very	easy	2. Fairly	easy	3. Fairly	difficult	4. Very	difficult	5. I	don’t	know		V30:	Some	people	hate	waiting	in	long	lines,	while	others	don’t	mind	it	much.	On	a	scale	from	1	to	5	how	much	do	you	dislike	waiting	in	lines?	1. (I	don’t	mind	waiting	in	line	at	all)	2. 		3. 		4. 		5. (I	really	hate	waiting	in	line)	6. I	don’t	know		V31:	Visiting	a	government	office	like	the	Dept.	of	Motor	Vehicles	(DMV)	can	be	difficult	or	inconvenient	for	people	because	it	requires	locating	the	office,	traveling	there,	and	waiting	in	line.	All	things	considered,	how	difficult	or	inconvenient	is	it	for	you	to	visit	a	government	office	like	the	DMV?	1. Very	easy	/	convenient	2. Fairly	easy	/	convenient	3. Fairly	difficult	/	inconvenient	4. Very	difficult	/	inconvenient	5. I	don’t	know		V32:	Imagine	for	a	moment	you	need	to	visit	the	Dept.	of	Motor	Vehicles	(DMV)	to	get	a	new	drivers	license.		If	you	could	pay	someone	to	wait	in	line	and	get	the	license	for	you	how	much	money	(in	$)	would	you	offer	them?		Assume	that	this	activity	takes	two	hours.	$_________			 	
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V33:	What	is	the	highest	level	of	education	you	have	completed	or	the	highest	degree	you	have	received?	1. Less	than	9th	grade	2. 10th	grade	3. 11th	grade	4. 12th	grade,	no	HS	diploma	5. High	School	graduate	or	equivalent	(GED,	etc.)	6. Some	college,	no	degree	7. Associate	degree	8. Bachelor’s	degree	(BA,	BS,	AB,	etc.)	9. Master’s	degree	(MA,	MS,	MBA,	etc.)	10.	Professional	School	(MD,	DDS,	LLB,	JD,	etc.)	11.	Doctoral	Degree	(PhD,	EdD,	D.	Phil.,	etc.)		V34:	Which	of	the	following	best	describes	where	you	currently	live?	1. I	own	my	home	2. I	rent	my	home	3. I	live	in	a	dorm	or	other	community	housing	4. I	live	with	my	parents	or	other	family	in	their	home	5. I	live	in	an	assisted	care	facility	or	nursing	home	6. Other		V35:	Which	of	the	following	racial	and/or	ethnic	categories	would	you	use	to	describe	yourself?	Please	check	all	that	apply.		 V35w:	(White,	Anglo,	or	Caucasian)	.	/	1		 V35b:	(Black	or	African	American)	.	/	1		 V35h:	(Hispanic	or	Latino)	.	/	1		V35a:	(Asian	or	Pacific	Islander)	.	/	1		V35i:	(Native	American,	American	Indian,	or	Alaskan	Native)	.	/	1		V35o:	(Other)	.	/	1			 	
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V36:	How	many	children	under	the	age	of	12	live	in	your	household?	1. No	children	2. One	child	3. Two	children	4. Three	children	5. Four	children	6. More	than	four	children		V37:	How	many	children	between	the	ages	of	12	and	18	live	in	your	household?	1. No	children	2. One	child	3. Two	children	4. Three	children	5. Four	children	6. More	than	four	children		V38:	What	is	your	approximate	yearly	household	income?	Your	answers	will	be	kept	confidential.	1. Less	than	$10,000	2. $10,000	to	$30,000	3. $30,000	to	$50,000	4. $50,000	to	$70,000	5. $70,000	to	$90,000	6. $90,000	to	$120,000	7. $120,000	to	$150,000	8. $150,000	to	$180,000	9. $180,000	to	$210,000	10.	Above	$210,000	11.	I	don’t	know	12.	I	prefer	not	to	answer		
